Commit Graph

64636 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
b8ed41cc04 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix potential user-after-free
[ Upstream commit df5703348813235874d851934e957c3723d71644 ]

This fixes all instances of which requires to allocate a buffer calling
alloc_skb which may release the chan lock and reacquire later which
makes it possible that the chan is disconnected in the meantime.

Fixes: a6a5568c03 ("Bluetooth: Lock the L2CAP channel when sending")
Reported-by: Alexander Coffin <alex.coffin@matician.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-11 16:39:26 +01:00
Pietro Borrello
2416abd6ba net: add sock_init_data_uid()
[ Upstream commit 584f3742890e966d2f0a1f3c418c9ead70b2d99e ]

Add sock_init_data_uid() to explicitly initialize the socket uid.
To initialise the socket uid, sock_init_data() assumes a the struct
socket* sock is always embedded in a struct socket_alloc, used to
access the corresponding inode uid. This may not be true.
Examples are sockets created in tun_chr_open() and tap_open().

Fixes: 86741ec254 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-11 16:39:26 +01:00
Shivani Baranwal
45a1ca6f3a wifi: cfg80211: Fix extended KCK key length check in nl80211_set_rekey_data()
[ Upstream commit df4969ca135b9b3b2c38c07514aaa775112ac835 ]

The extended KCK key length check wrongly using the KEK key attribute
for validation. Due to this GTK rekey offload is failing when the KCK
key length is 24 bytes even though the driver advertising
WIPHY_FLAG_SUPPORTS_EXT_KEK_KCK flag. Use correct attribute to fix the
same.

Fixes: 093a48d2aa ("cfg80211: support bigger kek/kck key length")
Signed-off-by: Shivani Baranwal <quic_shivbara@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Veerendranath Jakkam <quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206143715.1802987-2-quic_vjakkam@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-11 16:39:22 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
3e4bbd1f38 net: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) from sk_stream_kill_queues().
commit 62ec33b44e0f7168ff2886520fec6fb62d03b5a3 upstream.

Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc29233d28 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy()
to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 </TASK>

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc29233d28 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-03 11:44:51 +01:00
Martin KaFai Lau
a2957adbf3 bpf: bpf_fib_lookup should not return neigh in NUD_FAILED state
commit 1fe4850b34ab512ff911e2c035c75fb6438f7307 upstream.

The bpf_fib_lookup() helper does not only look up the fib (ie. route)
but it also looks up the neigh. Before returning the neigh, the helper
does not check for NUD_VALID. When a neigh state (neigh->nud_state)
is in NUD_FAILED, its dmac (neigh->ha) could be all zeros. The helper
still returns SUCCESS instead of NO_NEIGH in this case. Because of the
SUCCESS return value, the bpf prog directly uses the returned dmac
and ends up filling all zero in the eth header.

This patch checks for NUD_VALID and returns NO_NEIGH if the neigh is
not valid.

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230217004150.2980689-3-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-03-03 11:44:51 +01:00
Julian Anastasov
2fd5059f4f neigh: make sure used and confirmed times are valid
[ Upstream commit c1d2ecdf5e38e3489ce8328238b558b3b2866fe1 ]

Entries can linger in cache without timer for days, thanks to
the gc_thresh1 limit. As result, without traffic, the confirmed
time can be outdated and to appear to be in the future. Later,
on traffic, NUD_STALE entries can switch to NUD_DELAY and start
the timer which can see the invalid confirmed time and wrongly
switch to NUD_REACHABLE state instead of NUD_PROBE. As result,
timer is set many days in the future. This is more visible on
32-bit platforms, with higher HZ value.

Why this is a problem? While we expect unused entries to expire,
such entries stay in REACHABLE state for too long, locked in
cache. They are not expired normally, only when cache is full.

Problem and the wrong state change reported by Zhang Changzhong:

172.16.1.18 dev bond0 lladdr 0a:0e:0f:01:12:01 ref 1 used 350521/15994171/350520 probes 4 REACHABLE

350520 seconds have elapsed since this entry was last updated, but it is
still in the REACHABLE state (base_reachable_time_ms is 30000),
preventing lladdr from being updated through probe.

Fix it by ensuring timer is started with valid used/confirmed
times. Considering the valid time range is LONG_MAX jiffies,
we try not to go too much in the past while we are in
DELAY/PROBE state. There are also places that need
used/updated times to be validated while timer is not running.

Reported-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Tested-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-03 11:44:51 +01:00
Benedict Wong
887975834d Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels
[ Upstream commit b0355dbbf13c0052931dd14c38c789efed64d3de ]

This change adds support for nested IPsec tunnels by ensuring that
XFRM-I verifies existing policies before decapsulating a subsequent
policies. Addtionally, this clears the secpath entries after policies
are verified, ensuring that previous tunnels with no-longer-valid
do not pollute subsequent policy checks.

This is necessary especially for nested tunnels, as the IP addresses,
protocol and ports may all change, thus not matching the previous
policies. In order to ensure that packets match the relevant inbound
templates, the xfrm_policy_check should be done before handing off to
the inner XFRM protocol to decrypt and decapsulate.

Notably, raw ESP/AH packets did not perform policy checks inherently,
whereas all other encapsulated packets (UDP, TCP encapsulated) do policy
checks after calling xfrm_input handling in the respective encapsulation
layer.

Test: Verified with additional Android Kernel Unit tests
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-03 11:44:50 +01:00
Vladimir Oltean
c44e96d6c3 Revert "net/sched: taprio: make qdisc_leaf() see the per-netdev-queue pfifo child qdiscs"
commit af7b29b1deaac6da3bb7637f0e263dfab7bfc7a3 upstream.

taprio_attach() has this logic at the end, which should have been
removed with the blamed patch (which is now being reverted):

	/* access to the child qdiscs is not needed in offload mode */
	if (FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED(q->flags)) {
		kfree(q->qdiscs);
		q->qdiscs = NULL;
	}

because otherwise, we make use of q->qdiscs[] even after this array was
deallocated, namely in taprio_leaf(). Therefore, whenever one would try
to attach a valid child qdisc to a fully offloaded taprio root, one
would immediately dereference a NULL pointer.

$ tc qdisc replace dev eno0 handle 8001: parent root taprio \
	num_tc 8 \
	map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 \
	queues 1@0 1@1 1@2 1@3 1@4 1@5 1@6 1@7 \
	max-sdu 0 0 0 0 0 200 0 0 \
	base-time 200 \
	sched-entry S 80 20000 \
	sched-entry S a0 20000 \
	sched-entry S 5f 60000 \
	flags 2
$ max_frame_size=1500
$ data_rate_kbps=20000
$ port_transmit_rate_kbps=1000000
$ idleslope=$data_rate_kbps
$ sendslope=$(($idleslope - $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ locredit=$(($max_frame_size * $sendslope / $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ hicredit=$(($max_frame_size * $idleslope / $port_transmit_rate_kbps))
$ tc qdisc replace dev eno0 parent 8001:7 cbs \
	idleslope $idleslope \
	sendslope $sendslope \
	hicredit $hicredit \
	locredit $locredit \
	offload 0

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000030
pc : taprio_leaf+0x28/0x40
lr : qdisc_leaf+0x3c/0x60
Call trace:
 taprio_leaf+0x28/0x40
 tc_modify_qdisc+0xf0/0x72c
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x390
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x130
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x2c

The solution is not as obvious as the problem. The code which deallocates
q->qdiscs[] is in fact copied and pasted from mqprio, which also
deallocates the array in mqprio_attach() and never uses it afterwards.

Therefore, the identical cleanup logic of priv->qdiscs[] that
mqprio_destroy() has is deceptive because it will never take place at
qdisc_destroy() time, but just at raw ops->destroy() time (otherwise
said, priv->qdiscs[] do not last for the entire lifetime of the mqprio
root), but rather, this is just the twisted way in which the Qdisc API
understands error path cleanup should be done (Qdisc_ops :: destroy() is
called even when Qdisc_ops :: init() never succeeded).

Side note, in fact this is also what the comment in mqprio_init() says:

	/* pre-allocate qdisc, attachment can't fail */

Or reworded, mqprio's priv->qdiscs[] scheme is only meant to serve as
data passing between Qdisc_ops :: init() and Qdisc_ops :: attach().

[ this comment was also copied and pasted into the initial taprio
  commit, even though taprio_attach() came way later ]

The problem is that taprio also makes extensive use of the q->qdiscs[]
array in the software fast path (taprio_enqueue() and taprio_dequeue()),
but it does not keep a reference of its own on q->qdiscs[i] (you'd think
that since it creates these Qdiscs, it holds the reference, but nope,
this is not completely true).

To understand the difference between taprio_destroy() and mqprio_destroy()
one must look before commit 13511704f8d7 ("net: taprio offload: enforce
qdisc to netdev queue mapping"), because that just muddied the waters.

In the "original" taprio design, taprio always attached itself (the root
Qdisc) to all netdev TX queues, so that dev_qdisc_enqueue() would go
through taprio_enqueue().

It also called qdisc_refcount_inc() on itself for as many times as there
were netdev TX queues, in order to counter-balance what tc_get_qdisc()
does when destroying a Qdisc (simplified for brevity below):

	if (n->nlmsg_type == RTM_DELQDISC)
		err = qdisc_graft(dev, parent=NULL, new=NULL, q, extack);

qdisc_graft(where "new" is NULL so this deletes the Qdisc):

	for (i = 0; i < num_q; i++) {
		struct netdev_queue *dev_queue;

		dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i);

		old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new);
		if (new && i > 0)
			qdisc_refcount_inc(new);

		qdisc_put(old);
		~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
		this decrements taprio's refcount once for each TX queue
	}

	notify_and_destroy(net, skb, n, classid,
			   rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), new);
			   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
			   and this finally decrements it to zero,
			   making qdisc_put() call qdisc_destroy()

The q->qdiscs[] created using qdisc_create_dflt() (or their
replacements, if taprio_graft() was ever to get called) were then
privately freed by taprio_destroy().

This is still what is happening after commit 13511704f8d7 ("net: taprio
offload: enforce qdisc to netdev queue mapping"), but only for software
mode.

In full offload mode, the per-txq "qdisc_put(old)" calls from
qdisc_graft() now deallocate the child Qdiscs rather than decrement
taprio's refcount. So when notify_and_destroy(taprio) finally calls
taprio_destroy(), the difference is that the child Qdiscs were already
deallocated.

And this is exactly why the taprio_attach() comment "access to the child
qdiscs is not needed in offload mode" is deceptive too. Not only the
q->qdiscs[] array is not needed, but it is also necessary to get rid of
it as soon as possible, because otherwise, we will also call qdisc_put()
on the child Qdiscs in qdisc_destroy() -> taprio_destroy(), and this
will cause a nasty use-after-free/refcount-saturate/whatever.

In short, the problem is that since the blamed commit, taprio_leaf()
needs q->qdiscs[] to not be freed by taprio_attach(), while qdisc_destroy()
-> taprio_destroy() does need q->qdiscs[] to be freed by taprio_attach()
for full offload. Fixing one problem triggers the other.

All of this can be solved by making taprio keep its q->qdiscs[i] with a
refcount elevated at 2 (in offloaded mode where they are attached to the
netdev TX queues), both in taprio_attach() and in taprio_graft(). The
generic qdisc_graft() would just decrement the child qdiscs' refcounts
to 1, and taprio_destroy() would give them the final coup de grace.

However the rabbit hole of changes is getting quite deep, and the
complexity increases. The blamed commit was supposed to be a bug fix in
the first place, and the bug it addressed is not so significant so as to
justify further rework in stable trees. So I'd rather just revert it.
I don't know enough about multi-queue Qdisc design to make a proper
judgement right now regarding what is/isn't idiomatic use of Qdisc
concepts in taprio. I will try to study the problem more and come with a
different solution in net-next.

Fixes: 1461d212ab27 ("net/sched: taprio: make qdisc_leaf() see the per-netdev-queue pfifo child qdiscs")
Reported-by: Muhammad Husaini Zulkifli <muhammad.husaini.zulkifli@intel.com>
Reported-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221004220100.1650558-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-25 11:55:04 +01:00
Pavel Skripkin
267f62b7f3 mac80211: mesh: embedd mesh_paths and mpp_paths into ieee80211_if_mesh
commit 8b5cb7e41d9d77ffca036b0239177de123394a55 upstream.

Syzbot hit NULL deref in rhashtable_free_and_destroy(). The problem was
in mesh_paths and mpp_paths being NULL.

mesh_pathtbl_init() could fail in case of memory allocation failure, but
nobody cared, since ieee80211_mesh_init_sdata() returns void. It led to
leaving 2 pointers as NULL. Syzbot has found null deref on exit path,
but it could happen anywhere else, because code assumes these pointers are
valid.

Since all ieee80211_*_setup_sdata functions are void and do not fail,
let's embedd mesh_paths and mpp_paths into parent struct to avoid
adding error handling on higher levels and follow the pattern of others
setup_sdata functions

Fixes: 60854fd945 ("mac80211: mesh: convert path table to rhashtable")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+860268315ba86ea6b96b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230195547.23977-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
[pchelkin@ispras.ru: adapt a comment spell fixing issue]
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-25 11:55:03 +01:00
Dan Carpenter
c00867afe4 net: sched: sch: Fix off by one in htb_activate_prios()
commit 9cec2aaffe969f2a3e18b5ec105fc20bb908e475 upstream.

The > needs be >= to prevent an out of bounds access.

Fixes: de5ca4c3852f ("net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y+D+KN18FQI2DKLq@kili
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:56:00 +01:00
Pedro Tammela
4fe9950815 net/sched: tcindex: search key must be 16 bits
[ Upstream commit 42018a322bd453e38b3ffee294982243e50a484f ]

Syzkaller found an issue where a handle greater than 16 bits would trigger
a null-ptr-deref in the imperfect hash area update.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000015: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af]
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: syz-executor456 Not tainted
6.2.0-rc7-syzkaller-00112-gc68f345b7c42 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/21/2023
RIP: 0010:tcindex_set_parms+0x1a6a/0x2990 net/sched/cls_tcindex.c:509
Code: 01 e9 e9 fe ff ff 4c 8b bd 28 fe ff ff e8 0e 57 7d f9 48 8d bb
a8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c
02 00 0f 85 94 0c 00 00 48 8b 85 f8 fd ff ff 48 8b 9b a8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d3ef88 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000015 RSI: ffffffff8803a102 RDI: 00000000000000a8
RBP: ffffc90003d3f1d8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801e2b10a8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000030000 R15: ffff888017b3be00
FS: 00005555569af300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056041c6d2000 CR3: 000000002bfca000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcindex_change+0x1ea/0x320 net/sched/cls_tcindex.c:572
tc_new_tfilter+0x96e/0x2220 net/sched/cls_api.c:2155
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x959/0xca0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6132
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2574
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x91b/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x334/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmmsg+0x18f/0x460 net/socket.c:2616
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2642 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2642
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80

Fixes: ee059170b1f7 ("net/sched: tcindex: update imperfect hash filters respecting rcu")
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:59 +01:00
Pedro Tammela
5dfa51dbfc net/sched: act_ctinfo: use percpu stats
[ Upstream commit 21c167aa0ba943a7cac2f6969814f83bb701666b ]

The tc action act_ctinfo was using shared stats, fix it to use percpu stats
since bstats_update() must be called with locks or with a percpu pointer argument.

tdc results:
1..12
ok 1 c826 - Add ctinfo action with default setting
ok 2 0286 - Add ctinfo action with dscp
ok 3 4938 - Add ctinfo action with valid cpmark and zone
ok 4 7593 - Add ctinfo action with drop control
ok 5 2961 - Replace ctinfo action zone and action control
ok 6 e567 - Delete ctinfo action with valid index
ok 7 6a91 - Delete ctinfo action with invalid index
ok 8 5232 - List ctinfo actions
ok 9 7702 - Flush ctinfo actions
ok 10 3201 - Add ctinfo action with duplicate index
ok 11 8295 - Add ctinfo action with invalid index
ok 12 3964 - Replace ctinfo action with invalid goto_chain control

Fixes: 24ec483cec ("net: sched: Introduce act_ctinfo action")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210200824.444856-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:59 +01:00
Baowen Zheng
015ea70d72 flow_offload: fill flags to action structure
[ Upstream commit 40bd094d65fc9f83941b024cde7c24516f036879 ]

Fill flags to action structure to allow user control if
the action should be offloaded to hardware or not.

Signed-off-by: Baowen Zheng <baowen.zheng@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Louis Peens <louis.peens@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 21c167aa0ba9 ("net/sched: act_ctinfo: use percpu stats")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:59 +01:00
Guillaume Nault
7546fb3554 ipv6: Fix tcp socket connection with DSCP.
commit 8230680f36fd1525303d1117768c8852314c488c upstream.

Take into account the IPV6_TCLASS socket option (DSCP) in
tcp_v6_connect(). Otherwise fib6_rule_match() can't properly
match the DSCP value, resulting in invalid route lookup.

For example:

  ip route add unreachable table main 2001:db8::10/124

  ip route add table 100 2001:db8::10/124 dev eth0
  ip -6 rule add dsfield 0x04 table 100

  echo test | socat - TCP6:[2001:db8::11]:54321,ipv6-tclass=0x04

Without this patch, socat fails at connect() time ("No route to host")
because the fib-rule doesn't jump to table 100 and the lookup ends up
being done in the main table.

Fixes: 2cc67cc731 ("[IPV6] ROUTE: Routing by Traffic Class.")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:58 +01:00
Guillaume Nault
5337bb508b ipv6: Fix datagram socket connection with DSCP.
commit e010ae08c71fda8be3d6bda256837795a0b3ea41 upstream.

Take into account the IPV6_TCLASS socket option (DSCP) in
ip6_datagram_flow_key_init(). Otherwise fib6_rule_match() can't
properly match the DSCP value, resulting in invalid route lookup.

For example:

  ip route add unreachable table main 2001:db8::10/124

  ip route add table 100 2001:db8::10/124 dev eth0
  ip -6 rule add dsfield 0x04 table 100

  echo test | socat - UDP6:[2001:db8::11]:54321,ipv6-tclass=0x04

Without this patch, socat fails at connect() time ("No route to host")
because the fib-rule doesn't jump to table 100 and the lookup ends up
being done in the main table.

Fixes: 2cc67cc731 ("[IPV6] ROUTE: Routing by Traffic Class.")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:58 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski
7ff0fdba82 net: mpls: fix stale pointer if allocation fails during device rename
commit fda6c89fe3d9aca073495a664e1d5aea28cd4377 upstream.

lianhui reports that when MPLS fails to register the sysctl table
under new location (during device rename) the old pointers won't
get overwritten and may be freed again (double free).

Handle this gracefully. The best option would be unregistering
the MPLS from the device completely on failure, but unfortunately
mpls_ifdown() can fail. So failing fully is also unreliable.

Another option is to register the new table first then only
remove old one if the new one succeeds. That requires more
code, changes order of notifications and two tables may be
visible at the same time.

sysctl point is not used in the rest of the code - set to NULL
on failures and skip unregister if already NULL.

Reported-by: lianhui tang <bluetlh@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0fae3bf018 ("mpls: handle device renames for per-device sysctls")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:58 +01:00
Hangyu Hua
c0f65ee0a3 net: openvswitch: fix possible memory leak in ovs_meter_cmd_set()
commit 2fa28f5c6fcbfc794340684f36d2581b4f2d20b5 upstream.

old_meter needs to be free after it is detached regardless of whether
the new meter is successfully attached.

Fixes: c7c4c44c9a ("net: openvswitch: expand the meters supported number")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:57 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
9d68bfa220 dccp/tcp: Avoid negative sk_forward_alloc by ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions.
commit ca43ccf41224b023fc290073d5603a755fd12eed upstream.

Eric Dumazet pointed out [0] that when we call skb_set_owner_r()
for ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions, sk_rmem_schedule() has not been called,
resulting in a negative sk_forward_alloc.

We add a new helper which clones a skb and sets its owner only
when sk_rmem_schedule() succeeds.

Note that we move skb_set_owner_r() forward in (dccp|tcp)_v6_do_rcv()
because tcp_send_synack() can make sk_forward_alloc negative before
ipv6_opt_accepted() in the crossed SYN-ACK or self-connect() cases.

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iK9oc20Jdi_41jb9URdF210r7d1Y-+uypbMSbOfY6jqrg@mail.gmail.com/

Fixes: 323fbd0edf ("net: dccp: Add handling of IPV6_PKTOPTIONS to dccp_v6_do_rcv()")
Fixes: 3df80d9320 ("[DCCP]: Introduce DCCPv6")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:57 +01:00
Pedro Tammela
eb8e9d8572 net/sched: tcindex: update imperfect hash filters respecting rcu
commit ee059170b1f7e94e55fa6cadee544e176a6e59c2 upstream.

The imperfect hash area can be updated while packets are traversing,
which will cause a use-after-free when 'tcf_exts_exec()' is called
with the destroyed tcf_ext.

CPU 0:               CPU 1:
tcindex_set_parms    tcindex_classify
tcindex_lookup
                     tcindex_lookup
tcf_exts_change
                     tcf_exts_exec [UAF]

Stop operating on the shared area directly, by using a local copy,
and update the filter with 'rcu_replace_pointer()'. Delete the old
filter version only after a rcu grace period elapsed.

Fixes: 9b0d4446b5 ("net: sched: avoid atomic swap in tcf_exts_change")
Reported-by: valis <sec@valis.email>
Suggested-by: valis <sec@valis.email>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209143739.279867-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:57 +01:00
Pietro Borrello
747a17e25a sctp: sctp_sock_filter(): avoid list_entry() on possibly empty list
commit a1221703a0f75a9d81748c516457e0fc76951496 upstream.

Use list_is_first() to check whether tsp->asoc matches the first
element of ep->asocs, as the list is not guaranteed to have an entry.

Fixes: 8f840e47f1 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230208-sctp-filter-v2-1-6e1f4017f326@diag.uniroma1.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:57 +01:00
Felix Riemann
e2bf52ff15 net: Fix unwanted sign extension in netdev_stats_to_stats64()
commit 9b55d3f0a69af649c62cbc2633e6d695bb3cc583 upstream.

When converting net_device_stats to rtnl_link_stats64 sign extension
is triggered on ILP32 machines as 6c1c509778 changed the previous
"ulong -> u64" conversion to "long -> u64" by accessing the
net_device_stats fields through a (signed) atomic_long_t.

This causes for example the received bytes counter to jump to 16EiB after
having received 2^31 bytes. Casting the atomic value to "unsigned long"
beforehand converting it into u64 avoids this.

Fixes: 6c1c5097781f ("net: add atomic_long_t to net_device_stats fields")
Signed-off-by: Felix Riemann <felix.riemann@sma.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:56 +01:00
Florian Westphal
eaba3f9b67 netfilter: nft_tproxy: restrict to prerouting hook
commit 18bbc3213383a82b05383827f4b1b882e3f0a5a5 upstream.

TPROXY is only allowed from prerouting, but nft_tproxy doesn't check this.
This fixes a crash (null dereference) when using tproxy from e.g. output.

Fixes: 4ed8eb6570 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add native tproxy support")
Reported-by: Shell Chen <xierch@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Qingfang DENG <dqfext@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:55 +01:00
Kees Cook
90fcf55d83 net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority
[ Upstream commit de5ca4c3852f896cacac2bf259597aab5e17d9e3 ]

Nothing was explicitly bounds checking the priority index used to access
clpriop[]. WARN and bail out early if it's pathological. Seen with GCC 13:

../net/sched/sch_htb.c: In function 'htb_activate_prios':
../net/sched/sch_htb.c:437:44: warning: array subscript [0, 31] is outside array bounds of 'struct htb_prio[8]' [-Warray-bounds=]
  437 |                         if (p->inner.clprio[prio].feed.rb_node)
      |                             ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
../net/sched/sch_htb.c:131:41: note: while referencing 'clprio'
  131 |                         struct htb_prio clprio[TC_HTB_NUMPRIO];
      |                                         ^~~~~~

Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230127224036.never.561-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:53 +01:00
Hyunwoo Kim
aa84a8cc1b net/rose: Fix to not accept on connected socket
[ Upstream commit 14caefcf9837a2be765a566005ad82cd0d2a429f ]

If you call listen() and accept() on an already connect()ed
rose socket, accept() can successfully connect.
This is because when the peer socket sends data to sendmsg,
the skb with its own sk stored in the connected socket's
sk->sk_receive_queue is connected, and rose_accept() dequeues
the skb waiting in the sk->sk_receive_queue.

This creates a child socket with the sk of the parent
rose socket, which can cause confusion.

Fix rose_listen() to return -EINVAL if the socket has
already been successfully connected, and add lock_sock
to prevent this issue.

Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125105944.GA133314@ubuntu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-22 12:55:53 +01:00
Pietro Borrello
c53f34ec3f rds: rds_rm_zerocopy_callback() use list_first_entry()
[ Upstream commit f753a68980cf4b59a80fe677619da2b1804f526d ]

rds_rm_zerocopy_callback() uses list_entry() on the head of a list
causing a type confusion.
Use list_first_entry() to actually access the first element of the
rs_zcookie_queue list.

Fixes: 9426bbc6de ("rds: use list structure to track information for zerocopy completion notification")
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230202-rds-zerocopy-v3-1-83b0df974f9a@diag.uniroma1.it
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:25 +01:00
Christian Hopps
30fdf66035 xfrm: fix bug with DSCP copy to v6 from v4 tunnel
[ Upstream commit 6028da3f125fec34425dbd5fec18e85d372b2af6 ]

When copying the DSCP bits for decap-dscp into IPv6 don't assume the
outer encap is always IPv6. Instead, as with the inner IPv4 case, copy
the DSCP bits from the correctly saved "tos" value in the control block.

Fixes: 227620e295 ("[IPSEC]: Separate inner/outer mode processing on input")
Signed-off-by: Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:23 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
a893cc6448 xfrm/compat: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in xfrm_xlate32_attr()
[ Upstream commit b6ee896385380aa621102e8ea402ba12db1cabff ]

  int type = nla_type(nla);

  if (type > XFRMA_MAX) {
            return -EOPNOTSUPP;
  }

@type is then used as an array index and can be used
as a Spectre v1 gadget.

  if (nla_len(nla) < compat_policy[type].len) {

array_index_nospec() can be used to prevent leaking
content of kernel memory to malicious users.

Fixes: 5106f4a8ac ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:23 +01:00
Anastasia Belova
3797e94c19 xfrm: compat: change expression for switch in xfrm_xlate64
[ Upstream commit eb6c59b735aa6cca77cdbb59cc69d69a0d63d986 ]

Compare XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO (value from netlink
configuration messages enum) with nlh_src->nlmsg_type
instead of nlh_src->nlmsg_type - XFRM_MSG_BASE.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: 4e9505064f58 ("net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributes")
Signed-off-by: Anastasia Belova <abelova@astralinux.ru>
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:23 +01:00
Devid Antonio Filoni
bc9771cd63 can: j1939: do not wait 250 ms if the same addr was already claimed
commit 4ae5e1e97c44f4654516c1d41591a462ed62fa7b upstream.

The ISO 11783-5 standard, in "4.5.2 - Address claim requirements", states:
  d) No CF shall begin, or resume, transmission on the network until 250
     ms after it has successfully claimed an address except when
     responding to a request for address-claimed.

But "Figure 6" and "Figure 7" in "4.5.4.2 - Address-claim
prioritization" show that the CF begins the transmission after 250 ms
from the first AC (address-claimed) message even if it sends another AC
message during that time window to resolve the address contention with
another CF.

As stated in "4.4.2.3 - Address-claimed message":
  In order to successfully claim an address, the CF sending an address
  claimed message shall not receive a contending claim from another CF
  for at least 250 ms.

As stated in "4.4.3.2 - NAME management (NM) message":
  1) A commanding CF can
     d) request that a CF with a specified NAME transmit the address-
        claimed message with its current NAME.
  2) A target CF shall
     d) send an address-claimed message in response to a request for a
        matching NAME

Taking the above arguments into account, the 250 ms wait is requested
only during network initialization.

Do not restart the timer on AC message if both the NAME and the address
match and so if the address has already been claimed (timer has expired)
or the AC message has been sent to resolve the contention with another
CF (timer is still running).

Signed-off-by: Devid Antonio Filoni <devid.filoni@egluetechnologies.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221125170418.34575-1-devid.filoni@egluetechnologies.com
Fixes: 9d71dd0c70 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:23 +01:00
Natalia Petrova
0c76eddc1f net: qrtr: free memory on error path in radix_tree_insert()
commit 29de68c2b32ce58d64dea496d281e25ad0f551bd upstream.

Function radix_tree_insert() returns errors if the node hasn't
been initialized and added to the tree.

"kfree(node)" and return value "NULL" of node_get() help
to avoid using unclear node in other calls.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7
Fixes: 0c2204a4ad ("net: qrtr: Migrate nameservice to kernel from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Natalia Petrova <n.petrova@fintech.ru>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125134831.8090-1-n.petrova@fintech.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:16 +01:00
Hyunwoo Kim
4bbc34401d net/x25: Fix to not accept on connected socket
[ Upstream commit f2b0b5210f67c56a3bcdf92ff665fb285d6e0067 ]

When listen() and accept() are called on an x25 socket
that connect() succeeds, accept() succeeds immediately.
This is because x25_connect() queues the skb to
sk->sk_receive_queue, and x25_accept() dequeues it.

This creates a child socket with the sk of the parent
x25 socket, which can cause confusion.

Fix x25_listen() to return -EINVAL if the socket has
already been successfully connect()ed to avoid this issue.

Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:15 +01:00
Fedor Pchelkin
70154489f5 net: openvswitch: fix flow memory leak in ovs_flow_cmd_new
[ Upstream commit 0c598aed445eb45b0ee7ba405f7ece99ee349c30 ]

Syzkaller reports a memory leak of new_flow in ovs_flow_cmd_new() as it is
not freed when an allocation of a key fails.

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888116668000 (size 632):
  comm "syz-executor231", pid 1090, jiffies 4294844701 (age 18.871s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000defa3494>] kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:654 [inline]
    [<00000000defa3494>] ovs_flow_alloc+0x19/0x180 net/openvswitch/flow_table.c:77
    [<00000000c67d8873>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x1de/0xd40 net/openvswitch/datapath.c:957
    [<0000000010a539a8>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22d/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
    [<00000000dff3302d>] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
    [<00000000dff3302d>] genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x590 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
    [<000000000286dd87>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2515
    [<0000000061fed410>] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
    [<000000009dc0f111>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline]
    [<000000009dc0f111>] netlink_unicast+0x545/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339
    [<000000004a5ee816>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8e7/0xde0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1934
    [<00000000482b476f>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
    [<00000000482b476f>] sock_sendmsg+0x152/0x190 net/socket.c:671
    [<00000000698574ba>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x70a/0x870 net/socket.c:2356
    [<00000000d28d9e11>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2410
    [<0000000083ba9120>] __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439
    [<00000000c00628f8>] do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    [<000000004abfdcf4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

To fix this the patch rearranges the goto labels to reflect the order of
object allocations and adds appropriate goto statements on the error
paths.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 68bb10101e6b ("openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230201210218.361970-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:14 +01:00
Ziyang Xuan
b6d4407211 can: j1939: fix errant WARN_ON_ONCE in j1939_session_deactivate
[ Upstream commit d0553680f94c49bbe0e39eb50d033ba563b4212d ]

The conclusion "j1939_session_deactivate() should be called with a
session ref-count of at least 2" is incorrect. In some concurrent
scenarios, j1939_session_deactivate can be called with the session
ref-count less than 2. But there is not any problem because it
will check the session active state before session putting in
j1939_session_deactivate_locked().

Here is the concurrent scenario of the problem reported by syzbot
and my reproduction log.

        cpu0                            cpu1
                                j1939_xtp_rx_eoma
j1939_xtp_rx_abort_one
                                j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 2]
j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 3]
j1939_session_deactivate [kref == 2]
j1939_session_put [kref == 1]
				j1939_session_completed
				j1939_session_deactivate
				WARN_ON_ONCE(kref < 2)

=====================================================
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at net/can/j1939/transport.c:1088 j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70
CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ #32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70
Call Trace:
 j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next+0x11/0x28
 j1939_xtp_rx_eoma+0x12a/0x180
 j1939_tp_recv+0x4a2/0x510
 j1939_can_recv+0x226/0x380
 can_rcv_filter+0xf8/0x220
 can_receive+0x102/0x220
 ? process_backlog+0xf0/0x2c0
 can_rcv+0x53/0xf0
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x67/0x90
 ? process_backlog+0x97/0x2c0
 __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x80

Fixes: 0c71437dd50d ("can: j1939: j1939_session_deactivate(): clarify lifetime of session object")
Reported-by: syzbot+9981a614060dcee6eeca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210906094200.95868-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:13 +01:00
Florian Westphal
f53c6e7e77 netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression
[ Upstream commit 2b272bb558f1d3a5aa95ed8a82253786fd1a48ba ]

When using a xfrm interface in a bridged setup (the outgoing device is
bridged), the incoming packets in the xfrm interface are only tracked
in the outgoing direction.

$ brctl show
bridge name     interfaces
br_eth1         eth1

$ conntrack -L
tcp 115 SYN_SENT src=192... dst=192... [UNREPLIED] ...

If br_netfilter is enabled, the first (encrypted) packet is received onR
eth1, conntrack hooks are called from br_netfilter emulation which
allocates nf_bridge info for this skb.

If the packet is for local machine, skb gets passed up the ip stack.
The skb passes through ip prerouting a second time. br_netfilter
ip_sabotage_in supresses the re-invocation of the hooks.

After this, skb gets decrypted in xfrm layer and appears in
network stack a second time (after decryption).

Then, ip_sabotage_in is called again and suppresses netfilter
hook invocation, even though the bridge layer never called them
for the plaintext incarnation of the packet.

Free the bridge info after the first suppression to avoid this.

I was unable to figure out where the regression comes from, as far as i
can see br_netfilter always had this problem; i did not expect that skb
is looped again with different headers.

Fixes: c4b0e771f9 ("netfilter: avoid using skb->nf_bridge directly")
Reported-and-tested-by: Wolfgang Nothdurft <wolfgang@linogate.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:12 +01:00
Hyunwoo Kim
dd6991251a netrom: Fix use-after-free caused by accept on already connected socket
[ Upstream commit 611792920925fb088ddccbe2783c7f92fdfb6b64 ]

If you call listen() and accept() on an already connect()ed
AF_NETROM socket, accept() can successfully connect.
This is because when the peer socket sends data to sendmsg,
the skb with its own sk stored in the connected socket's
sk->sk_receive_queue is connected, and nr_accept() dequeues
the skb waiting in the sk->sk_receive_queue.

As a result, nr_accept() allocates and returns a sock with
the sk of the parent AF_NETROM socket.

And here use-after-free can happen through complex race conditions:
```
                  cpu0                                                     cpu1
                                                               1. socket_2 = socket(AF_NETROM)
                                                                        .
                                                                        .
                                                                  listen(socket_2)
                                                                  accepted_socket = accept(socket_2)
       2. socket_1 = socket(AF_NETROM)
            nr_create()    // sk refcount : 1
          connect(socket_1)
                                                               3. write(accepted_socket)
                                                                    nr_sendmsg()
                                                                    nr_output()
                                                                    nr_kick()
                                                                    nr_send_iframe()
                                                                    nr_transmit_buffer()
                                                                    nr_route_frame()
                                                                    nr_loopback_queue()
                                                                    nr_loopback_timer()
                                                                    nr_rx_frame()
                                                                    nr_process_rx_frame(sk, skb);    // sk : socket_1's sk
                                                                    nr_state3_machine()
                                                                    nr_queue_rx_frame()
                                                                    sock_queue_rcv_skb()
                                                                    sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason()
                                                                    __sock_queue_rcv_skb()
                                                                    __skb_queue_tail(list, skb);    // list : socket_1's sk->sk_receive_queue
       4. listen(socket_1)
            nr_listen()
          uaf_socket = accept(socket_1)
            nr_accept()
            skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
                                                               5. close(accepted_socket)
                                                                    nr_release()
                                                                    nr_write_internal(sk, NR_DISCREQ)
                                                                    nr_transmit_buffer()    // NR_DISCREQ
                                                                    nr_route_frame()
                                                                    nr_loopback_queue()
                                                                    nr_loopback_timer()
                                                                    nr_rx_frame()    // sk : socket_1's sk
                                                                    nr_process_rx_frame()  // NR_STATE_3
                                                                    nr_state3_machine()    // NR_DISCREQ
                                                                    nr_disconnect()
                                                                    nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0;
       6. close(socket_1)    // sk refcount : 3
            nr_release()    // NR_STATE_0
            sock_put(sk);    // sk refcount : 0
            sk_free(sk);
          close(uaf_socket)
            nr_release()
            sock_hold(sk);    // UAF
```

KASAN report by syzbot:
```
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nr_release+0x66/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:520
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880235d8080 by task syz-executor564/5128

Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
 print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x141/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:102 [inline]
 atomic_fetch_add_relaxed include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:116 [inline]
 __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline]
 __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline]
 refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline]
 sock_hold include/net/sock.h:775 [inline]
 nr_release+0x66/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:520
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650
 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1365
 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xaa8/0x2950 kernel/exit.c:867
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1012
 get_signal+0x21c3/0x2450 kernel/signal.c:2859
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f6c19e3c9b9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f6c19e3c98f.
RSP: 002b:00007fffd4ba2ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: 0000000000000116 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f6c19e3c9b9
RDX: 0000000000000318 RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055555566a2c0
R13: 0000000000000011 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5128:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038
 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
 nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433
 __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515
 sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 5128:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline]
 __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline]
 __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166
 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline]
 __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192
 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203
 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
 nr_release+0x39e/0x460 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:554
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:650
 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1365
 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:320
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xaa8/0x2950 kernel/exit.c:867
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1012
 get_signal+0x21c3/0x2450 kernel/signal.c:2859
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
```

To fix this issue, nr_listen() returns -EINVAL for sockets that
successfully nr_connect().

Reported-by: syzbot+caa188bdfc1eeafeb418@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:12 +01:00
Jakub Sitnicki
9bd6074e18 bpf, sockmap: Check for any of tcp_bpf_prots when cloning a listener
[ Upstream commit ddce1e091757d0259107c6c0c7262df201de2b66 ]

A listening socket linked to a sockmap has its sk_prot overridden. It
points to one of the struct proto variants in tcp_bpf_prots. The variant
depends on the socket's family and which sockmap programs are attached.

A child socket cloned from a TCP listener initially inherits their sk_prot.
But before cloning is finished, we restore the child's proto to the
listener's original non-tcp_bpf_prots one. This happens in
tcp_create_openreq_child -> tcp_bpf_clone.

Today, in tcp_bpf_clone we detect if the child's proto should be restored
by checking only for the TCP_BPF_BASE proto variant. This is not
correct. The sk_prot of listening socket linked to a sockmap can point to
to any variant in tcp_bpf_prots.

If the listeners sk_prot happens to be not the TCP_BPF_BASE variant, then
the child socket unintentionally is left if the inherited sk_prot by
tcp_bpf_clone.

This leads to issues like infinite recursion on close [1], because the
child state is otherwise not set up for use with tcp_bpf_prot operations.

Adjust the check in tcp_bpf_clone to detect all of tcp_bpf_prots variants.

Note that it wouldn't be sufficient to check the socket state when
overriding the sk_prot in tcp_bpf_update_proto in order to always use the
TCP_BPF_BASE variant for listening sockets. Since commit
b8b8315e39ff ("bpf, sockmap: Remove unhash handler for BPF sockmap usage")
it is possible for a socket to transition to TCP_LISTEN state while already
linked to a sockmap, e.g. connect() -> insert into map ->
connect(AF_UNSPEC) -> listen().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/

Fixes: e80251555f ("tcp_bpf: Don't let child socket inherit parent protocol ops on copy")
Reported-by: syzbot+04c21ed96d861dccc5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v2-2-1e0ee7ac2f90@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-15 17:22:10 +01:00
Yan Zhai
6446369fb9 net: fix NULL pointer in skb_segment_list
commit 876e8ca8366735a604bac86ff7e2732fc9d85d2d upstream.

Commit 3a1296a38d ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
introduced UDP listifyed GRO. The segmentation relies on frag_list being
untouched when passing through the network stack. This assumption can be
broken sometimes, where frag_list itself gets pulled into linear area,
leaving frag_list being NULL. When this happens it can trigger
following NULL pointer dereference, and panic the kernel. Reverse the
test condition should fix it.

[19185.577801][    C1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
...
[19185.663775][    C1] RIP: 0010:skb_segment_list+0x1cc/0x390
...
[19185.834644][    C1] Call Trace:
[19185.841730][    C1]  <TASK>
[19185.848563][    C1]  __udp_gso_segment+0x33e/0x510
[19185.857370][    C1]  inet_gso_segment+0x15b/0x3e0
[19185.866059][    C1]  skb_mac_gso_segment+0x97/0x110
[19185.874939][    C1]  __skb_gso_segment+0xb2/0x160
[19185.883646][    C1]  udp_queue_rcv_skb+0xc3/0x1d0
[19185.892319][    C1]  udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x75/0x90
[19185.900979][    C1]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x200
[19185.910003][    C1]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x60
[19185.918757][    C1]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x8b/0xa0
[19185.927834][    C1]  process_backlog+0x88/0x130
[19185.935840][    C1]  __napi_poll+0x27/0x150
[19185.943447][    C1]  net_rx_action+0x27e/0x5f0
[19185.951331][    C1]  ? mlx5_cq_tasklet_cb+0x70/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[19185.960848][    C1]  __do_softirq+0xbc/0x25d
[19185.968607][    C1]  irq_exit_rcu+0x83/0xb0
[19185.976247][    C1]  common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0
[19185.984235][    C1]  asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
...
[19186.094106][    C1]  </TASK>

Fixes: 3a1296a38d ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai <yan@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y9gt5EUizK1UImEP@debian
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-06 07:56:16 +01:00
Soenke Huster
0f9db1209f Bluetooth: fix null ptr deref on hci_sync_conn_complete_evt
commit 3afee2118132e93e5f6fa636dfde86201a860ab3 upstream.

This event is just specified for SCO and eSCO link types.
On the reception of a HCI_Synchronous_Connection_Complete for a BDADDR
of an existing LE connection, LE link type and a status that triggers the
second case of the packet processing a NULL pointer dereference happens,
as conn->link is NULL.

Signed-off-by: Soenke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@eng.windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-06 07:56:16 +01:00
Sriram Yagnaraman
743435cd17 netfilter: conntrack: unify established states for SCTP paths
commit a44b7651489f26271ac784b70895e8a85d0cebf4 upstream.

An SCTP endpoint can start an association through a path and tear it
down over another one. That means the initial path will not see the
shutdown sequence, and the conntrack entry will remain in ESTABLISHED
state for 5 days.

By merging the HEARTBEAT_ACKED and ESTABLISHED states into one
ESTABLISHED state, there remains no difference between a primary or
secondary path. The timeout for the merged ESTABLISHED state is set to
210 seconds (hb_interval * max_path_retrans + rto_max). So, even if a
path doesn't see the shutdown sequence, it will expire in a reasonable
amount of time.

With this change in place, there is now more than one state from which
we can transition to ESTABLISHED, COOKIE_ECHOED and HEARTBEAT_SENT, so
handle the setting of ASSURED bit whenever a state change has happened
and the new state is ESTABLISHED. Removed the check for dir==REPLY since
the transition to ESTABLISHED can happen only in the reply direction.

Fixes: 9fb9cbb108 ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Signed-off-by: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:27 +01:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
6ef652f35d sctp: fail if no bound addresses can be used for a given scope
[ Upstream commit 458e279f861d3f61796894cd158b780765a1569f ]

Currently, if you bind the socket to something like:
        servaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        servaddr.sin6_port = htons(0);
        servaddr.sin6_scope_id = 0;
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &servaddr.sin6_addr);

And then request a connect to:
        connaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        connaddr.sin6_port = htons(20000);
        connaddr.sin6_scope_id = if_nametoindex("lo");
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe88::1", &connaddr.sin6_addr);

What the stack does is:
 - bind the socket
 - create a new asoc
 - to handle the connect
   - copy the addresses that can be used for the given scope
   - try to connect

But the copy returns 0 addresses, and the effect is that it ends up
trying to connect as if the socket wasn't bound, which is not the
desired behavior. This unexpected behavior also allows KASLR leaks
through SCTP diag interface.

The fix here then is, if when trying to copy the addresses that can
be used for the scope used in connect() it returns 0 addresses, bail
out. This is what TCP does with a similar reproducer.

Reported-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9fcd182f1099f86c6661f3717f63712ddd1c676c.1674496737.git.marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:25 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
cf9a2ce038 net/sched: sch_taprio: do not schedule in taprio_reset()
[ Upstream commit ea4fdbaa2f7798cb25adbe4fd52ffc6356f097bb ]

As reported by syzbot and hinted by Vinicius, I should not have added
a qdisc_synchronize() call in taprio_reset()

taprio_reset() can be called with qdisc spinlock held (and BH disabled)
as shown in included syzbot report [1].

Only taprio_destroy() needed this synchronization, as explained
in the blamed commit changelog.

[1]

BUG: scheduling while atomic: syz-executor150/5091/0x00000202
2 locks held by syz-executor150/5091:
Modules linked in:
Preemption disabled at:
[<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Kernel panic - not syncing: scheduling while atomic: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 5091 Comm: syz-executor150 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00219-g010a74f52203 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x2cc/0x626 kernel/panic.c:318
check_panic_on_warn.cold+0x19/0x35 kernel/panic.c:238
__schedule_bug.cold+0xd5/0xfe kernel/sched/core.c:5836
schedule_debug kernel/sched/core.c:5865 [inline]
__schedule+0x34e4/0x5450 kernel/sched/core.c:6500
schedule+0xde/0x1b0 kernel/sched/core.c:6682
schedule_timeout+0x14e/0x2a0 kernel/time/timer.c:2167
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible kernel/time/timer.c:2201 [inline]
msleep+0xb6/0x100 kernel/time/timer.c:2322
qdisc_synchronize include/net/sch_generic.h:1295 [inline]
taprio_reset+0x93/0x270 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1703
qdisc_reset+0x10c/0x770 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1022
dev_reset_queue+0x92/0x130 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1285
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2464 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x36d/0x9f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1351
dev_deactivate+0xed/0x1b0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1374
qdisc_graft+0xe4a/0x1380 net/sched/sch_api.c:1080
tc_modify_qdisc+0xb6b/0x19a0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1689
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43e/0xca0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6141
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356
netlink_sendmsg+0x91b/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x8c0 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2559
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]

Fixes: 3a415d59c1db ("net/sched: sch_taprio: fix possible use-after-free")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/167387581653.2747.13878941339893288655.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org/T/
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123084552.574396-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:25 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
7de16d75b2 netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.
[ Upstream commit 409db27e3a2eb5e8ef7226ca33be33361b3ed1c9 ]

syzbot reported a use-after-free in do_accept(), precisely nr_accept()
as sk_prot_alloc() allocated the memory and sock_put() frees it. [0]

The issue could happen if the heartbeat timer is fired and
nr_heartbeat_expiry() calls nr_destroy_socket(), where a socket
has SOCK_DESTROY or a listening socket has SOCK_DEAD.

In this case, the first condition cannot be true.  SOCK_DESTROY is
flagged in nr_release() only when the file descriptor is close()d,
but accept() is being called for the listening socket, so the second
condition must be true.

Usually, the AF_NETROM listener neither starts timers nor sets
SOCK_DEAD.  However, the condition is met if connect() fails before
listen().  connect() starts the t1 timer and heartbeat timer, and
t1timer calls nr_disconnect() when timeout happens.  Then, SOCK_DEAD
is set, and if we call listen(), the heartbeat timer calls
nr_destroy_socket().

  nr_connect
    nr_establish_data_link(sk)
      nr_start_t1timer(sk)
    nr_start_heartbeat(sk)
                                    nr_t1timer_expiry
                                      nr_disconnect(sk, ETIMEDOUT)
                                        nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0
                                        sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE
                                        sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)
nr_listen
  if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
    sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN
                                    nr_heartbeat_expiry
                                      switch (nr->state)
                                      case NR_STATE_0
                                        if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN &&
                                            sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
                                          nr_destroy_socket(sk)

This path seems expected, and nr_destroy_socket() is called to clean
up resources.  Initially, there was sock_hold() before nr_destroy_socket()
so that the socket would not be freed, but the commit 517a16b1a88b
("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire") accidentally
removed it.

To fix use-after-free, let's add sock_hold().

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807978d398 by task syz-executor.3/5315

CPU: 0 PID: 5315 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00165-gd9fc1511728c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
 print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1897 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1927
 __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1944 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1941 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1941
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fa436a8c0c9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa437784168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa436bac050 RCX: 00007fa436a8c0c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fa436ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffebc6700df R14: 00007fa437784300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5294:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038
 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
 nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433
 __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515
 sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 14:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline]
 __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline]
 __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166
 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline]
 __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192
 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203
 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
 nr_heartbeat_expiry+0x1d7/0x460 net/netrom/nr_timer.c:148
 call_timer_fn+0x1da/0x7c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
 expire_timers+0x2c6/0x5c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1751
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2022 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1995 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 kernel/time/timer.c:2035
 __do_softirq+0x1fb/0xadc kernel/softirq.c:571

Fixes: 517a16b1a88b ("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire")
Reported-by: syzbot+5fafd5cfe1fc91f6b352@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120231927.51711-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:25 +01:00
Sriram Yagnaraman
498584ccf4 netfilter: conntrack: fix vtag checks for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE
[ Upstream commit a9993591fa94246b16b444eea55d84c54608282a ]

RFC 9260, Sec 8.5.1 states that for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, the chunk
MUST be accepted if the vtag of the packet matches its own tag and the
T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's vtag and the T bit is set
in chunk flags. Otherwise the packet MUST be silently dropped.

Update vtag verification for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE based on the above
description.

Fixes: 9fb9cbb108 ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Signed-off-by: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:25 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
7f9828fb1f ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in fib_metrics_match()
[ Upstream commit 5e9398a26a92fc402d82ce1f97cc67d832527da0 ]

if (!type)
        continue;
    if (type > RTAX_MAX)
        return false;
    ...
    fi_val = fi->fib_metrics->metrics[type - 1];

@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.

Fixes: 5f9ae3d9e7 ("ipv4: do metrics match when looking up and deleting a route")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120133140.3624204-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:25 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
34c6142f0d ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()
[ Upstream commit 1d1d63b612801b3f0a39b7d4467cad0abd60e5c8 ]

if (!type)
		continue;
	if (type > RTAX_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;
	...
	metrics[type - 1] = val;

@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.

Fixes: 6cf9dfd3bd ("net: fib: move metrics parsing to a helper")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120133040.3623463-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
870a565bd6 netlink: annotate data races around sk_state
[ Upstream commit 9b663b5cbb15b494ef132a3c937641c90646eb73 ]

netlink_getsockbyportid() reads sk_state while a concurrent
netlink_connect() can change its value.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
8583f52c23 netlink: annotate data races around dst_portid and dst_group
[ Upstream commit 004db64d185a5f23dfb891d7701e23713b2420ee ]

netlink_getname(), netlink_sendmsg() and netlink_getsockbyportid()
can read nlk->dst_portid and nlk->dst_group while another
thread is changing them.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
eccb532ada netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid
[ Upstream commit c1bb9484e3b05166880da8574504156ccbd0549e ]

syzbot reminds us netlink_getname() runs locklessly [1]

This first patch annotates the race against nlk->portid.

Following patches take care of the remaining races.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_getname / netlink_insert

write to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2315 on cpu 1:
netlink_insert+0xf1/0x9a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:583
netlink_autobind+0xae/0x180 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:856
netlink_sendmsg+0x444/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1895
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x19a/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2316 on cpu 0:
netlink_getname+0xcd/0x1a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1144
__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2026
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2041 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2038 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:2038
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xc9a49780

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 2316 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00030-ge8f60cd7db24-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
0308b7dfea netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip elements in transaction from garbage collection
[ Upstream commit 5d235d6ce75c12a7fdee375eb211e4116f7ab01b ]

Skip interference with an ongoing transaction, do not perform garbage
collection on inactive elements. Reset annotated previous end interval
if the expired element is marked as busy (control plane removed the
element right before expiration).

Fixes: 8d8540c4f5 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
4aacf3d784 netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Switch to node list walk for overlap detection
[ Upstream commit c9e6978e2725a7d4b6cd23b2facd3f11422c0643 ]

...instead of a tree descent, which became overly complicated in an
attempt to cover cases where expired or inactive elements would affect
comparisons with the new element being inserted.

Further, it turned out that it's probably impossible to cover all those
cases, as inactive nodes might entirely hide subtrees consisting of a
complete interval plus a node that makes the current insertion not
overlap.

To speed up the overlap check, descent the tree to find a greater
element that is closer to the key value to insert. Then walk down the
node list for overlap detection. Starting the overlap check from
rb_first() unconditionally is slow, it takes 10 times longer due to the
full linear traversal of the list.

Moreover, perform garbage collection of expired elements when walking
down the node list to avoid bogus overlap reports.

For the insertion operation itself, this essentially reverts back to the
implementation before commit 7c84d41416 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree:
Detect partial overlaps on insertion"), except that cases of complete
overlap are already handled in the overlap detection phase itself, which
slightly simplifies the loop to find the insertion point.

Based on initial patch from Stefano Brivio, including text from the
original patch description too.

Fixes: 7c84d41416 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Detect partial overlaps on insertion")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-02-01 08:23:24 +01:00