diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f54207b90cad..2c43af9e836c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -402,6 +402,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE		(20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e41b271abbda..90a91ef0fc64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2286,10 +2286,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return;
 
-	has_microcode = cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
+	/*
+	 * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
+	 * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
+	 */
+	has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
 	if (!has_microcode) {
 		pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
 		pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
+		 * flag for guests.
+		 */
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
 	}
 
 	switch (srso_cmd) {