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UPSTREAM: sctp: validate chunk size in __rcv_asconf_lookup

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commit b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae upstream.

In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an
incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek.
Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had
enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized
memory.

Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in
sctp_verify_asconf().

Bug: 197154735
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ding <aaronding@google.com>
Change-Id: Ibfe53fc724143423353ed6b2984d2508ee4fc457
This commit is contained in:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 2021-06-28 16:13:43 -03:00 committed by Aaron Ding
parent fef7dba3a7
commit 282a4de8f0
1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
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3
net/sctp/input.c
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@ -1168,6 +1168,9 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
union sctp_addr_param *param;
union sctp_addr paddr;
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
return NULL;
/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */
param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);