Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
  with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e.  security labels are inherited
  from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).

  The rest of the changes are maintenance"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
  tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
  evm: audit integrity metadata failures
  integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
  evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
  maintainers:  add Dmitry Kasatkin
  Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
  Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
  Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
  Smack: Improve access check performance
  Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
  tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
  maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
  tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
  tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
  security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
  apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
  apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
  apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
  apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
  ...

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1129,11 +1129,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
 			owned by uid=0.
 
-	ima_audit=	[IMA]
-			Format: { "0" | "1" }
-			0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
-			1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
-
 	ima_hash=	[IMA]
 			Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
 			default: "sha1"
@@ -1160,6 +1155,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	int_pln_enable  [x86] Enable power limit notification interrupt
 
+	integrity_audit=[IMA]
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			0 -- basic integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+			1 -- additional integrity auditing messages.
+
 	intel_iommu=	[DMAR] Intel IOMMU driver (DMAR) option
 		on
 			Enable intel iommu driver.

MAINTAINERS

@@ -4001,7 +4001,8 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	arch/ia64/
 
 IBM Power in-Nest Crypto Acceleration
-M:	Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M:	Marcelo Henrique Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M:	Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
 L:	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 F:	drivers/crypto/nx/
@@ -4130,6 +4131,7 @@ F:	drivers/ipack/
 
 INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
 M:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+M:	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
 S:	Supported
 F:	security/integrity/ima/
 
@@ -8282,7 +8284,8 @@ S:	Odd fixes
 F:	drivers/media/usb/tm6000/
 
 TPM DEVICE DRIVER
-M:	Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M:	Leonidas Da Silva Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M:	Ashley Lai <ashley@ashleylai.com>
 M:	Rajiv Andrade <mail@srajiv.net>
 W:	http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net
 M:	Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c

@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_dev_vendor_release);
  * Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
  * release all allocated structures.
  */
-static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
+void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h

@@ -272,7 +272,6 @@ typedef union {
 	struct	tpm_output_header out;
 } tpm_cmd_header;
 
-#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
 struct tpm_pcrread_out {
 	u8	pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 } __packed;
@@ -333,6 +332,7 @@ extern struct tpm_chip* tpm_register_hardware(struct device *,
 				 const struct tpm_vendor_specific *);
 extern int tpm_open(struct inode *, struct file *);
 extern int tpm_release(struct inode *, struct file *);
+extern void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev);
 extern void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *);
 extern ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
 			 loff_t *);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/i2c.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include "tpm.h"
 
@@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ struct tpm_inf_dev {
 };
 
 static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev;
-static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
 
 /*
  * iic_tpm_read() - read from TPM register
@@ -744,11 +742,9 @@ static int tpm_tis_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
-	client->driver = &tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
 	tpm_dev.client = client;
 	rc = tpm_tis_i2c_init(&client->dev);
 	if (rc != 0) {
-		client->driver = NULL;
 		tpm_dev.client = NULL;
 		rc = -ENODEV;
 	}

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c

@@ -884,12 +884,19 @@ static int __init init_tis(void)
 	rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
-	if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
+	pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0);
-		return PTR_ERR(pdev);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdev)) {
-	if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(pdev);
-		platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+		goto err_dev;
-		platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
 	}
+	rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0);
+	if (rc)
+		goto err_init;
+	return 0;
+err_init:
+	platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+err_dev:
+	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
 	return rc;
 }
 

include/linux/security.h

@@ -1392,7 +1392,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * 	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
  *
  * @inode_getsecctx:
- *	Returns a string containing all relevant security context information
+ *	On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ *	context for the given @inode.
  *
  * 	@inode we wish to get the security context of.
  *	@ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.

include/linux/tpm.h

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
 #ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__
 #define __LINUX_TPM_H__
 
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
+
 /*
  * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
  */

mm/shmem.c

@@ -1936,6 +1936,13 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
 
 	inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
 	if (inode) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+		error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
+		if (error) {
+			iput(inode);
+			return error;
+		}
+#endif
 		error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
 						     &dentry->d_name,
 						     shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
@@ -1945,15 +1952,8 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
 				return error;
 			}
 		}
-#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+
-		error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
-		if (error) {
-			iput(inode);
-			return error;
-		}
-#else
 		error = 0;
-#endif
 		dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
 		dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
 		d_instantiate(dentry, inode);

security/apparmor/audit.c

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 	"HINT",
 	"STATUS",
 	"ERROR",
-	"KILLED"
+	"KILLED",
 	"AUTO"
 };
 

security/apparmor/context.c

@@ -68,6 +68,23 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
 	aa_get_profile(new->onexec);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's profile
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *p;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return p;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
  * @profile: new profile  (NOT NULL)
@@ -76,7 +93,7 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
 	struct cred *new;
 	BUG_ON(!profile);
 
@@ -87,17 +104,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
-	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
+	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
 		/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+		aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+
-		cxt->previous = NULL;
-		cxt->onexec = NULL;
-		cxt->token = 0;
-	}
 	/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
 	 * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping
 	 * @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping
@@ -123,7 +136,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	aa_get_profile(profile);
 	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
 	cxt->onexec = profile;
@@ -150,7 +163,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	BUG_ON(!profile);
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	if (!cxt->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
 		cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
@@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	if (cxt->token != token) {
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -205,11 +218,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
 		aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
 		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
 	}
-	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	/* ref has been transfered so avoid putting ref in clear_task_cxt */
 	cxt->previous = NULL;
-	cxt->token = 0;
+	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
-	cxt->onexec = NULL;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;

security/apparmor/domain.c

@@ -62,17 +62,14 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
 				     struct aa_profile *to_profile)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tracer;
-	const struct cred *cred = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
-	if (tracer) {
+	if (tracer)
 		/* released below */
-		cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+		tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
-		tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
-	}
 
 	/* not ptraced */
 	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
@@ -82,8 +79,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (cred)
+	aa_put_profile(tracerp);
-		put_cred(cred);
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
 
-	cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
 	BUG_ON(!cxt);
 
 	profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
@@ -443,6 +439,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			} else {
 				error = -ENOENT;
 				info = "profile not found";
+				/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+				perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
 			}
 		}
 	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
@@ -514,11 +512,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	cxt->profile = new_profile;
 
 	/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+	aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-	cxt->previous = NULL;
-	cxt->onexec = NULL;
-	cxt->token = 0;
 
 audit:
 	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
@@ -557,7 +551,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
-	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
 
 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
 	if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
@@ -634,7 +628,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
 
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	cxt = cred->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 	previous_profile = cxt->previous;
 
@@ -750,7 +744,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 		      bool permtest)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
 	struct file_perms perms = {};
@@ -770,7 +763,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 	}
 
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	cxt = cred->security;
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
 	/*

security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #ifndef __APPARMOR_H
 #define __APPARMOR_H
 
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 
 #include "match.h"
@@ -64,9 +65,18 @@ extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
 /* fn's in lib */
 char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
 void aa_info_message(const char *str);
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size);
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
 void kvfree(void *buffer);
 
+static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
+}
 
 /**
  * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring

security/apparmor/include/context.h

@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 
 #include "policy.h"
 
+#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security
+#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred())
+
 /* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
  * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
  *
@@ -80,23 +83,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
 int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task);
 
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
-
-	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
-	if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
-}
 
 /**
  * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
@@ -108,11 +96,35 @@ static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
 	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
 	return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
 }
 
+/**
+ * __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task));
+}
+
 /**
  * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
  *
@@ -136,7 +148,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
  */
 static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
 
@@ -151,4 +163,17 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
 	return profile;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt
+ * @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->previous = NULL;
+	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+	cxt->token = 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */

security/apparmor/include/file.h

@@ -186,11 +186,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
 	aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
 }
 
-#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
-
-/* from namei.c */
-#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
-
 /**
  * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
  * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
@@ -199,8 +194,13 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
  */
 static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
 {
-	int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
+	int flags = file->f_flags;
-	u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
+	u32 perms = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		perms |= MAY_READ;
 
 	if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
 		perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;

security/apparmor/include/match.h

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -16,25 +16,30 @@
 #define __AA_MATCH_H
 
 #include <linux/kref.h>
-#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 
 #define DFA_NOMATCH			0
 #define DFA_START			1
 
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK		0xffffffff
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0xffffffff
 
 /**
  * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
  * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
  * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
  * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
- * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
+ * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
- * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
+ * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
+ * package).
+ *
+ *
+ * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
+ * are arranged for flexibility.  We convert the table data to host native
+ * byte order.
+ *
+ * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
+ * tables.
  */
 
 #define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
-#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1			/* DEF Table is recursive */
 
 struct table_set_header {
 	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
@@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
 #define YYTD_DATA32	4
 #define YYTD_DATA64	8
 
-/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
  * first flags
  */
 #define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)

security/apparmor/include/policy.h

@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@
 extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
 
-#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	\
+#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode)		\
-	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \
+	((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) ||	\
-	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
+	 ((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
 
-#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
-	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \
+
-	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
 
 #define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
 
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct aa_ns_acct {
  * @acct: accounting for the namespace
  * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
  * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
  *
  * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
  * which profile to attach to a task.  Profiles can not be shared between
@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
 	struct aa_ns_acct acct;
 	struct aa_profile *unconfined;
 	struct list_head sub_ns;
+	atomic_t uniq_null;
 };
 
 /* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
@@ -148,7 +150,6 @@ struct aa_policydb {
  * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
  * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
  * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
- * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
  * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
  * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
  * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
@@ -184,7 +185,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
 	int xmatch_len;
-	u32 sid;
 	enum audit_mode audit;
 	enum profile_mode mode;
 	u32 flags;

security/apparmor/include/procattr.h

@@ -21,6 +21,5 @@
 int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
 int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
 int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname);
 
 #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */

security/apparmor/include/sid.h

@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-struct aa_profile;
+/* sid value that will not be allocated */
+#define AA_SID_INVALID 0
+#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID
 
 u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
 void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);

security/apparmor/ipc.c

@@ -95,23 +95,18 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
 	 *       - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
 	 */
 
-	struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
+	struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
-	/* cred released below */
-	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
 	int error = 0;
-	tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
 	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
-		/* lcred released below */
+		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
-		const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
-		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);
 
 		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
 		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
 
-		put_cred(lcred);
+		aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
 	}
-	put_cred(cred);
+	aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
 
 	return error;
 }

security/apparmor/lib.c

@@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
 		*ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
 		if (split) {
 			/* overwrite ':' with \0 */
-			*split = 0;
+			*split++ = 0;
-			name = skip_spaces(split + 1);
+			if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
+				split += 2;
+			name = skip_spaces(split);
 		} else
 			/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
 			name = NULL;
@@ -75,15 +77,16 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
 }
 
 /**
- * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
+ * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
- * @size: size of allocation
+ * @size: how many bytes of memory are required
+ * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
  *
  * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
  *
  * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
  * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
  */
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	void *buffer = NULL;
 
@@ -92,31 +95,21 @@ void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
 
 	/* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
 	if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
-		buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (!buffer) {
 		/* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size
 		 * when allocated via vmalloc
 		 */
 		if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct))
 			size = sizeof(struct work_struct);
-		buffer = vmalloc(size);
+		if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+			buffer = vzalloc(size);
+		else
+			buffer = vmalloc(size);
 	}
 	return buffer;
 }
 
-/**
- * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory
- * @work: data to be freed
- *
- * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point
- * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing
- * needs to be delayed until safe.
- */
-static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
-{
-	vfree(work);
-}
-
 /**
  * kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc
  * @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL)
@@ -125,13 +118,8 @@ static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
  */
 void kvfree(void *buffer)
 {
-	if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) {
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer))
-		/* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space
+		vfree(buffer);
-		 * as the work_struct
+	else
-		 */
-		struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer;
-		INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree);
-		schedule_work(work);
-	} else
 		kfree(buffer);
 }

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
+	aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
-	cred->security = NULL;
+	cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (!cxt)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cred->security = cxt;
+	cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	if (!cxt)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
+	aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
-	new->security = cxt;
+	cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
-	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 
 	aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
 }
@@ -469,7 +469,6 @@ static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry;
 	int mask = 0;
 
 	if (!file || !file->f_security)
@@ -486,7 +485,6 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
 		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 
-	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -507,11 +505,9 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				char **value)
 {
 	int error = -ENOENT;
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
-	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
 		error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
@@ -533,6 +529,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				void *value, size_t size)
 {
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	char *command, *args = value;
 	size_t arg_size;
 	int error;
@@ -576,30 +574,31 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
 			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
 							     AA_DO_TEST);
-		} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
+		} else
-			error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
+			goto fail;
-		} else {
-			struct common_audit_data sa;
-			struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-			sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
-			sa.aad = &aad;
-			aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
-			aad.info = name;
-			aad.error = -EINVAL;
-			return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
-					__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
-					&sa, NULL);
-		}
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
-		error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+		if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
-						     !AA_DO_TEST);
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
-	} else {
+							     !AA_DO_TEST);
+		else
+			goto fail;
+	} else
 		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	if (!error)
 		error = size;
 	return error;
+
+fail:
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
+	aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+	aad.info = name;
+	aad.error = -EINVAL;
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -886,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
-	cred->security = cxt;
+	cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -915,8 +914,11 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
 	if (error) {
+		struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+		aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+		cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
 		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-		goto set_init_cxt_out;
+		goto register_security_out;
 	}
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
@@ -930,9 +932,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	return error;
 
-set_init_cxt_out:
-	aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security);
-
 register_security_out:
 	aa_free_root_ns();
 

security/apparmor/match.c

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
 
+#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
+
 /**
  * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
  * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@
  *
  * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
  *
- * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc)
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
  */
 static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 {
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 	if (bsize < tsize)
 		goto out;
 
-	table = kvmalloc(tsize);
+	table = kvzalloc(tsize);
 	if (table) {
 		*table = th;
 		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
@@ -137,8 +139,7 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
 		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
 			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
 				goto out;
-			/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
+			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
-			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
 				       "bounds error\n");
 				goto out;
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		while (*str) {
-			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		while (*str) {
-			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -409,14 +410,14 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 
-		pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
+		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
 		if (check[pos] == state)
 			state = next[pos];
 		else
 			state = def[state];
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
+		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
 		if (check[pos] == state)
 			state = next[pos];
 		else

security/apparmor/path.c

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
 	if (info && error) {
 		if (error == -ENOENT)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-		else if (error == -ESTALE)
+		else if (error == -EACCES)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
 		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";

security/apparmor/policy.c

@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
 
 
 /* root profile namespace */
@@ -292,7 +291,6 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
 	if (!ns->unconfined)
 		goto fail_unconfined;
 
-	ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
 	ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
 	    PFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
 
@@ -303,6 +301,8 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
 	 */
 	ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
 
+	atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
+
 	return ns;
 
 fail_unconfined:
@@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
 	/* released when @new is freed */
 	new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent);
 	new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns);
-	new->sid = old->sid;
 	__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new);
 	/* inherit children */
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) {
@@ -635,83 +634,6 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
 	 aa_put_namespace(ns);
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
- * @hname: name of the profile  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
-
-	/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
-	profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!profile)
-		return NULL;
-
-	if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
-		kzfree(profile);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* refcount released by caller */
-	return profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
- * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
- * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
- *
- * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The name of
- * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid.
- *
- * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
- * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
- * not in use.
- *
- * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-	char *name;
-	u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid();
-
-	/* freed below */
-	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!name)
-		goto fail;
-	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid);
-
-	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
-	kfree(name);
-	if (!profile)
-		goto fail;
-
-	profile->sid = sid;
-	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
-	profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
-	if (hat)
-		profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
-
-	/* released on free_profile */
-	profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
-	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
-
-	write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
-	__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
-	write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
-
-	/* refcount released by caller */
-	return profile;
-
-fail:
-	aa_free_sid(sid);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
 /**
  * free_profile - free a profile
  * @profile: the profile to free  (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -749,7 +671,6 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
-	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 
@@ -790,6 +711,81 @@ void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref)
 	free_profile(p);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
+ * @hname: name of the profile  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
+	profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
+		kzfree(profile);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+ *
+ * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The name of
+ * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>.
+ *
+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+ * not in use.
+ *
+ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	char *name;
+	int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null);
+
+	/* freed below */
+	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		goto fail;
+	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq);
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+	kfree(name);
+	if (!profile)
+		goto fail;
+
+	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+	profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
+	if (hat)
+		profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+
+	/* released on free_profile */
+	profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
+	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
+
+	write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+	__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+	write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
 
 /**
@@ -972,7 +968,6 @@ static void __add_new_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_policy *policy,
 		profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy);
 	__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile);
 	/* released on free_profile */
-	profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
 	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
 }
 
@@ -1110,14 +1105,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
 	if (!error) {
 		if (rename_profile)
 			__replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile);
-		if (old_profile) {
+		if (old_profile)
-			/* when there are both rename and old profiles
-			 * inherit old profiles sid
-			 */
-			if (rename_profile)
-				aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid);
 			__replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile);
-		}
 		if (!(old_profile || rename_profile))
 			__add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile);
 	}
@@ -1167,14 +1156,12 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
 	if (fqname[0] == ':') {
 		char *ns_name;
 		name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
-		if (ns_name) {
+		/* released below */
-			/* released below */
+		ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
-			ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
+		if (!ns) {
-			if (!ns) {
+			info = "namespace does not exist";
-				info = "namespace does not exist";
+			error = -ENOENT;
-				error = -ENOENT;
+			goto fail;
-				goto fail;
-			}
 		}
 	} else
 		/* released below */

security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include "include/match.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
 
 /*
  * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
@@ -290,6 +289,9 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
 	return res;
 }
 
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK		0xffffffff
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0xffffffff
+
 /**
  * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
  * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)

security/apparmor/procattr.c

@@ -163,9 +163,3 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test)
 	name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
 	return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
 }
-
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname)
-{
-	/* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
-	return -ENOTSUPP;
-}

security/apparmor/resource.c

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
@@ -90,17 +91,25 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
 int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
 		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *task_profile;
 	int error = 0;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
-	 * processes.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+	 * profiles.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
-	 * that the task is setting the resource of the current process
+	 * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+	 * the same profile.
 	 */
-	if ((task != current->group_leader) ||
+	if (profile != task_profile ||
 	    (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
 	     new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
 		error = -EACCES;
 
+	aa_put_profile(task_profile);
+
 	return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
 }
 

security/integrity/Kconfig

@@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+	depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+	default y
+	help
+	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+	  option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+	  controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+	  0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+	  1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+	  Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+	  command line.
+
 config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
 	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE

security/integrity/Makefile

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
 
 int evm_initialized;
 
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
 int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 			return 0;
-		return -EPERM;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
 	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
@@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 		return 0;
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

@@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 	  that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
 	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
 
-config IMA_AUDIT
-	bool "Enables auditing support"
-	depends on IMA
-	depends on AUDIT
-	default y
-	help
-	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
-	  allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
-	  at boot.  If this option is selected, informational integrity
-	  auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
-	  the kernel command line.
-
 config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	bool
 	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)

security/integrity/ima/Makefile

@@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
 };
 extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-/* declarations */
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
-			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
-#else
-static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-				       const unsigned char *fname,
-				       const char *op, const char *cause,
-				       int result, int info)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);

security/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+				       const unsigned char *fname,
+				       const char *op, const char *cause,
+				       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int iint_initialized;

security/integrity/integrity_audit.c

@@ -13,20 +13,20 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include "ima.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
 
-static int ima_audit;
+static int integrity_audit_info;
 
 /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
-static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
 
 	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
-		ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
+		integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
 
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
-	if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
 		return;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);

security/smack/smack.h

@@ -28,71 +28,6 @@
 #define SMK_LABELLEN	24
 #define SMK_LONGLABEL	256
 
-/*
- * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
- * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
- * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
- * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
- * aside for the terminating null byte.
- */
-#define SMK_CIPSOLEN	24
-
-struct superblock_smack {
-	char		*smk_root;
-	char		*smk_floor;
-	char		*smk_hat;
-	char		*smk_default;
-	int		smk_initialized;
-};
-
-struct socket_smack {
-	char		*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
-	char		*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
-	char		*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
-};
-
-/*
- * Inode smack data
- */
-struct inode_smack {
-	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
-	char		*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
-	char		*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
-	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
-	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
-};
-
-struct task_smack {
-	char			*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
-	char			*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
-	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
-	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
-};
-
-#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
-#define	SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE	0x02	/* directory is transmuting */
-#define	SMK_INODE_CHANGED	0x04	/* smack was transmuted */
-
-/*
- * A label access rule.
- */
-struct smack_rule {
-	struct list_head	list;
-	char			*smk_subject;
-	char			*smk_object;
-	int			smk_access;
-};
-
-/*
- * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
- */
-struct smk_netlbladdr {
-	struct list_head	list;
-	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
-	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
-	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
-};
-
 /*
  * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
  * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
@@ -125,6 +60,82 @@ struct smack_known {
 	struct mutex			smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for rules */
 };
 
+/*
+ * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
+ * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
+ * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
+ * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
+ * aside for the terminating null byte.
+ */
+#define SMK_CIPSOLEN	24
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+	char		*smk_root;
+	char		*smk_floor;
+	char		*smk_hat;
+	char		*smk_default;
+	int		smk_initialized;
+};
+
+struct socket_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
+	char			*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	char			*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+	char			*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
+	struct mutex		smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
+	int			smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+struct task_smack {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
+};
+
+#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
+#define	SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE	0x02	/* directory is transmuting */
+#define	SMK_INODE_CHANGED	0x04	/* smack was transmuted */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
+	char			*smk_object;
+	int			smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
+	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
+	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying ports.
+ */
+struct smk_port_label {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct sock		*smk_sock;	/* socket initialized on */
+	unsigned short		smk_port;	/* the port number */
+	char			*smk_in;	/* incoming label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
+};
+
 /*
  * Mount options
  */
@@ -132,6 +143,7 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define SMK_FSFLOOR	"smackfsfloor="
 #define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
 #define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
+#define SMK_FSTRANS	"smackfstransmute="
 
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
 
@@ -203,9 +215,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
-int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
 int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
 char *smk_import(const char *, int);
@@ -218,7 +230,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
  */
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
-extern char *smack_net_ambient;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
@@ -254,17 +266,17 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
 }
 
 /*
- * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 {
 	return tsp->smk_task;
 }
 
 /*
- * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 {
 	return tsp->smk_forked;
 }
@@ -272,7 +284,7 @@ static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 /*
  * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 {
 	return smk_of_task(current_security());
 }
@@ -283,9 +295,11 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
  */
 static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
 	if (!capable(cap))
 		return 0;
-	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 }

security/smack/smack_access.c

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
-		    srp->smk_subject == subject_label) {
+		    srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
 			may = srp->smk_access;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 
 /**
  * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
- * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
  * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : a pointer to the audit data
@@ -115,10 +115,9 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
  *
  * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
  */
-int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
-	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
+		int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int may = MAY_NOT;
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 *
 	 * A star subject can't access any object.
 	 */
-	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) {
+	if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) {
 		rc = -EACCES;
 		goto out_audit;
 	}
@@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * An internet subject can access any object.
 	 */
 	if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
-	    subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+	    subject_known == &smack_known_web)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
 	 * with the same label.
 	 */
-	if (subject_label == object_label)
+	if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A hat subject can read any object.
@@ -157,7 +156,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
 		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
 			goto out_audit;
-		if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known)
+		if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat)
 			goto out_audit;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -167,9 +166,9 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
 	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
 	 */
-	skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules);
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label,
+				&subject_known->smk_rules);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
@@ -179,7 +178,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+		smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request,
+				rc, a);
 #endif
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -198,20 +198,21 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-	char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
 	int may;
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check the global rule list
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
 		 * it can further restrict access.
 		 */
-		may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (may < 0)
 			goto out_audit;
 		if ((mode & may) == mode)
@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+		smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
 #endif
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 	sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
 	sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!sap->attr.mls.cat)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
 
 	for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
@@ -513,10 +516,10 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
  * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
  * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
  *
- * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
  * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
  */
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
@@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
 		if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return skp->smk_known;
+			return skp;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -533,7 +536,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
 	 */
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	return &smack_known_invalid;
 }
 
 /**

security/smack/smackfs.c

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
  * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
  */
-char *smack_net_ambient;
+struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 
 /*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct smack_master_list {
 LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
 
 struct smack_parsed_rule {
-	char			*smk_subject;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
 	char			*smk_object;
 	int			smk_access1;
 	int			smk_access2;
@@ -163,9 +163,11 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
  */
 static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
 	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
+	nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (import) {
-		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
 			return -1;
 
@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
 			return -1;
-		rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
+		rule->smk_subject = skp;
 
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
@@ -445,7 +447,6 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 					struct list_head *rule_list,
 					struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_parsed_rule *rule;
 	char *data;
 	int datalen;
@@ -505,12 +506,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
-
 	if (rule_list == NULL) {
 		load = 1;
-		skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject);
+		rule_list = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules;
-		rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
+		rule_lock = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules_lock;
-		rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
 	}
 
 	rc = smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock, load);
@@ -579,13 +578,14 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 	 * because you should expect to be able to write
 	 * anything you read back.
 	 */
-	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
+	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
+	    strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
 		return;
 
 	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
 		return;
 
-	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object);
 
 	seq_putc(s, ' ');
 
@@ -738,9 +738,9 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 			       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
 	}
 	if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
-		smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+		smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
 
-	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
 				      NULL, NULL, &nai);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
 		rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
 	else
-		rule += strlen(skp->smk_known);
+		rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
 
 	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
 	if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
@@ -1535,11 +1535,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
 
-	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1;
+	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
 
 	if (cn >= asize)
 		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
-					     smack_net_ambient, asize);
+					     smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
+					     asize);
 	else
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1560,8 +1561,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *oldambient;
-	char *smack = NULL;
 	char *data;
 	int rc = count;
 
@@ -1577,16 +1578,16 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	smack = smk_import(data, count);
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
-	if (smack == NULL) {
+	if (skp == NULL) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
 
-	oldambient = smack_net_ambient;
+	oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
-	smack_net_ambient = smack;
+	smack_net_ambient = skp;
 	smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
@@ -1645,7 +1646,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	char *data;
-	char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
 	int rc = count;
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
@@ -1656,7 +1657,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
 	 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
 	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1866,8 +1867,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (res)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1,
+	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
-			  NULL);
+				rule.smk_access1, NULL);
 	data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
 	data[1] = '\0';