99f1bc32eb
71468 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
99f1bc32eb |
Bluetooth: Fix printing errors if LE Connection times out
[ Upstream commit b62e72200eaad523f08d8319bba50fc652e032a8 ]
This fixes errors like bellow when LE Connection times out since that
is actually not a controller error:
Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x200d failed: -110
Bluetooth: hci0: request failed to create LE connection: err -110
Instead the code shall properly detect if -ETIMEDOUT is returned and
send HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN_CANCEL to give up on the connection.
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/340
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
7c90d78301 |
Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not cleaning up on LE Connection failure
[ Upstream commit 19cf60bf63cbaf5262eac400c707966e19999b83 ]
hci_connect_le_scan_cleanup shall always be invoked to cleanup the
states and re-enable passive scanning if necessary, otherwise it may
cause the pending action to stay active causing multiple attempts to
connect.
Fixes:
|
||
Felix Huettner
|
644b3051b0 |
net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
[ Upstream commit 066b86787fa3d97b7aefb5ac0a99a22dad2d15f8 ]
assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server
when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu
stuck in a infinite loop:
1. send a large amount of parallel requests to the http server (around
3000 curls should work)
2. in parallel delete the network namespace (do not delete interfaces or
stop the server, just kill the namespace)
there is a low chance that this will cause the below kernel cpu stuck
message. If this does not happen just retry.
Below there is also the output of bpftrace for the functions mentioned
in the output.
The series of events happening here is:
1. the network namespace is deleted calling
`unregister_netdevice_many_notify` somewhere in the process
2. this sets first `NETREG_UNREGISTERING` on both ends of the veth and
then runs `synchronize_net`
3. it then calls `call_netdevice_notifiers` with `NETDEV_UNREGISTER`
4. this is then handled by `dp_device_event` which calls
`ovs_netdev_detach_dev` (if a vport is found, which is the case for
the veth interface attached to ovs)
5. this removes the rx_handlers of the device but does not prevent
packages to be sent to the device
6. `dp_device_event` then queues the vport deletion to work in
background as a ovs_lock is needed that we do not hold in the
unregistration path
7. `unregister_netdevice_many_notify` continues to call
`netdev_unregister_kobject` which sets `real_num_tx_queues` to 0
8. port deletion continues (but details are not relevant for this issue)
9. at some future point the background task deletes the vport
If after 7. but before 9. a packet is send to the ovs vport (which is
not deleted at this point in time) which forwards it to the
`dev_queue_xmit` flow even though the device is unregistering.
In `skb_tx_hash` (which is called in the `dev_queue_xmit`) path there is
a while loop (if the packet has a rx_queue recorded) that is infinite if
`dev->real_num_tx_queues` is zero.
To prevent this from happening we update `do_output` to handle devices
without carrier the same as if the device is not found (which would
be the code path after 9. is done).
Additionally we now produce a warning in `skb_tx_hash` if we will hit
the infinite loop.
bpftrace (first word is function name):
__dev_queue_xmit server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
netdev_core_pick_tx server: addr: 0xffff9f0a46d4a000 real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 2, reg_state: 1
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 6, reg_state: 2
ovs_netdev_detach_dev server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
netdev_rx_handler_unregister server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
netdev_rx_handler_unregister ret server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 27, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 22, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 18, reg_state: 2
netdev_unregister_kobject: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
ovs_vport_send server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
__dev_queue_xmit server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
netdev_core_pick_tx server: addr: 0xffff9f0a46d4a000 real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
broken device server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024
ovs_dp_detach_port server: real_num_tx_queues: 0 cpu 9, pid: 9124, tid: 9124, reg_state: 2
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 33604, tid: 33604
stuck message:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 26s! [curl:1929279]
Modules linked in: veth pktgen bridge stp llc ip_set_hash_net nft_counter xt_set nft_compat nf_tables ip_set_hash_ip ip_set nfnetlink_cttimeout nfnetlink openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 tls binfmt_misc nls_iso8859_1 input_leds joydev serio_raw dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua sch_fq_codel drm efi_pstore virtio_rng ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear hid_generic usbhid hid crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net ahci net_failover crypto_simd cryptd psmouse libahci virtio_blk failover
CPU: 5 PID: 1929279 Comm: curl Not tainted 5.15.0-67-generic #74-Ubuntu
Hardware name: OpenStack Foundation OpenStack Nova, BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:netdev_pick_tx+0xf1/0x320
Code: 00 00 8d 48 ff 0f b7 c1 66 39 ca 0f 86 e9 01 00 00 45 0f b7 ff 41 39 c7 0f 87 5b 01 00 00 44 29 f8 41 39 c7 0f 87 4f 01 00 00 <eb> f2 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 8b 94 24 28 04 00 00 48 85 d2 0f 84 53 01
RSP: 0018:ffffb78b40298820 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9c8773adc2e0 RCX: 000000000000083f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9c8773adc2e0 RDI: ffff9c870a25e000
RBP: ffffb78b40298858 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9c870a25e000
R13: ffff9c870a25e000 R14: ffff9c87fe043480 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f7b80008f00(0000) GS:ffff9c8e5f740000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7b80f6a0b0 CR3: 0000000329d66000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
netdev_core_pick_tx+0xa4/0xb0
__dev_queue_xmit+0xf8/0x510
? __bpf_prog_exit+0x1e/0x30
dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
ovs_vport_send+0xad/0x170 [openvswitch]
do_output+0x59/0x180 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0xa80/0xaa0 [openvswitch]
? kfree+0x1/0x250
? kfree+0x1/0x250
? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
? flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x5c/0x110 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0x4c/0x120 [openvswitch]
ovs_dp_process_packet+0xa1/0x200 [openvswitch]
? ovs_ct_update_key.isra.0+0xa8/0x120 [openvswitch]
? ovs_ct_fill_key+0x1d/0x30 [openvswitch]
? ovs_flow_key_extract+0x2db/0x350 [openvswitch]
ovs_vport_receive+0x77/0xd0 [openvswitch]
? __htab_map_lookup_elem+0x4e/0x60
? bpf_prog_680e8aff8547aec1_kfree+0x3b/0x714
? trace_call_bpf+0xc8/0x150
? kfree+0x1/0x250
? kfree+0x1/0x250
? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0x63/0xe0
netdev_port_receive+0xc4/0x180 [openvswitch]
? netdev_port_receive+0x180/0x180 [openvswitch]
netdev_frame_hook+0x1f/0x40 [openvswitch]
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x23d/0xf00
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3f/0xa0
__netif_receive_skb+0x15/0x60
process_backlog+0x9e/0x170
__napi_poll+0x33/0x180
net_rx_action+0x126/0x280
? ttwu_do_activate+0x72/0xf0
__do_softirq+0xd9/0x2e7
? rcu_report_exp_cpu_mult+0x1b0/0x1b0
do_softirq+0x7d/0xb0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x54/0x60
ip_finish_output2+0x191/0x460
__ip_finish_output+0xb7/0x180
ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xc0
ip_output+0x78/0x100
? __ip_finish_output+0x180/0x180
ip_local_out+0x5e/0x70
__ip_queue_xmit+0x184/0x440
? tcp_syn_options+0x1f9/0x300
ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x20
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x910/0x9c0
? __mod_memcg_state+0x44/0xa0
tcp_connect+0x437/0x4e0
? ktime_get_with_offset+0x60/0xf0
tcp_v4_connect+0x436/0x530
__inet_stream_connect+0xd4/0x3a0
? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1c0
inet_stream_connect+0x3b/0x60
__sys_connect_file+0x63/0x70
__sys_connect+0xa6/0xd0
? setfl+0x108/0x170
? do_fcntl+0xe8/0x5a0
__x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
? __x64_sys_fcntl+0xa9/0xd0
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
? __sys_setsockopt+0xea/0x1e0
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
? __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f7b8101c6a7
Code: 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2a 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 54 24 0c 48 89 34 24 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffffd6b2198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7b8101c6a7
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffffd6b2360 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000561f1370d560 R08: 00002795ad21d1ac R09: 0030312e302e302e
R10: 00007ffffd73f080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000561f1370c410
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Fixes:
|
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YueHaibing
|
9d7765638f |
tcp: restrict net.ipv4.tcp_app_win
[ Upstream commit dc5110c2d959c1707e12df5f792f41d90614adaa ]
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:555:23
shift exponent 255 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
CPU: 1 PID: 7907 Comm: ssh Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-00161-g62bad54b26db-dirty #206
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x21f/0x5a0
tcp_init_transfer.cold+0x3a/0xb9
tcp_finish_connect+0x1d0/0x620
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xd78/0x4d60
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x33d/0x9d0
__release_sock+0x133/0x3b0
release_sock+0x58/0x1b0
'maxwin' is int, shifting int for 32 or more bits is undefined behaviour.
Fixes:
|
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Zheng Wang
|
c4002b9d5e |
9p/xen : Fix use after free bug in xen_9pfs_front_remove due to race condition
[ Upstream commit ea4f1009408efb4989a0f139b70fb338e7f687d0 ]
In xen_9pfs_front_probe, it calls xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring
to init priv->rings and bound &ring->work with p9_xen_response.
When it calls xen_9pfs_front_event_handler to handle IRQ requests,
it will finally call schedule_work to start the work.
When we call xen_9pfs_front_remove to remove the driver, there
may be a sequence as follows:
Fix it by finishing the work before cleanup in xen_9pfs_front_free.
Note that, this bug is found by static analysis, which might be
false positive.
CPU0 CPU1
|p9_xen_response
xen_9pfs_front_remove|
xen_9pfs_front_free|
kfree(priv) |
//free priv |
|p9_tag_lookup
|//use priv->client
Fixes:
|
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Martin KaFai Lau
|
db9c9086d3 |
bpf: tcp: Use sock_gen_put instead of sock_put in bpf_iter_tcp
[ Upstream commit 580031ff9952b7dbf48dedba6b56a100ae002bef ]
While reviewing the udp-iter batching patches, noticed the bpf_iter_tcp
calling sock_put() is incorrect. It should call sock_gen_put instead
because bpf_iter_tcp is iterating the ehash table which has the req sk
and tw sk. This patch replaces all sock_put with sock_gen_put in the
bpf_iter_tcp codepath.
Fixes:
|
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|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
8c4b65f6c7 |
Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix possible UAF
commit 5dc7d23e167e2882ef118456ceccd57873e876d8 upstream. This fixes the following trace: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_conn_del+0xba/0x3a0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800208e9c8 by task iso-tester/31 CPU: 0 PID: 31 Comm: iso-tester Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-g991aa4a69a47 #4716 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc36 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x1d/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x610 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd4/0x150 ? hci_conn_del+0xba/0x3a0 kasan_report+0xdd/0x110 ? hci_conn_del+0xba/0x3a0 hci_conn_del+0xba/0x3a0 hci_conn_hash_flush+0xf2/0x120 hci_dev_close_sync+0x388/0x920 hci_unregister_dev+0x122/0x260 vhci_release+0x4f/0x90 __fput+0x102/0x430 task_work_run+0xf1/0x160 ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x170/0x180 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x70/0xda Fixes: 0f00cd322d22 ("Bluetooth: Free potentially unfreed SCO connection") Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8bb72f86fc823817bc5d Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Archie Pusaka
|
4290d89ae9 |
Bluetooth: Free potentially unfreed SCO connection
commit 0f00cd322d22d4441de51aa80bcce5bb6a8cbb44 upstream. It is possible to initiate a SCO connection while deleting the corresponding ACL connection, e.g. in below scenario: (1) < hci setup sync connect command (2) > hci disconn complete event (for the acl connection) (3) > hci command complete event (for(1), failure) When it happens, hci_cs_setup_sync_conn won't be able to obtain the reference to the SCO connection, so it will be stuck and potentially hinder subsequent connections to the same device. This patch prevents that by also deleting the SCO connection if it is still not established when the corresponding ACL connection is deleted. Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Min Li
|
f6719fd8f4 |
Bluetooth: Fix race condition in hidp_session_thread
commit c95930abd687fcd1aa040dc4fe90dff947916460 upstream. There is a potential race condition in hidp_session_thread that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, the timer is active while hidp_del_timer is called in hidp_session_thread(). After hidp_session_put, then 'session' will be freed, causing kernel panic when hidp_idle_timeout is running. The solution is to use del_timer_sync instead of del_timer. Here is the call trace: ? hidp_session_probe+0x780/0x780 call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1e0 __run_timers.part.0+0x569/0x940 hidp_session_probe+0x780/0x780 call_timer_fn+0x1e0/0x1e0 ktime_get+0x5c/0xf0 lapic_next_deadline+0x2c/0x40 clockevents_program_event+0x205/0x320 run_timer_softirq+0xa9/0x1b0 __do_softirq+0x1b9/0x641 __irq_exit_rcu+0xdc/0x190 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0xc0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Min Li <lm0963hack@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
348d446762 |
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_disconnect_{req,rsp}
commit a2a9339e1c9deb7e1e079e12e27a0265aea8421a upstream.
Similar to commit
|
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Oliver Hartkopp
|
b14abd6887 |
can: isotp: isotp_recvmsg(): use sock_recv_cmsgs() to get SOCK_RXQ_OVFL infos
commit 0145462fc802cd447ef5d029758043c7f15b4b1e upstream.
isotp.c was still using sock_recv_timestamp() which does not provide
control messages to detect dropped PDUs in the receive path.
Fixes:
|
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Michal Sojka
|
f0bfe06c55 |
can: isotp: isotp_ops: fix poll() to not report false EPOLLOUT events
commit 79e19fa79cb5d5f1b3bf3e3ae24989ccb93c7b7b upstream.
When using select()/poll()/epoll() with a non-blocking ISOTP socket to
wait for when non-blocking write is possible, a false EPOLLOUT event
is sometimes returned. This can happen at least after sending a
message which must be split to multiple CAN frames.
The reason is that isotp_sendmsg() returns -EAGAIN when tx.state is
not equal to ISOTP_IDLE and this behavior is not reflected in
datagram_poll(), which is used in isotp_ops.
This is fixed by introducing ISOTP-specific poll function, which
suppresses the EPOLLOUT events in that case.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230302092812.320643-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230224010659.48420-1-michal.sojka@cvut.cz
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b53a04a2-ba1f-3858-84c1-d3eb3301ae15@hartkopp.net
Signed-off-by: Michal Sojka <michal.sojka@cvut.cz>
Reported-by: Jakub Jira <jirajak2@fel.cvut.cz>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Oliver Hartkopp
|
db3f6340a7 |
can: isotp: fix race between isotp_sendsmg() and isotp_release()
commit 051737439eaee5bdd03d3c2ef5510d54a478fd05 upstream. As discussed with Dae R. Jeong and Hillf Danton here [1] the sendmsg() function in isotp.c might get into a race condition when restoring the former tx.state from the old_state. Remove the old_state concept and implement proper locking for the ISOTP_IDLE transitions in isotp_sendmsg(), inspired by a simplification idea from Hillf Danton. Introduce a new tx.state ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and use the same locking mechanism from isotp_release() which resolves a potential race between isotp_sendsmg() and isotp_release(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/ZB%2F93xJxq%2FBUqAgG@dragonet v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331102114.15164-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331123600.3550-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net take care of signal interrupts for wait_event_interruptible() in isotp_release() v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331130654.9886-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net take care of signal interrupts for wait_event_interruptible() in isotp_sendmsg() in the wait_tx_done case v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331131935.21465-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net take care of signal interrupts for wait_event_interruptible() in isotp_sendmsg() in ALL cases Cc: Dae R. Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Fixes: 4f027cba8216 ("can: isotp: split tx timer into transmission and timeout") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230331131935.21465-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [mkl: rephrase commit message] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Oleksij Rempel
|
4c3fb22a6e |
can: j1939: j1939_tp_tx_dat_new(): fix out-of-bounds memory access
commit b45193cb4df556fe6251b285a5ce44046dd36b4a upstream.
In the j1939_tp_tx_dat_new() function, an out-of-bounds memory access
could occur during the memcpy() operation if the size of skb->cb is
larger than the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This is because the
memcpy() operation uses the size of skb->cb, leading to a read beyond
the struct j1939_sk_buff_cb.
Updated the memcpy() operation to use the size of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb instead of the size of skb->cb. This ensures that the
memcpy() operation only reads the memory within the bounds of struct
j1939_sk_buff_cb, preventing out-of-bounds memory access.
Additionally, add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to check that the size of skb->cb
is greater than or equal to the size of struct j1939_sk_buff_cb. This
ensures that the skb->cb buffer is large enough to hold the
j1939_sk_buff_cb structure.
Fixes:
|
||
Eric Dumazet
|
e3bcf2a770 |
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
[ Upstream commit a1865f2e7d10dde00d35a2122b38d2e469ae67ed ]
syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1]
Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently,
and netlink_dump() also needs protection.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg
read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0:
netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
Fixes:
|
||
Andy Roulin
|
23a4bc3a2c |
ethtool: reset #lanes when lanes is omitted
[ Upstream commit e847c7675e19ef344913724dc68f83df31ad6a17 ]
If the number of lanes was forced and then subsequently the user
omits this parameter, the ksettings->lanes is reset. The driver
should then reset the number of lanes to the device's default
for the specified speed.
However, although the ksettings->lanes is set to 0, the mod variable
is not set to true to indicate the driver and userspace should be
notified of the changes.
The consequence is that the same ethtool operation will produce
different results based on the initial state.
If the initial state is:
$ ethtool swp1 | grep -A 3 'Speed: '
Speed: 500000Mb/s
Lanes: 2
Duplex: Full
Auto-negotiation: on
then executing 'ethtool -s swp1 speed 50000 autoneg off' will yield:
$ ethtool swp1 | grep -A 3 'Speed: '
Speed: 500000Mb/s
Lanes: 2
Duplex: Full
Auto-negotiation: off
While if the initial state is:
$ ethtool swp1 | grep -A 3 'Speed: '
Speed: 500000Mb/s
Lanes: 1
Duplex: Full
Auto-negotiation: off
executing the same 'ethtool -s swp1 speed 50000 autoneg off' results in:
$ ethtool swp1 | grep -A 3 'Speed: '
Speed: 500000Mb/s
Lanes: 1
Duplex: Full
Auto-negotiation: off
This patch fixes this behavior. Omitting lanes will always results in
the driver choosing the default lane width for the chosen speed. In this
scenario, regardless of the initial state, the end state will be, e.g.,
$ ethtool swp1 | grep -A 3 'Speed: '
Speed: 500000Mb/s
Lanes: 2
Duplex: Full
Auto-negotiation: off
Fixes:
|
||
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
5a08a32e62 |
ping: Fix potentail NULL deref for /proc/net/icmp.
[ Upstream commit ab5fb73ffa01072b4d8031cc05801fa1cb653bee ] After commit |
||
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
|
b34056bedf |
raw: Fix NULL deref in raw_get_next().
[ Upstream commit 0a78cf7264d29abeca098eae0b188a10aabc8a32 ] Dae R. Jeong reported a NULL deref in raw_get_next() [0]. It seems that the repro was running these sequences in parallel so that one thread was iterating on a socket that was being freed in another netns. unshare(0x40060200) r0 = syz_open_procfs(0x0, &(0x7f0000002080)='net/raw\x00') socket$inet_icmp_raw(0x2, 0x3, 0x1) pread64(r0, &(0x7f0000000000)=""/10, 0xa, 0x10000000007f) After commit |
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
53a0031217 |
raw: use net_hash_mix() in hash function
[ Upstream commit 6579f5bacc2c4cbc5ef6abb45352416939d1f844 ]
Some applications seem to rely on RAW sockets.
If they use private netns, we can avoid piling all RAW
sockets bound to a given protocol into a single bucket.
Also place (struct raw_hashinfo).lock into its own
cache line to limit false sharing.
Alternative would be to have per-netns hashtables,
but this seems too expensive for most netns
where RAW sockets are not used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 0a78cf7264d2 ("raw: Fix NULL deref in raw_get_next().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
Jeff Layton
|
94ef35dd2e |
sunrpc: only free unix grouplist after RCU settles
[ Upstream commit 5085e41f9e83a1bec51da1f20b54f2ec3a13a3fe ]
While the unix_gid object is rcu-freed, the group_info list that it
contains is not. Ensure that we only put the group list reference once
we are really freeing the unix_gid object.
Reported-by: Zhi Li <yieli@redhat.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2183056
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
Ziyang Xuan
|
2c9cefc142 |
ipv6: Fix an uninit variable access bug in __ip6_make_skb()
[ Upstream commit ea30388baebcce37fd594d425a65037ca35e59e8 ]
Syzbot reported a bug as following:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in arch_atomic64_inc arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:88 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in arch_atomic_long_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:161 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in atomic_long_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1429 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ip6_make_skb+0x2f37/0x30f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1956
arch_atomic64_inc arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:88 [inline]
arch_atomic_long_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:161 [inline]
atomic_long_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1429 [inline]
__ip6_make_skb+0x2f37/0x30f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1956
ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:1122 [inline]
ip6_push_pending_frames+0x10e/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1987
rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xb12/0xb90 net/ipv6/raw.c:579
rawv6_sendmsg+0x297e/0x2e60 net/ipv6/raw.c:922
inet_sendmsg+0x101/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:827
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa8e/0xe70 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a1/0x3f0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2559 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x367/0x540 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x114/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:988
kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:492 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x3af/0x8f0 net/core/skbuff.c:565
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1270 [inline]
__ip6_append_data+0x51c1/0x6bb0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1684
ip6_append_data+0x411/0x580 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1854
rawv6_sendmsg+0x2882/0x2e60 net/ipv6/raw.c:915
inet_sendmsg+0x101/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:827
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa8e/0xe70 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a1/0x3f0 net/socket.c:2530
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2559 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x367/0x540 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
It is because icmp6hdr does not in skb linear region under the scenario
of SOCK_RAW socket. Access icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type directly will
trigger the uninit variable access bug.
Use a local variable icmp6_type to carry the correct value in different
scenarios.
Fixes:
|
||
Sricharan Ramabadhran
|
ef5fa4de4c |
net: qrtr: Do not do DEL_SERVER broadcast after DEL_CLIENT
[ Upstream commit 839349d13905927d8a567ca4d21d88c82028e31d ]
On the remote side, when QRTR socket is removed, af_qrtr will call
qrtr_port_remove() which broadcasts the DEL_CLIENT packet to all neighbours
including local NS. NS upon receiving the DEL_CLIENT packet, will remove
the lookups associated with the node:port and broadcasts the DEL_SERVER
packet.
But on the host side, due to the arrival of the DEL_CLIENT packet, the NS
would've already deleted the server belonging to that port. So when the
remote's NS again broadcasts the DEL_SERVER for that port, it throws below
error message on the host:
"failed while handling packet from 2:-2"
So fix this error by not broadcasting the DEL_SERVER packet when the
DEL_CLIENT packet gets processed."
Fixes:
|
||
Xin Long
|
d2128636b3 |
sctp: check send stream number after wait_for_sndbuf
[ Upstream commit 2584024b23552c00d95b50255e47bd18d306d31a ]
This patch fixes a corner case where the asoc out stream count may change
after wait_for_sndbuf.
When the main thread in the client starts a connection, if its out stream
count is set to N while the in stream count in the server is set to N - 2,
another thread in the client keeps sending the msgs with stream number
N - 1, and waits for sndbuf before processing INIT_ACK.
However, after processing INIT_ACK, the out stream count in the client is
shrunk to N - 2, the same to the in stream count in the server. The crash
occurs when the thread waiting for sndbuf is awake and sends the msg in a
non-existing stream(N - 1), the call trace is as below:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sctp_cmd_send_msg net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1114 [inline]
sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1777 [inline]
sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1199 [inline]
sctp_do_sm+0x197d/0x5310 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1170
sctp_primitive_SEND+0x9f/0xc0 net/sctp/primitive.c:163
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x10eb/0x1a30 net/sctp/socket.c:1868
sctp_sendmsg+0x8d4/0x1d90 net/sctp/socket.c:2026
inet_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:825
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:722 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:745
The fix is to add an unlikely check for the send stream number after the
thread wakes up from the wait_for_sndbuf.
Fixes:
|
||
Jakub Kicinski
|
e48e6a4652 |
net: don't let netpoll invoke NAPI if in xmit context
[ Upstream commit 275b471e3d2daf1472ae8fa70dc1b50c9e0b9e75 ] Commit |
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
0185e87c69 |
icmp: guard against too small mtu
[ Upstream commit 7d63b67125382ff0ffdfca434acbc94a38bd092b ]
syzbot was able to trigger a panic [1] in icmp_glue_bits(), or
more exactly in skb_copy_and_csum_bits()
There is no repro yet, but I think the issue is that syzbot
manages to lower device mtu to a small value, fooling __icmp_send()
__icmp_send() must make sure there is enough room for the
packet to include at least the headers.
We might in the future refactor skb_copy_and_csum_bits() and its
callers to no longer crash when something bad happens.
[1]
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3343 !
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 15766 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00039-gffe78bbd5121 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x798/0x860 net/core/skbuff.c:3343
Code: f0 c1 c8 08 41 89 c6 e9 73 ff ff ff e8 61 48 d4 f9 e9 41 fd ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 48 e8 52 48 d4 f9 e9 c3 fc ff ff e8 c8 27 84 f9 <0f> 0b 48 89 44 24 28 e8 3c 48 d4 f9 48 8b 44 24 28 e9 9d fb ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000007620 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000001e8 RCX: 0000000000000100
RDX: ffff8880276f6280 RSI: ffffffff87fdd138 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001e8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000003c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888028244868 R15: 0000000000000b0e
FS: 00007fbc81f1c700(0000) GS:ffff88802ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2df43000 CR3: 00000000744db000 CR4: 0000000000150ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
icmp_glue_bits+0x7b/0x210 net/ipv4/icmp.c:353
__ip_append_data+0x1d1b/0x39f0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1161
ip_append_data net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1343 [inline]
ip_append_data+0x115/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1322
icmp_push_reply+0xa8/0x440 net/ipv4/icmp.c:370
__icmp_send+0xb80/0x1430 net/ipv4/icmp.c:765
ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1239 [inline]
ipv4_link_failure+0x5a9/0x9e0 net/ipv4/route.c:1246
dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:423 [inline]
arp_error_report+0xcb/0x1c0 net/ipv4/arp.c:296
neigh_invalidate+0x20d/0x560 net/core/neighbour.c:1079
neigh_timer_handler+0xc77/0xff0 net/core/neighbour.c:1166
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1751
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2022 [inline]
Fixes:
|
||
Andrea Righi
|
0f638a3d1b |
l2tp: generate correct module alias strings
[ Upstream commit 154e07c164859fc90bf4e8143f2f6c1af9f3a35e ] Commit |
||
|
Ziyang Xuan
|
aa95efa187 |
net: qrtr: Fix a refcount bug in qrtr_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit 44d807320000db0d0013372ad39b53e12d52f758 ]
Syzbot reported a bug as following:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline]
__refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline]
refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline]
kref_get include/linux/kref.h:45 [inline]
qrtr_node_acquire net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:202 [inline]
qrtr_node_lookup net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:398 [inline]
qrtr_send_resume_tx net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:1003 [inline]
qrtr_recvmsg+0x85f/0x990 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:1070
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1038
qrtr_ns_worker+0x170/0x1700 net/qrtr/ns.c:688
process_one_work+0x991/0x15c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2390
worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2537
It occurs in the concurrent scenario of qrtr_recvmsg() and
qrtr_endpoint_unregister() as following:
cpu0 cpu1
qrtr_recvmsg qrtr_endpoint_unregister
qrtr_send_resume_tx qrtr_node_release
qrtr_node_lookup mutex_lock(&qrtr_node_lock)
spin_lock_irqsave(&qrtr_nodes_lock, ) refcount_dec_and_test(&node->ref) [node->ref == 0]
radix_tree_lookup [node != NULL] __qrtr_node_release
qrtr_node_acquire spin_lock_irqsave(&qrtr_nodes_lock, )
kref_get(&node->ref) [WARNING] ...
mutex_unlock(&qrtr_node_lock)
Use qrtr_node_lock to protect qrtr_node_lookup() implementation, this
is actually improving the protection of node reference.
Fixes:
|
||
Felix Fietkau
|
022c8320d9 |
wifi: mac80211: fix invalid drv_sta_pre_rcu_remove calls for non-uploaded sta
[ Upstream commit 12b220a6171faf10638ab683a975cadcf1a352d6 ]
Avoid potential data corruption issues caused by uninitialized driver
private data structures.
Reported-by: Brian Coverstone <brian@mainsequence.net>
Fixes:
|
||
Ryder Lee
|
c46239e629 |
wifi: mac80211: fix the size calculation of ieee80211_ie_len_eht_cap()
[ Upstream commit dd01579e5ed922dcfcb8fec53fa03b81c7649a04 ]
Here should return the size of ieee80211_eht_cap_elem_fixed, so fix it.
Fixes:
|
||
Matthieu Baerts
|
9f291f2348 |
hsr: ratelimit only when errors are printed
commit 1b0120e4db0bf2838d1ce741195ce4b7cc100b91 upstream. Recently, when automatically merging -net and net-next in MPTCP devel tree, our CI reported [1] a conflict in hsr, the same as the one reported by Stephen in netdev [2]. When looking at the conflict, I noticed it is in fact the v1 [3] that has been applied in -net and the v2 [4] in net-next. Maybe the v1 was applied by accident. As mentioned by Jakub Kicinski [5], the new condition makes more sense before the net_ratelimit(), not to update net_ratelimit's state which is unnecessary if we're not going to print either way. Here, this modification applies the v2 but in -net. Link: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/actions/runs/4423171069 [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230315100914.53fc1760@canb.auug.org.au/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230307133229.127442-1-koverskeid@gmail.com/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230309092302.179586-1-koverskeid@gmail.com/ [4] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230308232001.2fb62013@kernel.org/ [5] Fixes: 28e8cabe80f3 ("net: hsr: Don't log netdev_err message on unknown prp dst node") Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Reviewed-by: Steen Hegelund <Steen.Hegelund@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315-net-20230315-hsr_framereg-ratelimit-v1-1-61d2ef176d11@tessares.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Oleksij Rempel
|
ace6aa2ab5 |
can: j1939: prevent deadlock by moving j1939_sk_errqueue()
commit d1366b283d94ac4537a4b3a1e8668da4df7ce7e9 upstream.
This commit addresses a deadlock situation that can occur in certain
scenarios, such as when running data TP/ETP transfer and subscribing to
the error queue while receiving a net down event. The deadlock involves
locks in the following order:
3
j1939_session_list_lock -> active_session_list_lock
j1939_session_activate
...
j1939_sk_queue_activate_next -> sk_session_queue_lock
...
j1939_xtp_rx_eoma_one
2
j1939_sk_queue_drop_all -> sk_session_queue_lock
...
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown -> j1939_socks_lock
j1939_netdev_notify
1
j1939_sk_errqueue -> j1939_socks_lock
__j1939_session_cancel -> active_session_list_lock
j1939_tp_rxtimer
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock);
lock(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
lock(&priv->active_session_list_lock);
lock(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
The solution implemented in this commit is to move the
j1939_sk_errqueue() call out of the active_session_list_lock context,
thus preventing the deadlock situation.
Reported-by: syzbot+ee1cd780f69483a8616b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes:
|
||
Ivan Orlov
|
c11dbc7705 |
can: bcm: bcm_tx_setup(): fix KMSAN uninit-value in vfs_write
[ Upstream commit 2b4c99f7d9a57ecd644eda9b1fb0a1072414959f ]
Syzkaller reported the following issue:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
aio_rw_done fs/aio.c:1520 [inline]
aio_write+0x899/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:766 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x71f/0xce0 mm/slub.c:3491
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x11d/0x3b0 mm/slab_common.c:981
kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:636 [inline]
bcm_tx_setup+0x80e/0x29d0 net/can/bcm.c:930
bcm_sendmsg+0x3a2/0xce0 net/can/bcm.c:1351
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x495/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1108
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline]
aio_write+0x63a/0x950 fs/aio.c:1600
io_submit_one+0x1d1c/0x3bf0 fs/aio.c:2019
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2078 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x293/0x770 fs/aio.c:2048
__x64_sys_io_submit+0x92/0xd0 fs/aio.c:2048
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
CPU: 1 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-syzkaller-80422-geda666ff2276 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
=====================================================
We can follow the call chain and find that 'bcm_tx_setup' function
calls 'memcpy_from_msg' to copy some content to the newly allocated
frame of 'op->frames'. After that the 'len' field of copied structure
being compared with some constant value (64 or 8). However, if
'memcpy_from_msg' returns an error, we will compare some uninitialized
memory. This triggers 'uninit-value' issue.
This patch will add 'memcpy_from_msg' possible errors processing to
avoid uninit-value issue.
Tested via syzkaller
Reported-by: syzbot+c9bfd85eca611ebf5db1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=47f897f8ad958bbde5790ebf389b5e7e0a345089
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Siddharth Kawar
|
c5a159d5e5 |
SUNRPC: fix shutdown of NFS TCP client socket
[ Upstream commit 943d045a6d796175e5d08f9973953b1d2c07d797 ] NFS server Duplicate Request Cache (DRC) algorithms rely on NFS clients reconnecting using the same local TCP port. Unique NFS operations are identified by the per-TCP connection set of XIDs. This prevents file corruption when non-idempotent NFS operations are retried. Currently, NFS client TCP connections are using different local TCP ports when reconnecting to NFS servers. After an NFS server initiates shutdown of the TCP connection, the NFS client's TCP socket is set to NULL after the socket state has reached TCP_LAST_ACK(9). When reconnecting, the new socket attempts to reuse the same local port but fails with EADDRNOTAVAIL (99). This forces the socket to use a different local TCP port to reconnect to the remote NFS server. State Transition and Events: TCP_CLOSE_WAIT(8) TCP_LAST_ACK(9) connect(fail EADDRNOTAVAIL(99)) TCP_CLOSE(7) bind on new port connect success dmesg excerpts showing reconnect switching from TCP local port of 926 to 763 after commit |
||
Kristian Overskeid
|
8b4dc07eb9 |
net: hsr: Don't log netdev_err message on unknown prp dst node
[ Upstream commit 28e8cabe80f3e6e3c98121576eda898eeb20f1b1 ] If no frames has been exchanged with a node for HSR_NODE_FORGET_TIME, the node will be deleted from the node_db list. If a frame is sent to the node after it is deleted, a netdev_err message for each slave interface is produced. This should not happen with dan nodes because of supervision frames, but can happen often with san nodes, which clutters the kernel log. Since the hsr protocol does not support sans, this is only relevant for the prp protocol. Signed-off-by: Kristian Overskeid <koverskeid@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Herbert Xu
|
5218af4ad5 |
xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap
[ Upstream commit 8222d5910dae08213b6d9d4bc9a7f8502855e624 ] When copying data to user-space we should ensure that only valid data is copied over. Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve) data and should never be given directly to user-space. This patch fixes the copying of xfrm algorithms and the encap template in xfrm_user so that padding is zeroed. Reported-by: syzbot+fa5414772d5c445dac3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Felix Fietkau
|
c5d24e07e3 |
wifi: mac80211: fix qos on mesh interfaces
commit 4e348c6c6e23491ae6eb5e077848a42d0562339c upstream.
When ieee80211_select_queue is called for mesh, the sta pointer is usually
NULL, since the nexthop is looked up much later in the tx path.
Explicitly check for unicast address in that case in order to make qos work
again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Min Li
|
608901a77c |
Bluetooth: Fix race condition in hci_cmd_sync_clear
commit 1c66bee492a5fe00ae3fe890bb693bfc99f994c6 upstream.
There is a potential race condition in hci_cmd_sync_work and
hci_cmd_sync_clear, and could lead to use-after-free. For instance,
hci_cmd_sync_work is added to the 'req_workqueue' after cancel_work_sync
The entry of 'cmd_sync_work_list' may be freed in hci_cmd_sync_clear, and
causing kernel panic when it is used in 'hci_cmd_sync_work'.
Here's the call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5d3
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
kasan_report+0xaa/0x120
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xf0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
? poll_idle+0x1e0/0x1e0
kthread+0x285/0x320
? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 266:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xae/0xe0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x191/0x350
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0x97/0x2b0
hci_update_passive_scan+0x176/0x1d0
le_conn_complete_evt+0x1b5/0x1a00
hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x234/0x340
hci_le_meta_evt+0x231/0x4e0
hci_event_packet+0x4c5/0xf00
hci_rx_work+0x37d/0x880
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
kthread+0x285/0x320
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Freed by task 269:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x176/0x1c0
__kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x95/0x1a0
kfree+0xba/0x2f0
hci_cmd_sync_clear+0x14c/0x210
hci_unregister_dev+0xff/0x440
vhci_release+0x7b/0xf0
__fput+0x1f3/0x970
____fput+0xe/0x20
task_work_run+0xd4/0x160
do_exit+0x8b0/0x22a0
do_group_exit+0xba/0x2a0
get_signal+0x1e4a/0x25b0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x1f80
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xf5/0x1a0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30
Fixes:
|
||
Davide Caratti
|
4c8fc3fe28 |
act_mirred: use the backlog for nested calls to mirred ingress
[ Upstream commit ca22da2fbd693b54dc8e3b7b54ccc9f7e9ba3640 ] William reports kernel soft-lockups on some OVS topologies when TC mirred egress->ingress action is hit by local TCP traffic [1]. The same can also be reproduced with SCTP (thanks Xin for verifying), when client and server reach themselves through mirred egress to ingress, and one of the two peers sends a "heartbeat" packet (from within a timer). Enqueueing to backlog proved to fix this soft lockup; however, as Cong noticed [2], we should preserve - when possible - the current mirred behavior that counts as "overlimits" any eventual packet drop subsequent to the mirred forwarding action [3]. A compromise solution might use the backlog only when tcf_mirred_act() has a nest level greater than one: change tcf_mirred_forward() accordingly. Also, add a kselftest that can reproduce the lockup and verifies TC mirred ability to account for further packet drops after TC mirred egress->ingress (when the nest level is 1). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/33dc43f587ec1388ba456b4915c75f02a8aae226.1663945716.git.dcaratti@redhat.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Y0w%2FWWY60gqrtGLp@pop-os.localdomain/ [3] such behavior is not guaranteed: for example, if RPS or skb RX timestamping is enabled on the mirred target device, the kernel can defer receiving the skb and return NET_RX_SUCCESS inside tcf_mirred_forward(). Reported-by: William Zhao <wizhao@redhat.com> CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Davide Caratti
|
e0c12b9bff |
net/sched: act_mirred: better wording on protection against excessive stack growth
[ Upstream commit 78dcdffe0418ac8f3f057f26fe71ccf4d8ed851f ]
with commit
|
||
Sungwoo Kim
|
b3168abd24 |
Bluetooth: HCI: Fix global-out-of-bounds
[ Upstream commit bce56405201111807cc8e4f47c6de3e10b17c1ac ]
To loop a variable-length array, hci_init_stage_sync(stage) considers
that stage[i] is valid as long as stage[i-1].func is valid.
Thus, the last element of stage[].func should be intentionally invalid
as hci_init0[], le_init2[], and others did.
However, amp_init1[] and amp_init2[] have no invalid element, letting
hci_init_stage_sync() keep accessing amp_init1[] over its valid range.
This patch fixes this by adding {} in the last of amp_init1[] and
amp_init2[].
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in hci_dev_open_sync (
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3154
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3343
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4418
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4609
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4689)
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffffaed1ab70 by task kworker/u5:0/1032
CPU: 0 PID: 1032 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Not tainted 6.2.0 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04
Workqueue: hci1 hci_power_on
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (/v6.2-bzimage/lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))
print_report (/v6.2-bzimage/mm/kasan/report.c:307
/v6.2-bzimage/mm/kasan/report.c:417)
? hci_dev_open_sync (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3154
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3343
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4418
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4609
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4689)
kasan_report (/v6.2-bzimage/mm/kasan/report.c:184
/v6.2-bzimage/mm/kasan/report.c:519)
? hci_dev_open_sync (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3154
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3343
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4418
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4609
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4689)
hci_dev_open_sync (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3154
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:3343
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4418
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4609
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4689)
? __pfx_hci_dev_open_sync (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:4635)
? mutex_lock (/v6.2-bzimage/./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:190
/v6.2-bzimage/./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:443
/v6.2-bzimage/./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1781
/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/locking/mutex.c:171
/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/locking/mutex.c:285)
? __pfx_mutex_lock (/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/locking/mutex.c:282)
hci_power_on (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:485
/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:984)
? __pfx_hci_power_on (/v6.2-bzimage/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:969)
? read_word_at_a_time (/v6.2-bzimage/./include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:85)
? strscpy (/v6.2-bzimage/./arch/x86/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h:62
/v6.2-bzimage/lib/string.c:161)
process_one_work (/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/workqueue.c:2294)
worker_thread (/v6.2-bzimage/./include/linux/list.h:292
/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/workqueue.c:2437)
? __pfx_worker_thread (/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/workqueue.c:2379)
kthread (/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/kthread.c:376)
? __pfx_kthread (/v6.2-bzimage/kernel/kthread.c:331)
ret_from_fork (/v6.2-bzimage/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314)
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
amp_init1+0x30/0x60
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:000000003a157ec6 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 ia
flags: 0x200000000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=2)
raw: 0200000000001000 ffffea0005054688 ffffea0005054688 000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffaed1aa00: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
ffffffffaed1aa80: 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffffaed1ab00: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9
^
ffffffffaed1ab80: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 f9
ffffffffaed1ac00: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 02 f9
This bug is found by FuzzBT, a modified version of Syzkaller.
Other contributors for this bug are Ruoyu Wu and Peng Hui.
Fixes:
|
||
Howard Chung
|
24997df50b |
Bluetooth: mgmt: Fix MGMT add advmon with RSSI command
[ Upstream commit 1a0291f81529e8044fb29845a0196ba47af894ce ]
The MGMT command: MGMT_OP_ADD_ADV_PATTERNS_MONITOR_RSSI uses variable
length argument. This causes host not able to register advmon with rssi.
This patch has been locally tested by adding monitor with rssi via
btmgmt on a kernel 6.1 machine.
Reviewed-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
c357e28b01 |
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix responding with wrong PDU type
[ Upstream commit 9aa9d9473f1550d1936c31259720b3f1f4690576 ]
L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ shall be responded with L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP not
L2CAP_LE_CONN_RSP:
L2CAP LE EATT Server - Reject - run
Listening for connections
New client connection with handle 0x002a
Sending L2CAP Request from client
Client received response code 0x15
Unexpected L2CAP response code (expected 0x18)
L2CAP LE EATT Server - Reject - test failed
> ACL Data RX: Handle 42 flags 0x02 dlen 26
LE L2CAP: Enhanced Credit Connection Request (0x17) ident 1 len 18
PSM: 39 (0x0027)
MTU: 64
MPS: 64
Credits: 5
Source CID: 65
Source CID: 66
Source CID: 67
Source CID: 68
Source CID: 69
< ACL Data TX: Handle 42 flags 0x00 dlen 16
LE L2CAP: LE Connection Response (0x15) ident 1 len 8
invalid size
00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00
L2CAP LE EATT Server - Reject - run
Listening for connections
New client connection with handle 0x002a
Sending L2CAP Request from client
Client received response code 0x18
L2CAP LE EATT Server - Reject - test passed
Fixes:
|
||
Brian Gix
|
554828c833 |
Bluetooth: Remove "Power-on" check from Mesh feature
[ Upstream commit 52dd5e964a55c98c1b0bcf5fc737a5ddd00e7d4d ]
The Bluetooth mesh experimental feature enable was requiring the
controller to be powered off in order for the Enable to work. Mesh is
supposed to be enablable regardless of the controller state, and created
an unintended requirement that the mesh daemon be started before the
classic bluetoothd daemon.
Fixes:
|
||
Pauli Virtanen
|
e2a90a5b15 |
Bluetooth: ISO: fix timestamped HCI ISO data packet parsing
[ Upstream commit 2f10e40a948e8a2abe7f983df3959a333ca8955f ]
Use correct HCI ISO data packet header struct when the packet has
timestamp. The timestamp, when present, goes before the other fields
(Core v5.3 4E 5.4.5), so the structs are not compatible.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
|
f770ce652b |
Bluetooth: hci_core: Detect if an ACL packet is in fact an ISO packet
[ Upstream commit 876e78104f23ce9267822757a63562a609b126c3 ] Because some transports don't have a dedicated type for ISO packets (see |
||
Zhengping Jiang
|
bc7a5dde52 |
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Resume adv with no RPA when active scan
[ Upstream commit 3c44a431d62bf4a20d7b901f98266ae3f4676d48 ]
The address resolution should be disabled during the active scan,
so all the advertisements can reach the host. The advertising
has to be paused before disabling the address resolution,
because the advertising will prevent any changes to the resolving
list and the address resolution status. Skipping this will cause
the hci error and the discovery failure.
According to the bluetooth specification:
"7.8.44 LE Set Address Resolution Enable command
This command shall not be used when:
- Advertising (other than periodic advertising) is enabled,
- Scanning is enabled, or
- an HCI_LE_Create_Connection, HCI_LE_Extended_Create_Connection, or
HCI_LE_Periodic_Advertising_Create_Sync command is outstanding."
If the host is using RPA, the controller needs to generate RPA for
the advertising, so the advertising must remain paused during the
active scan.
If the host is not using RPA, the advertising can be resumed after
disabling the address resolution.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
9c7d680368 |
erspan: do not use skb_mac_header() in ndo_start_xmit()
[ Upstream commit 8e50ed774554f93d55426039b27b1e38d7fa64d8 ]
Drivers should not assume skb_mac_header(skb) == skb->data in their
ndo_start_xmit().
Use skb_network_offset() and skb_transport_offset() which
better describe what is needed in erspan_fb_xmit() and
ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit()
syzbot reported:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5083 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5083 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x1d9c/0x2d90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:962
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5083 Comm: syz-executor406 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-syzkaller-00866-gd4671cb96fa3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x1d9c/0x2d90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:962
Code: 04 02 41 01 de 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1c 0a 00 00 45 89 b4 24 c8 00 00 00 c6 85 77 fe ff ff 01 e9 33 e7 ff ff e8 b4 27 a1 f8 <0f> 0b e9 b6 e7 ff ff e8 a8 27 a1 f8 49 8d bf f0 0c 00 00 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003b2f830 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888021273a80 RSI: ffffffff88e1bd4c RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90003b2f9d8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b28da00
R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: ffff88807e25b6d0 R15: ffff888023408000
FS: 0000555556a61300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055e5b11eb6e8 CR3: 0000000027c1b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4900 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4914 [inline]
__dev_direct_xmit+0x504/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4300
dev_direct_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x20a/0x390 net/packet/af_packet.c:285
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3075 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x31a0/0x5150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3107
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
__sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340 net/socket.c:2142
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2150 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2150
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f123aaa1039
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 b1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc15d12058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f123aaa1039
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000020000040 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f123aa648c0
R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Fixes:
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||
Álvaro Fernández Rojas
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7748653421 |
net: dsa: tag_brcm: legacy: fix daisy-chained switches
[ Upstream commit 032a954061afd4b7426c3eb6bfd2952ef1e9a384 ]
When BCM63xx internal switches are connected to switches with a 4-byte
Broadcom tag, it does not identify the packet as VLAN tagged, so it adds one
based on its PVID (which is likely 0).
Right now, the packet is received by the BCM63xx internal switch and the 6-byte
tag is properly processed. The next step would to decode the corresponding
4-byte tag. However, the internal switch adds an invalid VLAN tag after the
6-byte tag and the 4-byte tag handling fails.
In order to fix this we need to remove the invalid VLAN tag after the 6-byte
tag before passing it to the 4-byte tag decoding.
Fixes:
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||
Kal Conley
|
a069909acc |
xsk: Add missing overflow check in xdp_umem_reg
[ Upstream commit c7df4813b149362248d6ef7be41a311e27bf75fe ]
The number of chunks can overflow u32. Make sure to return -EINVAL on
overflow. Also remove a redundant u32 cast assigning umem->npgs.
Fixes:
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||
Paolo Abeni
|
5564be74a2 |
mptcp: fix UaF in listener shutdown
[ Upstream commit 0a3f4f1f9c27215e4ddcd312558342e57b93e518 ]
Backports notes: one simple conflict in net/mptcp/protocol.c with:
commit f8c9dfbd875b ("mptcp: add pm listener events")
Where one commit removes code in __mptcp_close_ssk() while the other
one adds one line at the same place. We can simply remove the whole
condition because this extra instruction is not present in v6.1.
As reported by Christoph after having refactored the passive
socket initialization, the mptcp listener shutdown path is prone
to an UaF issue.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x73/0xe0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88810cb23098 by task syz-executor731/1266
CPU: 1 PID: 1266 Comm: syz-executor731 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc59af4eaa31c1f6c00c8f1e448ed99a45c66340dd5 #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91
print_report+0x16a/0x46f
kasan_report+0xad/0x130
kasan_check_range+0x14a/0x1a0
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x73/0xe0
subflow_error_report+0x6d/0x110
sk_error_report+0x3b/0x190
tcp_disconnect+0x138c/0x1aa0
inet_child_forget+0x6f/0x2e0
inet_csk_listen_stop+0x209/0x1060
__mptcp_close_ssk+0x52d/0x610
mptcp_destroy_common+0x165/0x640
mptcp_destroy+0x13/0x80
__mptcp_destroy_sock+0xe7/0x270
__mptcp_close+0x70e/0x9b0
mptcp_close+0x2b/0x150
inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
__sock_release+0xd2/0x280
sock_close+0x15/0x20
__fput+0x252/0xa20
task_work_run+0x169/0x250
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
The msk grace period can legitly expire in between the last
reference count dropped in mptcp_subflow_queue_clean() and
the later eventual access in inet_csk_listen_stop()
After the previous patch we don't need anymore special-casing
msk listener socket cleanup: the mptcp worker will process each
of the unaccepted msk sockets.
Just drop the now unnecessary code.
Please note this commit depends on the two parent ones:
mptcp: refactor passive socket initialization
mptcp: use the workqueue to destroy unaccepted sockets
Fixes:
|