2b3ea8bdef
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEZH8oZUiU471FcZm+ONu9yGCSaT4FAmVbOmsACgkQONu9yGCS aT5m1RAAx7hgbFDnLHCGh4YVBbNy8JngItsUBaJcI/67Mk5toNi0x8pqcS8mq7ED GTwRnRcKaIR2bTyco5Ed2OZn4jMCyHC4oiyBZnHWg6AMuQjSCYzIgm7DzlTCVYZ7 2r8uRbt/uXADTILJ2kwR2mtVpGcwrXa+lsHrMqvt+MvNwRoSVHBHVVYCrAc+JXwR GXCopzV/RFGS6w4SBsX0K+8pV7GO+bhpxJ1lPz1T/xeLYfT4C3EwSTWDbUXPbez7 IpJ+5yKJXXT9Xn9m/pekwZ/aOirLqtEbDxneEctsjvw140lCoQiEZn6ZRscgNEns 3H+J3Asgc2zXqPzfZFH02TebPj31B8HZ43Upu0okr0hr4A4/4JL9pjXEhm1bON/Z x3jlTF4dyay4vOGGIEYOAuJSUbn6AqpZ318uBWCd3BSPocihEDMJz2aoazVHcb6k 83MVxfFfEL6s9utcoSXB8VjHa4FQmpMYsozegloUSJJCsizgdzmih0buJYhBB9sI HbEohW+YAh3cACSn6arXUJIMH5F5xsfD89od2Pj+6UrapdlPz5gCaggA1RZplCho bjGc1k61Rp2qSdfMEcx+h4ypgoOdhgqZI0YhYDCgBSRcWOXnGrDjFvnnumatcT+H 6vqyX6zlNt6U1NpE56Jtf7gt1Ds6PeoadD0L6B8vjXrkdeXOlUU= =AZ9s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge 6.1.63 into android14-6.1-lts Changes in 6.1.63 hwmon: (nct6775) Fix incorrect variable reuse in fan_div calculation sched/fair: Fix cfs_rq_is_decayed() on !SMP iov_iter, x86: Be consistent about the __user tag on copy_mc_to_user() sched/uclamp: Set max_spare_cap_cpu even if max_spare_cap is 0 sched/uclamp: Ignore (util == 0) optimization in feec() when p_util_max = 0 objtool: Propagate early errors sched: Fix stop_one_cpu_nowait() vs hotplug vfs: fix readahead(2) on block devices writeback, cgroup: switch inodes with dirty timestamps to release dying cgwbs x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for (possible) future fixed HW futex: Don't include process MM in futex key on no-MMU x86/numa: Introduce numa_fill_memblks() ACPI/NUMA: Apply SRAT proximity domain to entire CFMWS window x86/sev-es: Allow copy_from_kernel_nofault() in earlier boot x86/boot: Fix incorrect startup_gdt_descr.size drivers/clocksource/timer-ti-dm: Don't call clk_get_rate() in stop function pstore/platform: Add check for kstrdup string: Adjust strtomem() logic to allow for smaller sources genirq/matrix: Exclude managed interrupts in irq_matrix_allocated() wifi: cfg80211: add flush functions for wiphy work wifi: mac80211: move radar detect work to wiphy work wifi: mac80211: move scan work to wiphy work wifi: mac80211: move offchannel works to wiphy work wifi: mac80211: move sched-scan stop work to wiphy work wifi: mac80211: fix # of MSDU in A-MSDU calculation wifi: iwlwifi: honor the enable_ini value i40e: fix potential memory leaks in i40e_remove() iavf: Fix promiscuous mode configuration flow messages selftests/bpf: Correct map_fd to data_fd in tailcalls udp: add missing WRITE_ONCE() around up->encap_rcv tcp: call tcp_try_undo_recovery when an RTOd TFO SYNACK is ACKed gve: Use size_add() in call to struct_size() mlxsw: Use size_mul() in call to struct_size() tls: Only use data field in crypto completion function tls: Use size_add() in call to struct_size() tipc: Use size_add() in calls to struct_size() net: spider_net: Use size_add() in call to struct_size() net: ethernet: mtk_wed: fix EXT_INT_STATUS_RX_FBUF definitions for MT7986 SoC wifi: rtw88: debug: Fix the NULL vs IS_ERR() bug for debugfs_create_file() wifi: ath11k: fix boot failure with one MSI vector wifi: mt76: mt7603: rework/fix rx pse hang check wifi: mt76: mt7603: improve watchdog reset reliablity wifi: mt76: mt7603: improve stuck beacon handling wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix beamforming availability check wifi: ath: dfs_pattern_detector: Fix a memory initialization issue tcp_metrics: add missing barriers on delete tcp_metrics: properly set tp->snd_ssthresh in tcp_init_metrics() tcp_metrics: do not create an entry from tcp_init_metrics() wifi: rtlwifi: fix EDCA limit set by BT coexistence ACPI: property: Allow _DSD buffer data only for byte accessors ACPI: video: Add acpi_backlight=vendor quirk for Toshiba Portégé R100 wifi: ath11k: fix Tx power value during active CAC can: dev: can_restart(): don't crash kernel if carrier is OK can: dev: can_restart(): fix race condition between controller restart and netif_carrier_on() can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): don't crash kernel if can_priv::echo_skb is accessed out of bounds PM / devfreq: rockchip-dfi: Make pmu regmap mandatory wifi: wfx: fix case where rates are out of order netfilter: nf_tables: Drop pointless memset when dumping rules thermal: core: prevent potential string overflow r8169: use tp_to_dev instead of open code r8169: fix rare issue with broken rx after link-down on RTL8125 selftests: netfilter: test for sctp collision processing in nf_conntrack net: skb_find_text: Ignore patterns extending past 'to' chtls: fix tp->rcv_tstamp initialization tcp: fix cookie_init_timestamp() overflows wifi: iwlwifi: call napi_synchronize() before freeing rx/tx queues wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: synchronize IRQs before NAPI wifi: iwlwifi: empty overflow queue during flush Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix Opcode prints in bt_dev_dbg/err bpf: Fix unnecessary -EBUSY from htab_lock_bucket ACPI: sysfs: Fix create_pnp_modalias() and create_of_modalias() ipv6: avoid atomic fragment on GSO packets net: add DEV_STATS_READ() helper ipvlan: properly track tx_errors regmap: debugfs: Fix a erroneous check after snprintf() spi: tegra: Fix missing IRQ check in tegra_slink_probe() clk: qcom: gcc-msm8996: Remove RPM bus clocks clk: qcom: clk-rcg2: Fix clock rate overflow for high parent frequencies clk: qcom: mmcc-msm8998: Don't check halt bit on some branch clks clk: qcom: mmcc-msm8998: Fix the SMMU GDSC clk: qcom: gcc-sm8150: Fix gcc_sdcc2_apps_clk_src regulator: mt6358: Fail probe on unknown chip ID clk: imx: Select MXC_CLK for CLK_IMX8QXP clk: imx: imx8mq: correct error handling path clk: imx: imx8qxp: Fix elcdif_pll clock clk: renesas: rcar-gen3: Extend SDnH divider table clk: renesas: rzg2l: Wait for status bit of SD mux before continuing clk: renesas: rzg2l: Lock around writes to mux register clk: renesas: rzg2l: Trust value returned by hardware clk: renesas: rzg2l: Use FIELD_GET() for PLL register fields clk: renesas: rzg2l: Fix computation formula clk: linux/clk-provider.h: fix kernel-doc warnings and typos spi: nxp-fspi: use the correct ioremap function clk: keystone: pll: fix a couple NULL vs IS_ERR() checks clk: ti: change ti_clk_register[_omap_hw]() API clk: ti: fix double free in of_ti_divider_clk_setup() clk: npcm7xx: Fix incorrect kfree clk: mediatek: clk-mt6765: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: mediatek: clk-mt6779: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: mediatek: clk-mt6797: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: mediatek: clk-mt7629-eth: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: mediatek: clk-mt7629: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: mediatek: clk-mt2701: Add check for mtk_alloc_clk_data clk: qcom: config IPQ_APSS_6018 should depend on QCOM_SMEM platform/x86: wmi: Fix probe failure when failing to register WMI devices platform/x86: wmi: Fix opening of char device hwmon: (axi-fan-control) Fix possible NULL pointer dereference hwmon: (coretemp) Fix potentially truncated sysfs attribute name Revert "hwmon: (sch56xx-common) Add DMI override table" Revert "hwmon: (sch56xx-common) Add automatic module loading on supported devices" hwmon: (sch5627) Use bit macros when accessing the control register hwmon: (sch5627) Disallow write access if virtual registers are locked hte: tegra: Fix missing error code in tegra_hte_test_probe() drm/rockchip: vop: Fix reset of state in duplicate state crtc funcs drm/rockchip: vop: Fix call to crtc reset helper drm/rockchip: vop2: Don't crash for invalid duplicate_state drm/rockchip: vop2: Add missing call to crtc reset helper drm/radeon: possible buffer overflow drm: bridge: it66121: Fix invalid connector dereference drm/bridge: lt8912b: Add hot plug detection drm/bridge: lt8912b: Fix bridge_detach drm/bridge: lt8912b: Fix crash on bridge detach drm/bridge: lt8912b: Manually disable HPD only if it was enabled drm/bridge: lt8912b: Add missing drm_bridge_attach call drm/bridge: tc358768: Fix use of uninitialized variable drm/bridge: tc358768: Fix bit updates drm/bridge: tc358768: remove unused variable drm/bridge: tc358768: Use struct videomode drm/bridge: tc358768: Print logical values, not raw register values drm/bridge: tc358768: Use dev for dbg prints, not priv->dev drm/bridge: tc358768: Rename dsibclk to hsbyteclk drm/bridge: tc358768: Clean up clock period code drm/bridge: tc358768: Fix tc358768_ns_to_cnt() drm/amdkfd: fix some race conditions in vram buffer alloc/free of svm code drm/amd/display: Check all enabled planes in dm_check_crtc_cursor drm/amd/display: Refactor dm_get_plane_scale helper drm/amd/display: Bail from dm_check_crtc_cursor if no relevant change io_uring/kbuf: Fix check of BID wrapping in provided buffers io_uring/kbuf: Allow the full buffer id space for provided buffers drm/mediatek: Fix iommu fault by swapping FBs after updating plane state drm/mediatek: Fix iommu fault during crtc enabling drm/rockchip: cdn-dp: Fix some error handling paths in cdn_dp_probe() gpu: host1x: Correct allocated size for contexts drm/bridge: lt9611uxc: fix the race in the error path arm64/arm: xen: enlighten: Fix KPTI checks drm/rockchip: Fix type promotion bug in rockchip_gem_iommu_map() xenbus: fix error exit in xenbus_init() xen-pciback: Consider INTx disabled when MSI/MSI-X is enabled drm/msm/dsi: use msm_gem_kernel_put to free TX buffer drm/msm/dsi: free TX buffer in unbind clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: limit XGene-1 workaround drm: mediatek: mtk_dsi: Fix NO_EOT_PACKET settings/handling drivers/perf: hisi: use cpuhp_state_remove_instance_nocalls() for hisi_hns3_pmu uninit process perf/arm-cmn: Revamp model detection perf/arm-cmn: Fix DTC domain detection drivers/perf: hisi_pcie: Check the type first in pmu::event_init() perf: hisi: Fix use-after-free when register pmu fails ARM: dts: renesas: blanche: Fix typo in GP_11_2 pin name arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845: cheza doesn't support LMh node arm64: dts: qcom: sc7280: link usb3_phy_wrapper_gcc_usb30_pipe_clk arm64: dts: qcom: msm8916: Fix iommu local address range arm64: dts: qcom: msm8992-libra: drop duplicated reserved memory arm64: dts: qcom: sc7280: Add missing LMH interrupts arm64: dts: qcom: sm8150: add ref clock to PCIe PHYs arm64: dts: qcom: sm8350: fix pinctrl for UART18 arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845-mtp: fix WiFi configuration ARM64: dts: marvell: cn9310: Use appropriate label for spi1 pins arm64: dts: qcom: apq8016-sbc: Add missing ADV7533 regulators ARM: dts: qcom: mdm9615: populate vsdcc fixed regulator soc: qcom: llcc: Handle a second device without data corruption kunit: Fix missed memory release in kunit_free_suite_set() firmware: ti_sci: Mark driver as non removable arm64: dts: ti: k3-am62a7-sk: Drop i2c-1 to 100Khz firmware: arm_ffa: Assign the missing IDR allocation ID to the FFA device firmware: arm_ffa: Allow the FF-A drivers to use 32bit mode of messaging ARM: dts: am3517-evm: Fix LED3/4 pinmux clk: scmi: Free scmi_clk allocated when the clocks with invalid info are skipped arm64: dts: imx8qm-ss-img: Fix jpegenc compatible entry arm64: dts: imx8mm: Add sound-dai-cells to micfil node arm64: dts: imx8mn: Add sound-dai-cells to micfil node arm64: tegra: Use correct interrupts for Tegra234 TKE selftests/pidfd: Fix ksft print formats selftests/resctrl: Ensure the benchmark commands fits to its array module/decompress: use vmalloc() for gzip decompression workspace ASoC: cs35l41: Verify PM runtime resume errors in IRQ handler ASoC: cs35l41: Undo runtime PM changes at driver exit time ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Fix unbalanced pm_runtime_get() ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Undo runtime PM changes at driver exit time KEYS: Include linux/errno.h in linux/verification.h crypto: hisilicon/hpre - Fix a erroneous check after snprintf() hwrng: bcm2835 - Fix hwrng throughput regression hwrng: geode - fix accessing registers RDMA/core: Use size_{add,sub,mul}() in calls to struct_size() crypto: qat - ignore subsequent state up commands crypto: qat - relocate bufferlist logic crypto: qat - rename bufferlist functions crypto: qat - change bufferlist logic interface crypto: qat - generalize crypto request buffers crypto: qat - extend buffer list interface crypto: qat - fix unregistration of crypto algorithms scsi: ibmvfc: Fix erroneous use of rtas_busy_delay with hcall return code libnvdimm/of_pmem: Use devm_kstrdup instead of kstrdup and check its return value nd_btt: Make BTT lanes preemptible crypto: caam/qi2 - fix Chacha20 + Poly1305 self test failure crypto: caam/jr - fix Chacha20 + Poly1305 self test failure crypto: qat - increase size of buffers PCI: vmd: Correct PCI Header Type Register's multi-function check hid: cp2112: Fix duplicate workqueue initialization crypto: hisilicon/qm - delete redundant null assignment operations crypto: hisilicon/qm - modify the process of regs dfx crypto: hisilicon/qm - split a debugfs.c from qm crypto: hisilicon/qm - fix PF queue parameter issue ARM: 9321/1: memset: cast the constant byte to unsigned char ext4: move 'ix' sanity check to corrent position ASoC: fsl: mpc5200_dma.c: Fix warning of Function parameter or member not described IB/mlx5: Fix rdma counter binding for RAW QP RDMA/hns: Fix printing level of asynchronous events RDMA/hns: Fix uninitialized ucmd in hns_roce_create_qp_common() RDMA/hns: Fix signed-unsigned mixed comparisons RDMA/hns: Add check for SL RDMA/hns: The UD mode can only be configured with DCQCN ASoC: SOF: core: Ensure sof_ops_free() is still called when probe never ran. ASoC: fsl: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in fsl_easrc_probe scsi: ufs: core: Leave space for '\0' in utf8 desc string RDMA/hfi1: Workaround truncation compilation error HID: cp2112: Make irq_chip immutable hid: cp2112: Fix IRQ shutdown stopping polling for all IRQs on chip sh: bios: Revive earlyprintk support Revert "HID: logitech-hidpp: add a module parameter to keep firmware gestures" HID: logitech-hidpp: Remove HIDPP_QUIRK_NO_HIDINPUT quirk HID: logitech-hidpp: Don't restart IO, instead defer hid_connect() only HID: logitech-hidpp: Revert "Don't restart communication if not necessary" HID: logitech-hidpp: Move get_wireless_feature_index() check to hidpp_connect_event() ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix mem leak when parsing UUIDs fails padata: Fix refcnt handling in padata_free_shell() crypto: qat - fix deadlock in backlog processing ASoC: ams-delta.c: use component after check IB/mlx5: Fix init stage error handling to avoid double free of same QP and UAF mfd: core: Un-constify mfd_cell.of_reg mfd: core: Ensure disabled devices are skipped without aborting mfd: dln2: Fix double put in dln2_probe dt-bindings: mfd: mt6397: Add binding for MT6357 dt-bindings: mfd: mt6397: Split out compatible for MediaTek MT6366 PMIC mfd: arizona-spi: Set pdata.hpdet_channel for ACPI enumerated devs leds: turris-omnia: Drop unnecessary mutex locking leds: turris-omnia: Do not use SMBUS calls leds: pwm: Don't disable the PWM when the LED should be off leds: trigger: ledtrig-cpu:: Fix 'output may be truncated' issue for 'cpu' kunit: add macro to allow conditionally exposing static symbols to tests apparmor: test: make static symbols visible during kunit testing apparmor: fix invalid reference on profile->disconnected perf stat: Fix aggr mode initialization iio: frequency: adf4350: Use device managed functions and fix power down issue. perf kwork: Fix incorrect and missing free atom in work_push_atom() perf kwork: Add the supported subcommands to the document perf kwork: Set ordered_events to true in 'struct perf_tool' filemap: add filemap_get_folios_tag() f2fs: convert f2fs_write_cache_pages() to use filemap_get_folios_tag() f2fs: compress: fix deadloop in f2fs_write_cache_pages() f2fs: compress: fix to avoid use-after-free on dic f2fs: compress: fix to avoid redundant compress extension tty: tty_jobctrl: fix pid memleak in disassociate_ctty() livepatch: Fix missing newline character in klp_resolve_symbols() pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Make reverse order of enable() for disable() perf record: Fix BTF type checks in the off-cpu profiling dmaengine: idxd: Register dsa_bus_type before registering idxd sub-drivers usb: dwc2: fix possible NULL pointer dereference caused by driver concurrency usb: chipidea: Fix DMA overwrite for Tegra usb: chipidea: Simplify Tegra DMA alignment code dmaengine: ti: edma: handle irq_of_parse_and_map() errors misc: st_core: Do not call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave() tools: iio: iio_generic_buffer ensure alignment USB: usbip: fix stub_dev hub disconnect dmaengine: pxa_dma: Remove an erroneous BUG_ON() in pxad_free_desc() f2fs: fix to initialize map.m_pblk in f2fs_precache_extents() interconnect: qcom: sc7180: Retire DEFINE_QBCM interconnect: qcom: sc7180: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sc7280: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sc8180x: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sc8280xp: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sdm845: Retire DEFINE_QBCM interconnect: qcom: sdm845: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sm6350: Retire DEFINE_QBCM interconnect: qcom: sm6350: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: move ignore_list out of of_count_icc_providers() interconnect: qcom: sm8150: Drop IP0 interconnects interconnect: qcom: sm8150: Retire DEFINE_QBCM interconnect: qcom: sm8150: Set ACV enable_mask interconnect: qcom: sm8350: Retire DEFINE_QBCM interconnect: qcom: sm8350: Set ACV enable_mask powerpc: Only define __parse_fpscr() when required modpost: fix tee MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE built on big-endian host modpost: fix ishtp MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE built on big-endian host powerpc/40x: Remove stale PTE_ATOMIC_UPDATES macro powerpc/xive: Fix endian conversion size powerpc/vas: Limit open window failure messages in log bufffer powerpc/imc-pmu: Use the correct spinlock initializer. powerpc/pseries: fix potential memory leak in init_cpu_associativity() xhci: Loosen RPM as default policy to cover for AMD xHC 1.1 usb: host: xhci-plat: fix possible kernel oops while resuming perf machine: Avoid out of bounds LBR memory read perf hist: Add missing puts to hist__account_cycles 9p/net: fix possible memory leak in p9_check_errors() i3c: Fix potential refcount leak in i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs cxl/mem: Fix shutdown order crypto: ccp - Name -1 return value as SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL x86/sev: Change snp_guest_issue_request()'s fw_err argument virt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist target rtc: pcf85363: fix wrong mask/val parameters in regmap_update_bits call pcmcia: cs: fix possible hung task and memory leak pccardd() pcmcia: ds: fix refcount leak in pcmcia_device_add() pcmcia: ds: fix possible name leak in error path in pcmcia_device_add() media: hantro: Check whether reset op is defined before use media: verisilicon: Do not enable G2 postproc downscale if source is narrower than destination media: ov5640: Drop dead code using frame_interval media: ov5640: fix vblank unchange issue when work at dvp mode media: i2c: max9286: Fix some redundant of_node_put() calls media: ov5640: Fix a memory leak when ov5640_probe fails media: bttv: fix use after free error due to btv->timeout timer media: amphion: handle firmware debug message media: mtk-jpegenc: Fix bug in JPEG encode quality selection media: s3c-camif: Avoid inappropriate kfree() media: vidtv: psi: Add check for kstrdup media: vidtv: mux: Add check and kfree for kstrdup media: cedrus: Fix clock/reset sequence media: cadence: csi2rx: Unregister v4l2 async notifier media: dvb-usb-v2: af9035: fix missing unlock media: cec: meson: always include meson sub-directory in Makefile regmap: prevent noinc writes from clobbering cache pwm: sti: Reduce number of allocations and drop usage of chip_data pwm: brcmstb: Utilize appropriate clock APIs in suspend/resume Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix use after free in rmi_unregister_function() watchdog: ixp4xx: Make sure restart always works llc: verify mac len before reading mac header hsr: Prevent use after free in prp_create_tagged_frame() tipc: Change nla_policy for bearer-related names to NLA_NUL_STRING bpf: Check map->usercnt after timer->timer is assigned inet: shrink struct flowi_common octeontx2-pf: Fix error codes octeontx2-pf: Fix holes in error code net: page_pool: add missing free_percpu when page_pool_init fail dccp: Call security_inet_conn_request() after setting IPv4 addresses. dccp/tcp: Call security_inet_conn_request() after setting IPv6 addresses. net: r8169: Disable multicast filter for RTL8168H and RTL8107E Fix termination state for idr_for_each_entry_ul() net: stmmac: xgmac: Enable support for multiple Flexible PPS outputs selftests: pmtu.sh: fix result checking octeontx2-pf: Rename tot_tx_queues to non_qos_queues octeontx2-pf: qos send queues management octeontx2-pf: Free pending and dropped SQEs net/smc: fix dangling sock under state SMC_APPFINCLOSEWAIT net/smc: allow cdc msg send rather than drop it with NULL sndbuf_desc net/smc: put sk reference if close work was canceled nvme: fix error-handling for io_uring nvme-passthrough tg3: power down device only on SYSTEM_POWER_OFF nbd: fix uaf in nbd_open blk-core: use pr_warn_ratelimited() in bio_check_ro() virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff vsock/virtio: remove socket from connected/bound list on shutdown r8169: respect userspace disabling IFF_MULTICAST i2c: iproc: handle invalid slave state netfilter: xt_recent: fix (increase) ipv6 literal buffer length netfilter: nft_redir: use `struct nf_nat_range2` throughout and deduplicate eval call-backs netfilter: nat: fix ipv6 nat redirect with mapped and scoped addresses RISC-V: Don't fail in riscv_of_parent_hartid() for disabled HARTs drm/syncobj: fix DRM_SYNCOBJ_WAIT_FLAGS_WAIT_AVAILABLE ASoC: mediatek: mt8186_mt6366_rt1019_rt5682s: trivial: fix error messages ASoC: hdmi-codec: register hpd callback on component probe ASoC: dapm: fix clock get name spi: spi-zynq-qspi: add spi-mem to driver kconfig dependencies fbdev: imsttfb: Fix error path of imsttfb_probe() fbdev: imsttfb: fix a resource leak in probe fbdev: fsl-diu-fb: mark wr_reg_wa() static tracing/kprobes: Fix the order of argument descriptions io_uring/net: ensure socket is marked connected on connect retry x86/amd_nb: Use Family 19h Models 60h-7Fh Function 4 IDs Revert "mmc: core: Capture correct oemid-bits for eMMC cards" btrfs: use u64 for buffer sizes in the tree search ioctls wifi: cfg80211: fix kernel-doc for wiphy_delayed_work_flush() virtio/vsock: don't use skbuff state to account credit virtio/vsock: remove redundant 'skb_pull()' call virtio/vsock: don't drop skbuff on copy failure vsock/loopback: use only sk_buff_head.lock to protect the packet queue virtio/vsock: fix leaks due to missing skb owner virtio/vsock: Fix uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt() virtio/vsock: fix header length on skb merging Linux 6.1.63 Change-Id: I87b7a539b11c90cfaf16edb07d613f74d54458a4 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
1164 lines
32 KiB
C
1164 lines
32 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* Fast Userspace Mutexes (which I call "Futexes!").
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* (C) Rusty Russell, IBM 2002
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*
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* Generalized futexes, futex requeueing, misc fixes by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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*
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* Removed page pinning, fix privately mapped COW pages and other cleanups
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* (C) Copyright 2003, 2004 Jamie Lokier
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*
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* Robust futex support started by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2006 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for suggestions, analysis and fixes.
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*
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* PI-futex support started by Ingo Molnar and Thomas Gleixner
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Timesys Corp., Thomas Gleixner <tglx@timesys.com>
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*
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* PRIVATE futexes by Eric Dumazet
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* Copyright (C) 2007 Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
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*
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* Requeue-PI support by Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
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* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2009
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for conceptual design and careful reviews.
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*
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* Thanks to Ben LaHaise for yelling "hashed waitqueues" loudly
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* enough at me, Linus for the original (flawed) idea, Matthew
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* Kirkwood for proof-of-concept implementation.
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*
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* "The futexes are also cursed."
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* "But they come in a choice of three flavours!"
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*/
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/jhash.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/memblock.h>
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#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "futex.h"
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#include "../locking/rtmutex_common.h"
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#include <trace/hooks/futex.h>
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|
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/*
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* The base of the bucket array and its size are always used together
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* (after initialization only in futex_hash()), so ensure that they
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* reside in the same cacheline.
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*/
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static struct {
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struct futex_hash_bucket *queues;
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unsigned long hashsize;
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} __futex_data __read_mostly __aligned(2*sizeof(long));
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#define futex_queues (__futex_data.queues)
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#define futex_hashsize (__futex_data.hashsize)
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|
|
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/*
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* Fault injections for futexes.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX
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static struct {
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struct fault_attr attr;
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bool ignore_private;
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} fail_futex = {
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.attr = FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER,
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.ignore_private = false,
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};
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static int __init setup_fail_futex(char *str)
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{
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return setup_fault_attr(&fail_futex.attr, str);
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}
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__setup("fail_futex=", setup_fail_futex);
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bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
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{
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if (fail_futex.ignore_private && !fshared)
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return false;
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return should_fail(&fail_futex.attr, 1);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS
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static int __init fail_futex_debugfs(void)
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{
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umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
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struct dentry *dir;
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dir = fault_create_debugfs_attr("fail_futex", NULL,
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&fail_futex.attr);
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if (IS_ERR(dir))
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return PTR_ERR(dir);
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debugfs_create_bool("ignore-private", mode, dir,
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&fail_futex.ignore_private);
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(fail_futex_debugfs);
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#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS */
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#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX */
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/**
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* futex_hash - Return the hash bucket in the global hash
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* @key: Pointer to the futex key for which the hash is calculated
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*
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* We hash on the keys returned from get_futex_key (see below) and return the
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* corresponding hash bucket in the global hash.
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*/
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struct futex_hash_bucket *futex_hash(union futex_key *key)
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{
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u32 hash = jhash2((u32 *)key, offsetof(typeof(*key), both.offset) / 4,
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key->both.offset);
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return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
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}
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/**
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* futex_setup_timer - set up the sleeping hrtimer.
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* @time: ptr to the given timeout value
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* @timeout: the hrtimer_sleeper structure to be set up
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* @flags: futex flags
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* @range_ns: optional range in ns
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*
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* Return: Initialized hrtimer_sleeper structure or NULL if no timeout
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* value given
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*/
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struct hrtimer_sleeper *
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futex_setup_timer(ktime_t *time, struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout,
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int flags, u64 range_ns)
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{
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if (!time)
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return NULL;
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hrtimer_init_sleeper_on_stack(timeout, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
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CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
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HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
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/*
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* If range_ns is 0, calling hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns() is
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* effectively the same as calling hrtimer_set_expires().
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*/
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hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&timeout->timer, *time, range_ns);
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return timeout;
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}
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/*
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* Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this inode.
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*
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* This relies on u64 not wrapping in the life-time of the machine; which with
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* 1ns resolution means almost 585 years.
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*
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* This further relies on the fact that a well formed program will not unmap
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* the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it. This mapping will have
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* a file reference which pins the mount and inode.
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*
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* If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in again, it will get
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* a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match, even though it is the exact same
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* file.
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*
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* It is important that futex_match() will never have a false-positive, esp.
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* for PI futexes that can mess up the state. The above argues that false-negatives
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* are only possible for malformed programs.
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*/
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static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
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{
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static atomic64_t i_seq;
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u64 old;
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/* Does the inode already have a sequence number? */
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old = atomic64_read(&inode->i_sequence);
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if (likely(old))
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return old;
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for (;;) {
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u64 new = atomic64_add_return(1, &i_seq);
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new))
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continue;
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old = atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(&inode->i_sequence, 0, new);
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if (old)
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return old;
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return new;
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}
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}
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/**
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* get_futex_key() - Get parameters which are the keys for a futex
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* @uaddr: virtual address of the futex
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* @fshared: false for a PROCESS_PRIVATE futex, true for PROCESS_SHARED
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* @key: address where result is stored.
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* @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: FUTEX_READ,
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* FUTEX_WRITE)
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*
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* Return: a negative error code or 0
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*
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* The key words are stored in @key on success.
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*
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* For shared mappings (when @fshared), the key is:
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*
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* ( inode->i_sequence, page->index, offset_within_page )
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*
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* [ also see get_inode_sequence_number() ]
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*
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* For private mappings (or when !@fshared), the key is:
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*
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* ( current->mm, address, 0 )
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*
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* This allows (cross process, where applicable) identification of the futex
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* without keeping the page pinned for the duration of the FUTEX_WAIT.
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*
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* lock_page() might sleep, the caller should not hold a spinlock.
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*/
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int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, bool fshared, union futex_key *key,
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enum futex_access rw)
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{
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unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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struct page *page, *tail;
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struct address_space *mapping;
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int err, ro = 0;
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/*
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* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
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*/
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key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
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if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
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return -EINVAL;
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address -= key->both.offset;
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if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
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return -EFAULT;
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/*
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* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
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* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
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* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
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* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
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* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
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*/
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if (!fshared) {
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/*
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* On no-MMU, shared futexes are treated as private, therefore
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* we must not include the current process in the key. Since
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* there is only one address space, the address is a unique key
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* on its own.
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*/
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU))
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key->private.mm = mm;
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else
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key->private.mm = NULL;
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key->private.address = address;
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return 0;
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}
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again:
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/* Ignore any VERIFY_READ mapping (futex common case) */
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if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
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return -EFAULT;
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err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
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/*
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* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
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* and get read-only access.
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*/
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if (err == -EFAULT && rw == FUTEX_READ) {
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err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
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ro = 1;
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}
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if (err < 0)
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return err;
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else
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err = 0;
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/*
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* The treatment of mapping from this point on is critical. The page
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* lock protects many things but in this context the page lock
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* stabilizes mapping, prevents inode freeing in the shared
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* file-backed region case and guards against movement to swap cache.
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*
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* Strictly speaking the page lock is not needed in all cases being
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* considered here and page lock forces unnecessarily serialization
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* From this point on, mapping will be re-verified if necessary and
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* page lock will be acquired only if it is unavoidable
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*
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* Mapping checks require the head page for any compound page so the
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* head page and mapping is looked up now. For anonymous pages, it
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* does not matter if the page splits in the future as the key is
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* based on the address. For filesystem-backed pages, the tail is
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* required as the index of the page determines the key. For
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* base pages, there is no tail page and tail == page.
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*/
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tail = page;
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page = compound_head(page);
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mapping = READ_ONCE(page->mapping);
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/*
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* If page->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
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* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
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* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
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* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
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|
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
|
|
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
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|
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
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* so refcount care in invalidate_inode_page's remove_mapping
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* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
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*
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* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
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* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
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* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page->mapping.
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*/
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if (unlikely(!mapping)) {
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int shmem_swizzled;
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|
|
/*
|
|
* Page lock is required to identify which special case above
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* applies. If this is really a shmem page then the page lock
|
|
* will prevent unexpected transitions.
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*/
|
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lock_page(page);
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shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page) || page->mapping;
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unlock_page(page);
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put_page(page);
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|
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if (shmem_swizzled)
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goto again;
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return -EFAULT;
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}
|
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|
|
/*
|
|
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
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*
|
|
* If the futex key is stored on an anonymous page, then the associated
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* object is the mm which is implicitly pinned by the calling process.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
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* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
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* the object not the particular process.
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*/
|
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if (PageAnon(page)) {
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/*
|
|
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
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* sense for futex operations.
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*/
|
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if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)) || ro) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out;
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}
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|
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key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
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|
key->private.mm = mm;
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key->private.address = address;
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|
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|
} else {
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struct inode *inode;
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|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The associated futex object in this case is the inode and
|
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* the page->mapping must be traversed. Ordinarily this should
|
|
* be stabilised under page lock but it's not strictly
|
|
* necessary in this case as we just want to pin the inode, not
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* update the radix tree or anything like that.
|
|
*
|
|
* The RCU read lock is taken as the inode is finally freed
|
|
* under RCU. If the mapping still matches expectations then the
|
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* mapping->host can be safely accessed as being a valid inode.
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|
*/
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
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|
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if (READ_ONCE(page->mapping) != mapping) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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put_page(page);
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|
|
|
goto again;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
inode = READ_ONCE(mapping->host);
|
|
if (!inode) {
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|
rcu_read_unlock();
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put_page(page);
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|
goto again;
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|
}
|
|
|
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key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
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|
key->shared.i_seq = get_inode_sequence_number(inode);
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|
key->shared.pgoff = page_to_pgoff(tail);
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|
rcu_read_unlock();
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}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
put_page(page);
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|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fault_in_user_writeable() - Fault in user address and verify RW access
|
|
* @uaddr: pointer to faulting user space address
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|
*
|
|
* Slow path to fixup the fault we just took in the atomic write
|
|
* access to @uaddr.
|
|
*
|
|
* We have no generic implementation of a non-destructive write to the
|
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* user address. We know that we faulted in the atomic pagefault
|
|
* disabled section so we can as well avoid the #PF overhead by
|
|
* calling get_user_pages() right away.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fault_in_user_writeable(u32 __user *uaddr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
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ret = fixup_user_fault(mm, (unsigned long)uaddr,
|
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FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
|
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mmap_read_unlock(mm);
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|
|
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return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_top_waiter() - Return the highest priority waiter on a futex
|
|
* @hb: the hash bucket the futex_q's reside in
|
|
* @key: the futex key (to distinguish it from other futex futex_q's)
|
|
*
|
|
* Must be called with the hb lock held.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct futex_q *futex_top_waiter(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, union futex_key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_q *this;
|
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry(this, &hb->chain, list) {
|
|
if (futex_match(&this->key, key))
|
|
return this;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int futex_cmpxchg_value_locked(u32 *curval, u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
|
ret = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int futex_get_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
|
ret = __get_user(*dest, from);
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
|
|
|
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited
|
|
* @ret: owner's current futex lock status
|
|
* @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task
|
|
*
|
|
* Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting.
|
|
*/
|
|
void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ret != -EBUSY) {
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
/*
|
|
* No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here
|
|
* while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can
|
|
* have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the
|
|
* mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit()
|
|
* already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round
|
|
* through the futex maze.
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(exiting);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* __futex_unqueue() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
*
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be NULL and must be held by the caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
void __futex_unqueue(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_SMP(!q->lock_ptr) || WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list)))
|
|
return;
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
hb = container_of(q->lock_ptr, struct futex_hash_bucket, lock);
|
|
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The key must be already stored in q->key. */
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *futex_q_lock(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
__acquires(&hb->lock)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
|
|
hb = futex_hash(&q->key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment the counter before taking the lock so that
|
|
* a potential waker won't miss a to-be-slept task that is
|
|
* waiting for the spinlock. This is safe as all futex_q_lock()
|
|
* users end up calling futex_queue(). Similarly, for housekeeping,
|
|
* decrement the counter at futex_q_unlock() when some error has
|
|
* occurred and we don't end up adding the task to the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_inc(hb); /* implies smp_mb(); (A) */
|
|
|
|
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
return hb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_q_unlock(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
__releases(&hb->lock)
|
|
{
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void __futex_queue(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
{
|
|
int prio;
|
|
bool already_on_hb = false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The priority used to register this element is
|
|
* - either the real thread-priority for the real-time threads
|
|
* (i.e. threads with a priority lower than MAX_RT_PRIO)
|
|
* - or MAX_RT_PRIO for non-RT threads.
|
|
* Thus, all RT-threads are woken first in priority order, and
|
|
* the others are woken last, in FIFO order.
|
|
*/
|
|
prio = min(current->normal_prio, MAX_RT_PRIO);
|
|
|
|
plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
|
|
trace_android_vh_alter_futex_plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain, &already_on_hb);
|
|
if (!already_on_hb)
|
|
plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
|
q->task = current;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_unqueue() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
*
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be held by the caller. A call to futex_unqueue() must
|
|
* be paired with exactly one earlier call to futex_queue().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return:
|
|
* - 1 - if the futex_q was still queued (and we removed unqueued it);
|
|
* - 0 - if the futex_q was already removed by the waking thread
|
|
*/
|
|
int futex_unqueue(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
|
|
retry:
|
|
/*
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between this read and the following spin_lock.
|
|
* Use READ_ONCE to forbid the compiler from reloading q->lock_ptr and
|
|
* optimizing lock_ptr out of the logic below.
|
|
*/
|
|
lock_ptr = READ_ONCE(q->lock_ptr);
|
|
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
|
|
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
|
|
/*
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
|
|
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
|
|
* corrects the race condition.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
|
|
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
|
|
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
|
|
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
|
|
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
|
|
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
|
|
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
__futex_unqueue(q);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PI futexes can not be requeued and must remove themselves from the
|
|
* hash bucket. The hash bucket lock (i.e. lock_ptr) is held.
|
|
*/
|
|
void futex_unqueue_pi(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
__futex_unqueue(q);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!q->pi_state);
|
|
put_pi_state(q->pi_state);
|
|
q->pi_state = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING true
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST false
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
|
|
* dying task, and do notification if so:
|
|
*/
|
|
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
|
|
bool pi, bool pending_op)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 uval, nval, mval;
|
|
pid_t owner;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
|
|
if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
|
|
* user space has two race scenarios:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
|
|
* before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
|
|
* waiters it is killed.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
|
|
* futex in user space.
|
|
*
|
|
* In the second case, the wake up notification could be generated
|
|
* by the unlock path in user space after setting the futex value
|
|
* to zero or by the kernel after setting the OWNER_DIED bit below.
|
|
*
|
|
* In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
|
|
* potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
|
|
* forever.
|
|
*
|
|
* In both cases the following conditions are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
|
|
* @pending_op == true
|
|
* 2) The owner part of user space futex value == 0
|
|
* 3) Regular futex: @pi == false
|
|
*
|
|
* If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
|
|
* potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
|
|
* trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. If the futex value is zero,
|
|
* the rest of the user space mutex state is consistent, so a woken
|
|
* waiter will just take over the uncontended futex. Setting the
|
|
* OWNER_DIED bit would create inconsistent state and malfunction
|
|
* of the user space owner died handling. Otherwise, the OWNER_DIED
|
|
* bit is already set, and the woken waiter is expected to deal with
|
|
* this.
|
|
*/
|
|
owner = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (pending_op && !pi && !owner) {
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (owner != task_pid_vnr(curr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
|
|
* of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
|
|
* via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
|
|
* set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
|
|
* futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
|
|
* to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
|
|
* thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
|
|
* userspace.
|
|
*/
|
|
mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
|
|
* the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
|
|
* we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
|
|
* access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
|
|
* verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
|
|
* does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
|
|
* give up and leave the futex locked.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((err = futex_cmpxchg_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
|
|
switch (err) {
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
|
if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nval != uval)
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
|
|
* PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
|
struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
|
|
unsigned int *pi)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long uentry;
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(uentry, (unsigned long __user *)head))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
*entry = (void __user *)(uentry & ~1UL);
|
|
*pi = uentry & 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
*
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct robust_list_head __user *head = curr->robust_list;
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
|
unsigned long futex_offset;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&pending, &head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
|
while (entry != &head->list) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_entry, &entry->next, &next_pi);
|
|
/*
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
|
* don't process it twice:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
|
if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
|
|
curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return;
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
|
|
curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
|
|
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
return uaddr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int
|
|
compat_fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
|
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
|
|
{
|
|
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
|
|
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
*
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
|
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
*/
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
|
|
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
|
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = compat_fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
|
|
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
|
|
/*
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
|
* dont process it twice:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
|
|
HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return;
|
|
uentry = next_uentry;
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_PI
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This task is holding PI mutexes at exit time => bad.
|
|
* Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
|
|
* (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
|
|
*/
|
|
static void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
|
|
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
|
|
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
|
|
*/
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
while (!list_empty(head)) {
|
|
next = head->next;
|
|
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
|
|
key = pi_state->key;
|
|
hb = futex_hash(&key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can race against put_pi_state() removing itself from the
|
|
* list (a waiter going away). put_pi_state() will first
|
|
* decrement the reference count and then modify the list, so
|
|
* its possible to see the list entry but fail this reference
|
|
* acquire.
|
|
*
|
|
* In that case; drop the locks to let put_pi_state() make
|
|
* progress and retry the loop.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount)) {
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
cpu_relax();
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
raw_spin_lock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
/*
|
|
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
|
|
* task still owns the PI-state:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (head->next != next) {
|
|
/* retain curr->pi_lock for the loop invariant */
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
|
|
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
|
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
|
|
pi_state->owner = NULL;
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
|
|
exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
|
|
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
|
|
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_exit_recursive - Set the tasks futex state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD
|
|
* @tsk: task to set the state on
|
|
*
|
|
* Set the futex exit state of the task lockless. The futex waiter code
|
|
* observes that state when a task is exiting and loops until the task has
|
|
* actually finished the futex cleanup. The worst case for this is that the
|
|
* waiter runs through the wait loop until the state becomes visible.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is called from the recursive fault handling path in make_task_dead().
|
|
*
|
|
* This is best effort. Either the futex exit code has run already or
|
|
* not. If the OWNER_DIED bit has been set on the futex then the waiter can
|
|
* take it over. If not, the problem is pushed back to user space. If the
|
|
* futex exit code did not run yet, then an already queued waiter might
|
|
* block forever, but there is nothing which can be done about that.
|
|
*/
|
|
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the state is FUTEX_STATE_EXITING then futex_exit_mutex is held */
|
|
if (tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING)
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_begin(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prevent various race issues against a concurrent incoming waiter
|
|
* including live locks by forcing the waiter to block on
|
|
* tsk->futex_exit_mutex when it observes FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner().
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_lock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Switch the state to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING under tsk->pi_lock.
|
|
*
|
|
* This ensures that all subsequent checks of tsk->futex_state in
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner() must observe FUTEX_STATE_EXITING with
|
|
* tsk->pi_lock held.
|
|
*
|
|
* It guarantees also that a pi_state which was queued right before
|
|
* the state change under tsk->pi_lock by a concurrent waiter must
|
|
* be observed in exit_pi_state_list().
|
|
*/
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_end(struct task_struct *tsk, int state)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lockless store. The only side effect is that an observer might
|
|
* take another loop until it becomes visible.
|
|
*/
|
|
tsk->futex_state = state;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the exit protection. This unblocks waiters which observed
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_EXITING to reevaluate the state.
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* The state handling is done for consistency, but in the case of
|
|
* exec() there is no way to prevent further damage as the PID stays
|
|
* the same. But for the unlikely and arguably buggy case that a
|
|
* futex is held on exec(), this provides at least as much state
|
|
* consistency protection which is possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset the state to FUTEX_STATE_OK. The task is alive and about
|
|
* exec a new binary.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_OK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_DEAD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __init futex_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int futex_shift;
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
|
|
futex_hashsize = 16;
|
|
#else
|
|
futex_hashsize = roundup_pow_of_two(256 * num_possible_cpus());
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
futex_queues = alloc_large_system_hash("futex", sizeof(*futex_queues),
|
|
futex_hashsize, 0,
|
|
futex_hashsize < 256 ? HASH_SMALL : 0,
|
|
&futex_shift, NULL,
|
|
futex_hashsize, futex_hashsize);
|
|
futex_hashsize = 1UL << futex_shift;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < futex_hashsize; i++) {
|
|
atomic_set(&futex_queues[i].waiters, 0);
|
|
plist_head_init(&futex_queues[i].chain);
|
|
spin_lock_init(&futex_queues[i].lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
core_initcall(futex_init);
|