diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 726a2dbb407f..7865db2f827e 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1034,6 +1034,7 @@ struct xfrm_offload {
 struct sec_path {
 	int			len;
 	int			olen;
+	int			verified_cnt;
 
 	struct xfrm_state	*xvec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
 	struct xfrm_offload	ovec[XFRM_MAX_OFFLOAD_DEPTH];
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index fef99a1c5df1..f3bccab983f0 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ struct sec_path *secpath_set(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memset(sp->ovec, 0, sizeof(sp->ovec));
 	sp->olen = 0;
 	sp->len = 0;
+	sp->verified_cnt = 0;
 
 	return sp;
 }
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index d3b128b74a38..465d28341ed6 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3277,6 +3277,13 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int star
 		if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family, if_id))
 			return ++idx;
 		if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
+			if (idx < sp->verified_cnt) {
+				/* Secpath entry previously verified, consider optional and
+				 * continue searching
+				 */
+				continue;
+			}
+
 			if (start == -1)
 				start = -2-idx;
 			break;
@@ -3688,6 +3695,9 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		 * Order is _important_. Later we will implement
 		 * some barriers, but at the moment barriers
 		 * are implied between each two transformations.
+		 * Upon success, marks secpath entries as having been
+		 * verified to allow them to be skipped in future policy
+		 * checks (e.g. nested tunnels).
 		 */
 		for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
 			k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family, if_id);
@@ -3706,6 +3716,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 
 		xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols);
+		sp->verified_cnt = k;
+
 		return 1;
 	}
 	XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK);