[ Upstream commit af16df54b89dee72df253abc5e7b5e8a6d16c11c ]
Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.
Fixes: 99d5cadfde ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7d1025e559782b58824b36cb8ad547a69f2e4b31 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies() to use READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now,
proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still
need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e877820877663fbae8cb9582ea597a7230b94df3 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_dointvec_jiffies() to use READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now,
proc_dointvec_jiffies() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still
need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c31bcc8fb89fc2812663900589c6325ba35d9a65 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_doulongvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now,
proc_doulongvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still
need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2d3b559df3ed39258737789aae2ae7973d205bc1 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_douintvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now,
proc_douintvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still
need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 61d9b56a89 ("sysctl: add unsigned int range support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f613d86d014b6375a4085901de39406598121e35 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_dointvec_minmax() to use READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE() internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now,
proc_dointvec_minmax() itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still
need to add annotations on the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4762b532ec9539755aab61445d5da6e1926ccb99 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec()
itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on
the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: e7d316a02f ("sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fields")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f1be04b4d48a2475ea1aab46a99221bfc5c0968 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_dointvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_dointvec()
itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on
the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 07fd5b6cdf3cc30bfde8fe0f644771688be04447 upstream.
Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around
across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination
csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This
is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the
mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the
same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as
a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time.
Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are
involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while
others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with
the following sequence on cgroup1:
#1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b
#2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
#3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS &
#4> PID=$!
#5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks
#6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration,
non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader
is doing an actual one.
After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the
leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens:
1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader.
2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads.
3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list.
4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst
list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy.
5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity
migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and
putting references accordingly.
6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on
the dst list.
This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks
leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the
cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free.
This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst
preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up
inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too.
This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into
->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst
preloadings don't interfere with each other.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Reported-by: shisiyuan <shisiyuan19870131@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html
Fixes: f817de9851 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7edc3945bdce9c39198a10d6129377a5c53559c2 upstream.
This reverts commit 46bbe5c671.
As commit 46bbe5c671 ("tracing: fix double free") said, the
"double free" problem reported by clang static analyzer is:
> In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating
> var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed.
> This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees
> the rest of the list.
However, if there is a problem allocating N-th var_defs.expr:
+ in parse_var_defs(), the freed 'earlier var_defs.name' is
actually the N-th var_defs.name;
+ then in free_var_defs(), the names from 0th to (N-1)-th are freed;
IF ALLOCATING PROBLEM HAPPENED HERE!!! -+
\
|
0th 1th (N-1)-th N-th V
+-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+-----------
var_defs: | name | expr | name | expr | ... | name | expr | name | ///
+-------------+-------------+-----+-------------+-----------
These two frees don't act on same name, so there was no "double free"
problem before. Conversely, after that commit, we get a "memory leak"
problem because the above "N-th var_defs.name" is not freed.
If enable CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and inject a fault at where the N-th
var_defs.expr allocated, then execute on shell like:
$ echo 'hist:key=call_site:val=$v1,$v2:v1=bytes_req,v2=bytes_alloc' > \
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/trigger
Then kmemleak reports:
unreferenced object 0xffff8fb100ef3518 (size 8):
comm "bash", pid 196, jiffies 4295681690 (age 28.538s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
76 31 00 00 b1 8f ff ff v1......
backtrace:
[<0000000038fe4895>] kstrdup+0x2d/0x60
[<00000000c99c049a>] event_hist_trigger_parse+0x206f/0x20e0
[<00000000ae70d2cc>] trigger_process_regex+0xc0/0x110
[<0000000066737a4c>] event_trigger_write+0x75/0xd0
[<000000007341e40c>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x2a0
[<0000000087fde4c2>] ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
[<00000000581e9cdf>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[<00000000cf3b065c>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220711014731.69520-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 46bbe5c671 ("tracing: fix double free")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d5b36a4dbd06c5e8e36ca8ccc552f679069e2946 upstream.
As Chris explains, the comment above exit_itimers() is not correct,
we can race with proc_timers_seq_ops. Change exit_itimers() to clear
signal->posix_timers with ->siglock held.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: chris@accessvector.net
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5 upstream.
Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.
This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
Before:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
10: (95) exit
What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
the umax to be equal to umin.
Refactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.
After:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
0: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
1: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
2: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
3: (87) r3 = -r3 ; R3_w=scalar()
4: (47) r3 |= 32767 ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
6: (95) exit
from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1 ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
8: (95) exit
from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
9: (07) r3 += -32767 ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) <--- [*]
10: (95) exit
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a12ca6277eca6aeeccf66e840c23a2b520e24c8f upstream.
Kuee reported a quirk in the jmp32's jeq/jne simulation, namely that the
register value does not match expectations for the fall-through path. For
example:
Before fix:
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
0: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2_w=P0
1: (b7) r6 = 563 ; R6_w=P563
2: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
3: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
4: (4c) w2 |= w6 ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2_w=P571 <--- [*]
6: (95) exit
R0 !read_ok
After fix:
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
0: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2_w=P0
1: (b7) r6 = 563 ; R6_w=P563
2: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
3: (87) r2 = -r2 ; R2_w=Pscalar()
4: (4c) w2 |= w6 ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2_w=P8 <--- [*]
6: (95) exit
R0 !read_ok
As can be seen on line 5 for the branch fall-through path in R2 [*] is that
given condition w2 != 0x8 is false, verifier should conclude that r2 = 8 as
upper 32 bit are known to be zero. However, verifier incorrectly concludes
that r2 = 571 which is far off.
The problem is it only marks false{true}_reg as known in the switch for JE/NE
case, but at the end of the function, it uses {false,true}_{64,32}off to
update {false,true}_reg->var_off and they still hold the prior value of
{false,true}_reg->var_off before it got marked as known. The subsequent
__reg_combine_32_into_64() then propagates this old var_off and derives new
bounds. The information between min/max bounds on {false,true}_reg from
setting the register to known const combined with the {false,true}_reg->var_off
based on the old information then derives wrong register data.
Fix it by detangling the BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE cases and updating relevant
{false,true}_{64,32}off tnums along with the register marking to known
constant.
Fixes: 3f50f132d8 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2390095113e98fc52fffe35c5206d30d9efe3f78 upstream.
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
modpost used to detect it, but it had been broken for a decade.
Commit 28438794aba4 ("modpost: fix section mismatch check for exported
init/exit sections") fixed it so modpost started to warn it again, then
this showed up:
MODPOST vmlinux.symvers
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab_gpl+tick_nohz_full_setup+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_tick_nohz_full_setup to the function .init.text:tick_nohz_full_setup()
The symbol tick_nohz_full_setup is exported and annotated __init
Fix this by removing the __init annotation of tick_nohz_full_setup or drop the export.
Drop the export because tick_nohz_full_setup() is only called from the
built-in code in kernel/sched/isolation.c.
Fixes: ae9e557b5b ("time: Export tick start/stop functions for rcutorture")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Backlund <tmb@tmb.nu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a37f3dd9a83186cb88d44808ab35b78375082c9 upstream.
The original x86 sev_alloc() only called set_memory_decrypted() on
memory returned by alloc_pages_node(), so the page order calculation
fell out of that logic. However, the common dma-direct code has several
potential allocators, not all of which are guaranteed to round up the
underlying allocation to a power-of-two size, so carrying over that
calculation for the encryption/decryption size was a mistake. Fix it by
rounding to a *number* of pages, rather than an order.
Until recently there was an even worse interaction with DMA_DIRECT_REMAP
where we could have ended up decrypting part of the next adjacent
vmalloc area, only averted by no architecture actually supporting both
configs at once. Don't ask how I found that one out...
Fixes: c10f07aa27 ("dma/direct: Handle force decryption for DMA coherent buffers in common code")
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
[ backport the functional change without all the prior refactoring ]
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e19f8fa6ce1ca9b8b934ba7d2e8f34c95abc6e60 ]
Limit the error msg to avoid flooding the console. If you have a lot of
threads hitting this at once, they could have already gotten passed the
dma_debug_disabled() check before they get to the point of allocation
failure, resulting in quite a lot of this error message spamming the
log. Use pr_err_once() to limit that.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 upstream.
This is a backport of the original upstream patch for 5.4/5.10.
The original upstream patch has been applied to 5.4/5.10 branches, which
simply removed the line:
cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket));
This is correct for upstream branch but incorrect for 5.4/5.10 branches,
as the 5.4/5.10 branches do not have the commit 370868107bf6 ("bpf:
Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for stackmap maps"), so the
bpf_map_charge_init() function has not been removed.
Currently the bpf_map_charge_init() function in 5.4/5.10 branches takes a
wrong memory charge cost, the
attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size))
part is missing, let's fix it.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.y
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.y
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ef9188bcc6ca1d8a2ad83e826b548e6820721061 ]
To prepare for support asynchronous tracer_init_tracefs initcall,
avoid calling create_trace_option_files before __update_tracer_options.
Otherwise, create_trace_option_files will show warning because
some tracers in trace_types list are already in tr->topts.
For example, hwlat_tracer call register_tracer in late_initcall,
and global_trace.dir is already created in tracing_init_dentry,
hwlat_tracer will be put into tr->topts.
Then if the __update_tracer_options is executed after hwlat_tracer
registered, create_trace_option_files find that hwlat_tracer is
already in tr->topts.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220426122407.17042-2-mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220322133339.GA32582@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 12025abdc8539ed9d5014e2d647a3fd1bd3de5cd ]
When setting bootparams="trace_event=initcall:initcall_start tp_printk=1" in the
cmdline, the output_printk() was called, and the spin_lock_irqsave() was called in the
atomic and irq disable interrupt context suitation. On the PREEMPT_RT kernel,
these locks are replaced with sleepable rt-spinlock, so the stack calltrace will
be triggered.
Fix it by raw_spin_lock_irqsave when PREEMPT_RT and "trace_event=initcall:initcall_start
tp_printk=1" enabled.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8992303e>] try_to_wake_up+0x7e/0xba0
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.1-rt17+ #19 34c5812404187a875f32bee7977f7367f9679ea7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x8c
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
__might_resched.cold+0x11d/0x155
rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x70
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x2fa/0x4c0
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start+0xbe/0x110
? perf_trace_initcall_finish+0x210/0x210
? probe_sched_wakeup+0x34/0x40
? ttwu_do_wakeup+0xda/0x310
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x35/0x170
? map_vsyscall+0x93/0x93
do_one_initcall+0x217/0x3c0
? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level+0x170/0x170
? push_cpu_stop+0x400/0x400
? cblist_init_generic+0x241/0x290
kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x347
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x65/0x80
? rest_init+0xf0/0xf0
kernel_init+0x1e/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419013910.894370-1-jun.miao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jun Miao <jun.miao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit caff1fa4118cec4dfd4336521ebd22a6408a1e3e ]
I think there is something wrong with BPF_PROBE_MEM in ___bpf_prog_run()
in big-endian machine. Let's make a test and see what will happen if we
want to load a 'u16' with BPF_PROBE_MEM.
Let's make the src value '0x0001', the value of dest register will become
0x0001000000000000, as the value will be loaded to the first 2 byte of
DST with following code:
bpf_probe_read_kernel(&DST, SIZE, (const void *)(long) (SRC + insn->off));
Obviously, the value in DST is not correct. In fact, we can compare
BPF_PROBE_MEM with LDX_MEM_H:
DST = *(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (SRC + insn->off);
If the memory load is done by LDX_MEM_H, the value in DST will be 0x1 now.
And I think this error results in the test case 'test_bpf_sk_storage_map'
failing:
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:bpf_iter_bpf_sk_storage_map__open_and_load 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:socket 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:map_update 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:socket 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:map_update 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:socket 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:map_update 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:attach_iter 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:create_iter 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:PASS:read 0 nsec
test_bpf_sk_storage_map:FAIL:ipv6_sk_count got 0 expected 3
$10/26 bpf_iter/bpf_sk_storage_map:FAIL
The code of the test case is simply, it will load sk->sk_family to the
register with BPF_PROBE_MEM and check if it is AF_INET6. With this patch,
now the test case 'bpf_iter' can pass:
$10 bpf_iter:OK
Fixes: 2a02759ef5 ("bpf: Add support for BTF pointers to interpreter")
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <benbjiang@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220524021228.533216-1-imagedong@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3e35142ef99fe6b4fe5d834ad43ee13cca10a2dc upstream.
Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section
symbols") [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that
it thought were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with
kexec_file.c, gcc is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a
separate .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely"
is being dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak
symbol in .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against.
Address this by dropping the weak attribute from these functions.
Instead, follow the existing pattern of having architectures #define the
name of the function they want to override in their headers.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=d1bcae833b32f1
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h needs linux/module.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220519091237.676736-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 99696a2592bca641eb88cc9a80c90e591afebd0f upstream.
In create_var_ref(), init_var_ref() is called to initialize the fields
of variable ref_field, which is allocated in the previous function call
to create_hist_field(). Function init_var_ref() allocates the
corresponding fields such as ref_field->system, but frees these fields
when the function encounters an error. The caller later calls
destroy_hist_field() to conduct error handling, which frees the fields
and the variable itself. This results in double free of the fields which
are already freed in the previous function.
Fix this by storing NULL to the corresponding fields when they are freed
in init_var_ref().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220425063739.3859998-1-keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp
Fixes: 067fe038e7 ("tracing: Add variable reference handling to hist triggers")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Keita Suzuki <keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 64eaf50731ac0a8c76ce2fedd50ef6652aabc5ff ]
Since commit 2312729688 ("sched/fair: Update scale invariance of PELT")
change to use rq_clock_pelt() instead of rq_clock_task(), we should also
use rq_clock_pelt() for throttled_clock_task_time and throttled_clock_task
accounting to get correct cfs_rq_clock_pelt() of throttled cfs_rq. And
rename throttled_clock_task(_time) to be clock_pelt rather than clock_task.
Fixes: 2312729688 ("sched/fair: Update scale invariance of PELT")
Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408115309.81603-1-zhouchengming@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8106bddbab5f0ba180e6d693c7c1fc6926d57caa ]
The scftorture test module's scf_handler() function is supposed to provide
three different distributions of short delays (including "no delay") and
one distribution of long delays, if specified by the scftorture.longwait
module parameter. However, the second of the two non-zero-wait short delays
is disabled due to the first such delay's "goto out" not being enclosed in
the "then" clause with the "udelay()".
This commit therefore adjusts the code to provide the intended set of
delays.
Fixes: e9d338a0b1 ("scftorture: Add smp_call_function() torture test")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 ]
The 'n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket))' part of the
allocated memory for 'smap' is never used after the memlock accounting was
removed, thus get rid of it.
[ Note, Daniel:
Commit b936ca643a ("bpf: rework memlock-based memory accounting for maps")
moved `cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket))`
up and therefore before the bpf_map_area_alloc() allocation, sigh. In a later
step commit c85d69135a ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()"),
and the overflow checks of `cost >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE` moved into
bpf_map_charge_init(). And then 370868107bf6 ("bpf: Eliminate rlimit-based
memory accounting for stackmap maps") finally removed the bpf_map_charge_init().
Anyway, the original code did the allocation same way as /after/ this fix. ]
Fixes: b936ca643a ("bpf: rework memlock-based memory accounting for maps")
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220407130423.798386-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 84bc4f1dbbbb5f8aa68706a96711dccb28b518e5 ]
We observed the error "cacheline tracking ENOMEM, dma-debug disabled"
during a light system load (copying some files). The reason for this error
is that the dma_active_cacheline radix tree uses GFP_NOWAIT allocation -
so it can't access the emergency memory reserves and it fails as soon as
anybody reaches the watermark.
This patch changes GFP_NOWAIT to GFP_ATOMIC, so that it can access the
emergency memory reserves.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 46e861be589881e0905b9ade3d8439883858721c ]
The TASKS_RUDE_RCU does not select IRQ_WORK, which can result in build
failures for kernels that do not otherwise select IRQ_WORK. This commit
therefore causes the TASKS_RUDE_RCU Kconfig option to select IRQ_WORK.
Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f75fd4b9221d93177c50dcfde671b2e907f53e86 ]
While booting secondary CPUs, cpus_read_[lock/unlock] is not keeping
online cpumask stable. The transient online mask results in below
calltrace.
[ 0.324121] CPU1: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000001 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.346652] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU2
[ 0.347212] CPU2: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000002 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.377255] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU3
[ 0.377823] CPU3: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000003 [0x410fd083]
[ 0.379040] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.383662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10 at kernel/workqueue.c:3084 __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.384850] Modules linked in:
[ 0.385403] CPU: 0 PID: 10 Comm: rcu_tasks_rude_ Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-v8+ #13
[ 0.386473] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (DT)
[ 0.387289] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 0.388308] pc : __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.388970] lr : __flush_work+0x80/0x138
[ 0.389620] sp : ffffffc00aaf3c60
[ 0.390139] x29: ffffffc00aaf3d20 x28: ffffffc009c16af0 x27: ffffff80f761df48
[ 0.391316] x26: 0000000000000004 x25: 0000000000000003 x24: 0000000000000100
[ 0.392493] x23: ffffffffffffffff x22: ffffffc009c16b10 x21: ffffffc009c16b28
[ 0.393668] x20: ffffffc009e53861 x19: ffffff80f77fbf40 x18: 00000000d744fcc9
[ 0.394842] x17: 000000000000000b x16: 00000000000001c2 x15: ffffffc009e57550
[ 0.396016] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000100000000
[ 0.397190] x11: 0000000000000462 x10: ffffff8040258008 x9 : 0000000100000000
[ 0.398364] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffffc0093c8bf4 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.399538] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffffffc00a976e40 x3 : ffffffc00810444c
[ 0.400711] x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.401886] Call trace:
[ 0.402309] __flush_work+0x12c/0x138
[ 0.402941] schedule_on_each_cpu+0x228/0x278
[ 0.403693] rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp+0x130/0x144
[ 0.404502] rcu_tasks_kthread+0x220/0x254
[ 0.405264] kthread+0x174/0x1ac
[ 0.405837] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 0.406456] irq event stamp: 102
[ 0.406966] hardirqs last enabled at (101): [<ffffffc0093c8468>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x78/0xb4
[ 0.408304] hardirqs last disabled at (102): [<ffffffc0093b8270>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c
[ 0.409410] softirqs last enabled at (54): [<ffffffc0081b80c8>] local_bh_enable+0xc/0x2c
[ 0.410645] softirqs last disabled at (50): [<ffffffc0081b809c>] local_bh_disable+0xc/0x2c
[ 0.411890] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 0.413000] smp: Brought up 1 node, 4 CPUs
[ 0.413762] SMP: Total of 4 processors activated.
[ 0.414566] CPU features: detected: 32-bit EL0 Support
[ 0.415414] CPU features: detected: 32-bit EL1 Support
[ 0.416278] CPU features: detected: CRC32 instructions
[ 0.447021] Callback from call_rcu_tasks_rude() invoked.
[ 0.506693] Callback from call_rcu_tasks() invoked.
This commit therefore fixes this issue by applying a single-CPU
optimization to the RCU Tasks Rude grace-period process. The key point
here is that the purpose of this RCU flavor is to force a schedule on
each online CPU since some past event. But the rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp()
function runs in the context of the RCU Tasks Rude's grace-period kthread,
so there must already have been a context switch on the current CPU since
the call to either synchronize_rcu_tasks_rude() or call_rcu_tasks_rude().
So if there is only a single CPU online, RCU Tasks Rude's grace-period
kthread does not need to anything at all.
It turns out that the rcu_tasks_rude_wait_gp() function's call to
schedule_on_each_cpu() causes problems during early boot. During that
time, there is only one online CPU, namely the boot CPU. Therefore,
applying this single-CPU optimization fixes early-boot instances of
this problem.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220210184319.25009-1-treasure4paddy@gmail.com/T/
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Padmanabha Srinivasaiah <treasure4paddy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6a2d90ba027adba528509ffa27097cffd3879257 upstream.
The current implementation of PTRACE_KILL is buggy and has been for
many years as it assumes it's target has stopped in ptrace_stop. At a
quick skim it looks like this assumption has existed since ptrace
support was added in linux v1.0.
While PTRACE_KILL has been deprecated we can not remove it as
a quick search with google code search reveals many existing
programs calling it.
When the ptracee is not stopped at ptrace_stop some fields would be
set that are ignored except in ptrace_stop. Making the userspace
visible behavior of PTRACE_KILL a noop in those case.
As the usual rules are not obeyed it is not clear what the
consequences are of calling PTRACE_KILL on a running process.
Presumably userspace does not do this as it achieves nothing.
Replace the implementation of PTRACE_KILL with a simple
send_sig_info(SIGKILL) followed by a return 0. This changes the
observable user space behavior only in that PTRACE_KILL on a process
not stopped in ptrace_stop will also kill it. As that has always
been the intent of the code this seems like a reasonable change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-7-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a2aa95b71c9bbec793b5c5fa50f0a80d882b3e8d upstream.
The cnt value in the 'cnt >= BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS' check does not
include BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs, so the number of
the attached BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs in a trampoline
can exceed BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS.
When this happens, the assignment '*progs++ = aux->prog' in
bpf_trampoline_get_progs() will cause progs array overflow as the
progs field in the bpf_tramp_progs struct can only hold at most
BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS bpf programs.
Fixes: 88fd9e5352 ("bpf: Refactor trampoline update code")
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220430130803.210624-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1366992e16bddd5e2d9a561687f367f9f802e2e4 upstream.
The addition of random_get_entropy_fallback() provides access to
whichever time source has the highest frequency, which is useful for
gathering entropy on platforms without available cycle counters. It's
not necessarily as good as being able to quickly access a cycle counter
that the CPU has, but it's still something, even when it falls back to
being jiffies-based.
In the event that a given arch does not define get_cycles(), falling
back to the get_cycles() default implementation that returns 0 is really
not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling
random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always
needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually.
It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision
or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all
the time is better than returning zero all the time.
Finally, since random_get_entropy_fallback() is used during extremely
early boot when randomizing freelists in mm_init(), it can be called
before timekeeping has been initialized. In that case there really is
nothing we can do; jiffies hasn't even started ticking yet. So just give
up and return 0.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3191dd5a1179ef0fad5a050a1702ae98b6251e8f upstream.
For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.
As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream.
Since commit
ee3e00e9e7 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream.
KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 055f23b74b20f2824ce33047b4cf2e2aa856bf3b upstream.
Previously, when CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=n, the module loader just does not
attempt to load exit sections since it never expects that any code in those
sections will ever execute. However, dynamic code patching (alternatives,
jump_label and static_call) can have sites in __exit code, even if __exit is
never executed. Therefore __exit must be present at runtime, at least for as
long as __init code is.
Commit 33121347fb1c ("module: treat exit sections the same as init
sections when !CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD") solves the requirements of
jump_labels and static_calls by putting the exit sections in the init
region of the module so that they are at least present at init, and
discarded afterwards. It does this by including a check for exit
sections in module_init_section(), so that it also returns true for exit
sections, and the module loader will automatically sort them in the init
region of the module.
However, the solution there was not completely arch-independent. ARM is
a special case where it supplies its own module_{init, exit}_section()
functions. Instead of pushing the exit section checks into
module_init_section(), just implement the exit section check in
layout_sections(), so that we don't have to touch arch-dependent code.
Fixes: 33121347fb1c ("module: treat exit sections the same as init sections when !CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD")
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 33121347fb1c359bd6e3e680b9f2c6ced5734a81 upstream.
Dynamic code patching (alternatives, jump_label and static_call) can
have sites in __exit code, even it __exit is never executed. Therefore
__exit must be present at runtime, at least for as long as __init code
is.
Additionally, for jump_label and static_call, the __exit sites must also
identify as within_module_init(), such that the infrastructure is aware
to never touch them after module init -- alternatives are only ran once
at init and hence don't have this particular constraint.
By making __exit identify as __init for MODULE_UNLOAD, the above is
satisfied.
So, when !CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD, the section ordering should look like the
following, with the .exit sections moved to the init region of the module.
Core section allocation order:
.text
.rodata
__ksymtab_gpl
__ksymtab_strings
.note.* sections
.bss
.data
.gnu.linkonce.this_module
Init section allocation order:
.init.text
.exit.text
.symtab
.strtab
[jeyu: thanks to Peter Zijlstra for most of changelog]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YFiuphGw0RKehWsQ@gunter/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323142756.11443-1-jeyu@kernel.org
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Joerg Vehlow <lkml@jv-coder.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ac6487e584a1eb54071dbe1212e05b884136704 upstream.
Norbert reported that it's possible to race sys_perf_event_open() such
that the looser ends up in another context from the group leader,
triggering many WARNs.
The move_group case checks for races against itself, but the
!move_group case doesn't, seemingly relying on the previous
group_leader->ctx == ctx check. However, that check is racy due to not
holding any locks at that time.
Therefore, re-check the result after acquiring locks and bailing
if they no longer match.
Additionally, clarify the not_move_group case from the
move_group-vs-move_group race.
Fixes: f63a8daa58 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Reported-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 901c7280ca0d5e2b4a8929fbe0bfb007ac2a6544 ]
Halil Pasic points out [1] that the full revert of that commit (revert
in bddac7c1e02b), and that a partial revert that only reverts the
problematic case, but still keeps some of the cleanups is probably
better. 
And that partial revert [2] had already been verified by Oleksandr
Natalenko to also fix the issue, I had just missed that in the long
discussion.
So let's reinstate the cleanups from commit aa6f8dcbab47 ("swiotlb:
rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""), and effectively only
revert the part that caused problems.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220328013731.017ae3e3.pasic@linux.ibm.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220324055732.GB12078@lst.de/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4386660.LvFx2qVVIh@natalenko.name/ [3]
Suggested-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This reverts commit d4d975e792.
Upstream had a follow-up fix, revert, and a semi-reverted-revert.
Instead of going through this chain which is more painful to backport,
I'm just going to revert this original commit and pick the final one.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2685027fca387b602ae565bff17895188b803988 upstream.
There are 3 places where the cpu and node masks of the top cpuset can
be initialized in the order they are executed:
1) start_kernel -> cpuset_init()
2) start_kernel -> cgroup_init() -> cpuset_bind()
3) kernel_init_freeable() -> do_basic_setup() -> cpuset_init_smp()
The first cpuset_init() call just sets all the bits in the masks.
The second cpuset_bind() call sets cpus_allowed and mems_allowed to the
default v2 values. The third cpuset_init_smp() call sets them back to
v1 values.
For systems with cgroup v2 setup, cpuset_bind() is called once. As a
result, cpu and memory node hot add may fail to update the cpu and node
masks of the top cpuset to include the newly added cpu or node in a
cgroup v2 environment.
For systems with cgroup v1 setup, cpuset_bind() is called again by
rebind_subsystem() when the v1 cpuset filesystem is mounted as shown
in the dmesg log below with an instrumented kernel.
[ 2.609781] cpuset_bind() called - v2 = 1
[ 3.079473] cpuset_init_smp() called
[ 7.103710] cpuset_bind() called - v2 = 0
smp_init() is called after the first two init functions. So we don't
have a complete list of active cpus and memory nodes until later in
cpuset_init_smp() which is the right time to set up effective_cpus
and effective_mems.
To fix this cgroup v2 mask setup problem, the potentially incorrect
cpus_allowed & mems_allowed setting in cpuset_init_smp() are removed.
For cgroup v2 systems, the initial cpuset_bind() call will set the masks
correctly. For cgroup v1 systems, the second call to cpuset_bind()
will do the right setup.
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a554ba288845fd3f6f12311fd76a51694233458a upstream.
Time limit only makes sense when callbacks are serviced in softirq mode
because:
_ In case we need to get back to the scheduler,
cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() is called after each callback.
_ In case some other softirq vector needs the CPU, the call to
local_bh_enable() before cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() takes care about
them via a call to do_softirq().
Therefore, make sure the time limit only applies to softirq mode.
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[UR: backport to 5.10-stable]
Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3e61e95e2d095e308616cba4ffb640f95a480e01 upstream.
The callbacks processing time limit makes sure we are not exceeding a
given amount of time executing the queue.
However its "continue" clause bypasses the cond_resched() call on
rcuc and NOCB kthreads, delaying it until we reach the limit, which can
be very long...
Make sure the scheduler has a higher priority than the time limit.
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[UR: backport to 5.10-stable + commit update]
Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8707898e22fd665bc1d7b18b809be4b56ce25bdd upstream.
A kernel hang can be observed when running setserial in a loop on a kernel
with force threaded interrupts. The sequence of events is:
setserial
open("/dev/ttyXXX")
request_irq()
do_stuff()
-> serial interrupt
-> wake(irq_thread)
desc->threads_active++;
close()
free_irq()
kthread_stop(irq_thread)
synchronize_irq() <- hangs because desc->threads_active != 0
The thread is created in request_irq() and woken up, but does not get on a
CPU to reach the actual thread function, which would handle the pending
wake-up. kthread_stop() sets the should stop condition which makes the
thread immediately exit, which in turn leaves the stale threads_active
count around.
This problem was introduced with commit 519cc8652b, which addressed a
interrupt sharing issue in the PCIe code.
Before that commit free_irq() invoked synchronize_irq(), which waits for
the hard interrupt handler and also for associated threads to complete.
To address the PCIe issue synchronize_irq() was replaced with
__synchronize_hardirq(), which only waits for the hard interrupt handler to
complete, but not for threaded handlers.
This was done under the assumption, that the interrupt thread already
reached the thread function and waits for a wake-up, which is guaranteed to
be handled before acting on the stop condition. The problematic case, that
the thread would not reach the thread function, was obviously overlooked.
Make sure that the interrupt thread is really started and reaches
thread_fn() before returning from __setup_irq().
This utilizes the existing wait queue in the interrupt descriptor. The
wait queue is unused for non-shared interrupts. For shared interrupts the
usage might cause a spurious wake-up of a waiter in synchronize_irq() or the
completion of a threaded handler might cause a spurious wake-up of the
waiter for the ready flag. Both are harmless and have no functional impact.
[ tglx: Amended changelog ]
Fixes: 519cc8652b ("genirq: Synchronize only with single thread on free_irq()")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Pfaff <tpfaff@pcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/552fe7b4-9224-b183-bb87-a8f36d335690@pcs.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 60490e7966659b26d74bf1fa4aa8693d9a94ca88 ]
This problem can be reproduced with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled on
both x86_64 and aarch64 arch when using sysdig -B(using ebpf)[1].
sysdig -B works fine after rebuilding the kernel with
CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC disabled.
I tracked it down to the if condition event->rb->nr_pages != nr_pages
in perf_mmap is true when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC is enabled where
event->rb->nr_pages = 1 and nr_pages = 2048 resulting perf_mmap to
return -EINVAL. This is because when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC is
enabled, rb->nr_pages is always equal to 1.
Arch with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled by default:
arc/arm/csky/mips/sh/sparc/xtensa
Arch with CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC disabled by default:
x86_64/aarch64/...
Fix this problem by using data_page_nr()
[1] https://github.com/draios/sysdig
Fixes: 906010b213 ("perf_event: Provide vmalloc() based mmap() backing")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220209145417.6495-1-xiezhipeng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 40f5aa4c5eaebfeaca4566217cb9c468e28ed682 ]
The warning in cfs_rq_is_decayed() triggered:
SCHED_WARN_ON(cfs_rq->avg.load_avg ||
cfs_rq->avg.util_avg ||
cfs_rq->avg.runnable_avg)
There exists a corner case in attach_entity_load_avg() which will
cause load_sum to be zero while load_avg will not be.
Consider se_weight is 88761 as per the sched_prio_to_weight[] table.
Further assume the get_pelt_divider() is 47742, this gives:
se->avg.load_avg is 1.
However, calculating load_sum:
se->avg.load_sum = div_u64(se->avg.load_avg * se->avg.load_sum, se_weight(se));
se->avg.load_sum = 1*47742/88761 = 0.
Then enqueue_load_avg() adds this to the cfs_rq totals:
cfs_rq->avg.load_avg += se->avg.load_avg;
cfs_rq->avg.load_sum += se_weight(se) * se->avg.load_sum;
Resulting in load_avg being 1 with load_sum is 0, which will trigger
the WARN.
Fixes: f207934fb7 ("sched/fair: Align PELT windows between cfs_rq and its se")
Signed-off-by: kuyo chang <kuyo.chang@mediatek.com>
[peterz: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414090229.342-1-kuyo.chang@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ce33c845b030c9cf768370c951bc699470b09fa7 upstream.
The stacktrace event trigger is not dumping the stacktrace to the instance
where it was enabled, but to the global "instance."
Use the private_data, pointing to the trigger file, to figure out the
corresponding trace instance, and use it in the trigger action, like
snapshot_trigger does.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/afbb0b4f18ba92c276865bc97204d438473f4ebc.1645396236.git.bristot@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ae63b31e4d ("tracing: Separate out trace events from global variables")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9e02977bfad006af328add9434c8bffa40e053bb upstream.
When we looked into FIO performance with swiotlb enabled in VM, we found
swiotlb_bounce() is always called one more time than expected for each DMA
read request.
It turns out that the bounce buffer is copied to original DMA buffer twice
after the completion of a DMA request (one is done by in
dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu(), the other by swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single()).
But the content in bounce buffer actually doesn't change between the two
rounds of copy. So, one round of copy is redundant.
Pass DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC flag to swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single() to
skip the memory copy in it.
This fix increases FIO 64KB sequential read throughput in a guest with
swiotlb=force by 5.6%.
Fixes: 55897af630 ("dma-direct: merge swiotlb_dma_ops into the dma_direct code")
Reported-by: Wang Zhaoyang1 <zhaoyang1.wang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Gao Liang <liang.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c54bc0fc84214b203f7a0ebfd1bd308ce2abe920 upstream.
When the timer base is empty, base::next_expiry is set to base::clk +
NEXT_TIMER_MAX_DELTA and base::next_expiry_recalc is false. When no timer
is queued until jiffies reaches base::next_expiry value, the warning for
not finding any expired timer and base::next_expiry_recalc is false in
__run_timers() triggers.
To prevent triggering the warning in this valid scenario
base::timers_pending needs to be added to the warning condition.
Fixes: 31cd0e119d ("timers: Recalculate next timer interrupt only when necessary")
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405191732.7438-3-anna-maria@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9e949a3886356fe9112c6f6f34a6e23d1d35407f upstream.
The check in flush_smp_call_function_queue() for callbacks that are sent
to offline CPUs currently checks whether the queue is empty.
However, flush_smp_call_function_queue() has just deleted all the
callbacks from the queue and moved all the entries into a local list.
This checks would only be positive if some callbacks were added in the
short time after llist_del_all() was called. This does not seem to be
the intention of this check.
Change the check to look at the local list to which the entries were
moved instead of the queue from which all the callbacks were just
removed.
Fixes: 8d056c48e4 ("CPU hotplug, smp: flush any pending IPI callbacks before CPU offline")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220319072015.1495036-1-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
