android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8450/fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (C) 2008 Christoph Hellwig.
* Portions Copyright (C) 2000-2008 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
*/
#include "xfs.h"
#include "xfs_shared.h"
#include "xfs_format.h"
#include "xfs_log_format.h"
#include "xfs_da_format.h"
#include "xfs_inode.h"
#include "xfs_attr.h"
#include "xfs_acl.h"
#include "xfs_da_btree.h"
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
static int
xfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused,
FROMLIST: Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr Add a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of XATTR_NOSECURITY passed to it. XATTR_NOSECURITY is generally then set in the __vfs_getxattr path when called by security infrastructure. This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being requested by the security layer to report back the xattr data. For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer. The path then could be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> __vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back the target context that was blocked. Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) -> handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> nested -> security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry) which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES. For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly determined blocked access. In the first case with this change a correct avc log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow. This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of __vfs_getxattr with __vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY). Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from (rejected from archive because of too many recipients)) Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com> Bug: 133515582 Bug: 136124883 Bug: 129319403 Change-Id: Iabbb8771939d5f66667a26bb23ddf4c562c349a1
2019-11-05 01:57:10 +09:00
struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct xfs_da_args args = {
.dp = XFS_I(inode),
.attr_filter = handler->flags,
.name = name,
.namelen = strlen(name),
.value = value,
.valuelen = size,
};
int error;
error = xfs_attr_get(&args);
if (error)
return error;
return args.valuelen;
}
static int
xfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused,
struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct xfs_da_args args = {
.dp = XFS_I(inode),
.attr_filter = handler->flags,
.attr_flags = flags,
.name = name,
.namelen = strlen(name),
.value = (void *)value,
.valuelen = size,
};
xfs: invalidate cached acl if set directly via xattr ACLs are stored as extended attributes of the inode to which they apply. XFS converts the standard "system.posix_acl_[access|default]" attribute names used to control ACLs to "trusted.SGI_ACL_[FILE|DEFAULT]" as stored on-disk. These xattrs are directly exposed in on-disk format via getxattr/setxattr, without any ACL aware code in the path to perform validation, etc. This is partly historical and supports backup/restore applications such as xfsdump to back up and restore the binary blob that represents ACLs as-is. Andreas reports that the ACLs observed via the getfacl interface is not consistent when ACLs are set directly via the setxattr path. This occurs because the ACLs are cached in-core against the inode and the xattr path has no knowledge that the operation relates to ACLs. Update the xattr set codepath to trap writes of the special XFS ACL attributes and invalidate the associated cached ACL when this occurs. This ensures that the correct ACLs are used on a subsequent operation through the actual ACL interface. Note that this does not update or add support for setting the ACL xattrs directly beyond the restore use case that requires a correctly formatted binary blob and to restore a consistent i_mode at the same time. It is still possible for a root user to set an invalid or inconsistent (with i_mode) ACL blob on-disk and potentially cause corruption. [ With fixes from Andreas Gruenbacher. ] Reported-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-11-03 10:40:59 +09:00
int error;
error = xfs_attr_set(&args);
if (!error && (handler->flags & XFS_ATTR_ROOT))
xfs_forget_acl(inode, name);
xfs: invalidate cached acl if set directly via xattr ACLs are stored as extended attributes of the inode to which they apply. XFS converts the standard "system.posix_acl_[access|default]" attribute names used to control ACLs to "trusted.SGI_ACL_[FILE|DEFAULT]" as stored on-disk. These xattrs are directly exposed in on-disk format via getxattr/setxattr, without any ACL aware code in the path to perform validation, etc. This is partly historical and supports backup/restore applications such as xfsdump to back up and restore the binary blob that represents ACLs as-is. Andreas reports that the ACLs observed via the getfacl interface is not consistent when ACLs are set directly via the setxattr path. This occurs because the ACLs are cached in-core against the inode and the xattr path has no knowledge that the operation relates to ACLs. Update the xattr set codepath to trap writes of the special XFS ACL attributes and invalidate the associated cached ACL when this occurs. This ensures that the correct ACLs are used on a subsequent operation through the actual ACL interface. Note that this does not update or add support for setting the ACL xattrs directly beyond the restore use case that requires a correctly formatted binary blob and to restore a consistent i_mode at the same time. It is still possible for a root user to set an invalid or inconsistent (with i_mode) ACL blob on-disk and potentially cause corruption. [ With fixes from Andreas Gruenbacher. ] Reported-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2015-11-03 10:40:59 +09:00
return error;
}
static const struct xattr_handler xfs_xattr_user_handler = {
.prefix = XATTR_USER_PREFIX,
.flags = 0, /* no flags implies user namespace */
.get = xfs_xattr_get,
.set = xfs_xattr_set,
};
static const struct xattr_handler xfs_xattr_trusted_handler = {
.prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
.flags = XFS_ATTR_ROOT,
.get = xfs_xattr_get,
.set = xfs_xattr_set,
};
static const struct xattr_handler xfs_xattr_security_handler = {
.prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
.flags = XFS_ATTR_SECURE,
.get = xfs_xattr_get,
.set = xfs_xattr_set,
};
const struct xattr_handler *xfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
&xfs_xattr_user_handler,
&xfs_xattr_trusted_handler,
&xfs_xattr_security_handler,
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
&posix_acl_access_xattr_handler,
&posix_acl_default_xattr_handler,
#endif
NULL
};
static void
__xfs_xattr_put_listent(
struct xfs_attr_list_context *context,
char *prefix,
int prefix_len,
unsigned char *name,
int namelen)
{
char *offset;
int arraytop;
if (context->count < 0 || context->seen_enough)
return;
if (!context->buffer)
goto compute_size;
arraytop = context->count + prefix_len + namelen + 1;
if (arraytop > context->firstu) {
context->count = -1; /* insufficient space */
context->seen_enough = 1;
return;
}
offset = context->buffer + context->count;
strncpy(offset, prefix, prefix_len);
offset += prefix_len;
strncpy(offset, (char *)name, namelen); /* real name */
offset += namelen;
*offset = '\0';
compute_size:
context->count += prefix_len + namelen + 1;
return;
}
static void
xfs_xattr_put_listent(
struct xfs_attr_list_context *context,
int flags,
unsigned char *name,
int namelen,
int valuelen)
{
char *prefix;
int prefix_len;
ASSERT(context->count >= 0);
if (flags & XFS_ATTR_ROOT) {
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
if (namelen == SGI_ACL_FILE_SIZE &&
strncmp(name, SGI_ACL_FILE,
SGI_ACL_FILE_SIZE) == 0) {
__xfs_xattr_put_listent(
context, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX,
XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN,
XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS,
strlen(XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS));
} else if (namelen == SGI_ACL_DEFAULT_SIZE &&
strncmp(name, SGI_ACL_DEFAULT,
SGI_ACL_DEFAULT_SIZE) == 0) {
__xfs_xattr_put_listent(
context, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX,
XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN,
XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT,
strlen(XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT));
}
#endif
/*
* Only show root namespace entries if we are actually allowed to
* see them.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX;
prefix_len = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
} else if (flags & XFS_ATTR_SECURE) {
prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX;
prefix_len = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
} else {
prefix = XATTR_USER_PREFIX;
prefix_len = XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
}
__xfs_xattr_put_listent(context, prefix, prefix_len, name,
namelen);
return;
}
ssize_t
xfs_vn_listxattr(
struct dentry *dentry,
char *data,
size_t size)
{
struct xfs_attr_list_context context;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int error;
/*
* First read the regular on-disk attributes.
*/
memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
context.dp = XFS_I(inode);
context.resynch = 1;
context.buffer = size ? data : NULL;
context.bufsize = size;
context.firstu = context.bufsize;
context.put_listent = xfs_xattr_put_listent;
error = xfs_attr_list(&context);
if (error)
return error;
if (context.count < 0)
return -ERANGE;
return context.count;
}