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Merge 6.1.44 into android14-6.1-lts

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Changes in 6.1.44
	init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	ARM: cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	ia64/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	loongarch/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	m68k/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	mips/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	sh/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	sparc/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	um/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	init: Remove check_bugs() leftovers
	init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier
	init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	x86/init: Initialize signal frame size late
	x86/fpu: Remove cpuinfo argument from init functions
	x86/fpu: Mark init functions __init
	x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()
	x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
	x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation
	x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
	KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
	x86/mem_encrypt: Unbreak the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n build
	x86/xen: Fix secondary processors' FPU initialization
	x86/mm: fix poking_init() for Xen PV guests
	x86/mm: Use mm_alloc() in poking_init()
	mm: Move mm_cachep initialization to mm_init()
	x86/mm: Initialize text poking earlier
	Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support
	x86/bugs: Increase the x86 bugs vector size to two u32s
	x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
	x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
	x86/srso: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support
	x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support
	x86/srso: Add IBPB
	x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT
	x86/srso: Fix return thunks in generated code
	x86/srso: Add a forgotten NOENDBR annotation
	x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection
	xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet
	x86: fix backwards merge of GDS/SRSO bit
	Linux 6.1.44

Change-Id: Ia40e37c806ae2a2daf2127415aa28d0151660667
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2023-09-02 19:59:42 +00:00
commit f474c6446c
72 changed files with 1153 additions and 413 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

15
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
View File

@ -513,17 +513,18 @@ Description: information about CPUs heterogeneity.
cpu_capacity: capacity of cpuX.
What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

109
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
GDS - Gather Data Sampling
==========================
Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
Problem
-------
When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
vulnerable.
Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
are possible.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
permission boundaries:
Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
Userspace can infer kernel data
Guests can infer data from hosts
Guest can infer guest from other guests
Users can infer data from other users
Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure
that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
attack, and re-enable it.
Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
bits:
================================ === ============================
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability
and mitigation support.
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation
0 by default.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
Can't be cleared once set.
================================ === ============================
GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that
does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
support will break.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
GDS System Information
------------------------
The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
The possible values contained in this file are:
============================== =============================================
Not affected Processor not vulnerable.
Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation.
Mitigation: AVX disabled,
no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect.
Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect and cannot be disabled.
Unknown: Dependent on
hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is
affected but with no way to know if host
processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
============================== =============================================
GDS Default mitigation
----------------------
The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.

2
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
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@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
l1d_flush.rst
processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
cross-thread-rsb.rst
gather_data_sampling.rst
srso

133
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO)
========================================
This is a mitigation for the speculative return stack overflow (SRSO)
vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mechanism is by now the well
known scenario of poisoning CPU functional units - the Branch Target
Buffer (BTB) and Return Address Predictor (RAP) in this case - and then
tricking the elevated privilege domain (the kernel) into leaking
sensitive data.
AMD CPUs predict RET instructions using a Return Address Predictor (aka
Return Address Stack/Return Stack Buffer). In some cases, a non-architectural
CALL instruction (i.e., an instruction predicted to be a CALL but is
not actually a CALL) can create an entry in the RAP which may be used
to predict the target of a subsequent RET instruction.
The specific circumstances that lead to this varies by microarchitecture
but the concern is that an attacker can mis-train the CPU BTB to predict
non-architectural CALL instructions in kernel space and use this to
control the speculative target of a subsequent kernel RET, potentially
leading to information disclosure via a speculative side-channel.
The issue is tracked under CVE-2023-20569.
Affected processors
-------------------
AMD Zen, generations 1-4. That is, all families 0x17 and 0x19. Older
processors have not been investigated.
System information and options
------------------------------
First of all, it is required that the latest microcode be loaded for
mitigations to be effective.
The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow
The possible values in this file are:
- 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
- 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no
microcode extending IBPB functionality
to address the vulnerability has been
applied.
- 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode
patch has been applied. It does not
address User->Kernel and Guest->Host
transitions protection but it does
address User->User and VM->VM attack
vectors.
(spec_rstack_overflow=microcode)
- 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements
the extended IBPB microcode patch
functionality by addressing User->Kernel
and Guest->Host transitions protection.
Selected by default or by
spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret
- 'Mitigation: IBPB' Similar protection as "safe RET" above
but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege
domain crossings (User->Kernel,
Guest->Host).
(spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb)
- 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider
scenario - the Guest->Host transitions
only.
(spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit)
In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to:
- gain local access on the machine
- break kASLR
- find gadgets in the running kernel in order to use them in the exploit
- potentially create and pin an additional workload on the sibling
thread, depending on the microarchitecture (not necessary on fam 0x19)
- run the exploit
Considering the performance implications of each mitigation type, the
default one is 'Mitigation: safe RET' which should take care of most
attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one.
As always, the user is advised to keep her/his system up-to-date by
applying software updates regularly.
The default setting will be reevaluated when needed and especially when
new attack vectors appear.
As one can surmise, 'Mitigation: safe RET' does come at the cost of some
performance depending on the workload. If one trusts her/his userspace
and does not want to suffer the performance impact, one can always
disable the mitigation with spec_rstack_overflow=off.
Similarly, 'Mitigation: IBPB' is another full mitigation type employing
an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required
microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at
a performance cost.
Mitigation: safe RET
--------------------
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

58
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
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@ -1597,6 +1597,26 @@
Format: off | on
default: on
gather_data_sampling=
[X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS)
mitigation.
Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which
allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was
previously stored in vector registers.
This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode.
The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be
disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation
disabling AVX serves as a mitigation.
force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without
microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode
mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in
userspace with buggy AVX enumeration.
off: Disable GDS mitigation.
gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for
kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via
debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded.
@ -3265,24 +3285,25 @@
Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
Equivalent to: if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
l1tf=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
no_entry_flush [PPC]
no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
nobp=0 [S390]
nopti [X86,PPC]
nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
retbleed=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
@ -5801,6 +5822,17 @@
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2_user=auto.
spec_rstack_overflow=
[X86] Control RAS overflow mitigation on AMD Zen CPUs
off - Disable mitigation
microcode - Enable microcode mitigation only
safe-ret - Enable sw-only safe RET mitigation (default)
ibpb - Enable mitigation by issuing IBPB on
kernel entry
ibpb-vmexit - Issue IBPB only on VMEXIT
(cloud-specific mitigation)
spec_store_bypass_disable=
[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)

2
Makefile
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 1
SUBLEVEL = 43
SUBLEVEL = 44
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Curry Ramen

3
arch/Kconfig
View File

@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED
config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED
bool
config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
bool
# Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section
config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK
bool

20
arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/*
* include/asm-alpha/bugs.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
/*
* I don't know of any alpha bugs yet.. Nice chip
*/
static void check_bugs(void)
{
}

1
arch/arm/Kconfig
View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config ARM
select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T
select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE if HAVE_KRETPROBES && FRAME_POINTER && !ARM_UNWIND
select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU
select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if MMU
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_WRITE_COMBINE if !ARM_DMA_MEM_BUFFERABLE

4
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1995-2003 Russell King
*/
#ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
@ -10,10 +8,8 @@
extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
extern void check_bugs(void);
extern void check_other_bugs(void);
#else
#define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
#endif

3
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ void check_other_bugs(void)
#endif
}
void __init check_bugs(void)
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
check_writebuffer_bugs();
check_other_bugs();

1
arch/ia64/Kconfig
View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ menu "Processor type and features"
config IA64
bool
select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_EXTRA_PHDRS
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_MARK_CLEAN
select ARCH_HAS_STRNCPY_FROM_USER
select ARCH_HAS_STRNLEN_USER

20
arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*
* Based on <asm-alpha/bugs.h>.
*
* Modified 1998, 1999, 2003
* David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@hpl.hp.com>, Hewlett-Packard Co.
*/
#ifndef _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H
#define _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H
#include <asm/processor.h>
extern void check_bugs (void);
#endif /* _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H */

3
arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c
View File

@ -1067,8 +1067,7 @@ cpu_init (void)
}
}
void __init
check_bugs (void)
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
ia64_patch_mckinley_e9((unsigned long) __start___mckinley_e9_bundles,
(unsigned long) __end___mckinley_e9_bundles);

1
arch/loongarch/Kconfig
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST

6
arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
@ -80,6 +81,11 @@ const char *get_system_type(void)
return "generic-loongson-machine";
}
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
alternative_instructions();
}
static const char *dmi_string_parse(const struct dmi_header *dm, u8 s)
{
const u8 *bp = ((u8 *) dm) + dm->length;

1
arch/m68k/Kconfig
View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config M68K
default y
select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T
select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU
select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT if HAS_DMA && MMU && !COLDFIRE
select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE if HAS_DMA

21
arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* include/asm-m68k/bugs.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
extern void check_bugs(void); /* in arch/m68k/kernel/setup.c */
#else
static void check_bugs(void)
{
}
#endif

3
arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ static int __init proc_hardware_init(void)
module_init(proc_hardware_init);
#endif
void check_bugs(void)
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_FPU) && !defined(CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU)
if (m68k_fputype == 0) {

1
arch/mips/Kconfig
View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config MIPS
default y
select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if !64BIT
select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE if MIPS_FP_SUPPORT
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER if !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if !64BIT
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE

17
arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,17 +1,11 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
#ifndef _ASM_BUGS_H
#define _ASM_BUGS_H
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
@ -30,17 +24,6 @@ static inline void check_bugs_early(void)
check_bugs64_early();
}
static inline void check_bugs(void)
{
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy;
check_bugs32();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64))
check_bugs64();
}
static inline int r4k_daddiu_bug(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64))

13
arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
View File

@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/screen_info.h>
@ -840,3 +842,14 @@ static int __init setnocoherentio(char *str)
}
early_param("nocoherentio", setnocoherentio);
#endif
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy;
check_bugs32();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64))
check_bugs64();
}

20
arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* include/asm-parisc/bugs.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1999 Mike Shaver
*/
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
#include <asm/processor.h>
static inline void check_bugs(void)
{
// identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
}

15
arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H
/*
*/
/*
* This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for
* architecture-dependent bugs.
*/
static inline void check_bugs(void) { }
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H */

1
arch/sh/Kconfig
View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config SUPERH
select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG if (GUSA_RB || CPU_SH4A)
select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT if !MMU
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL

74
arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __ASM_SH_BUGS_H
#define __ASM_SH_BUGS_H
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
/*
* I don't know of any Super-H bugs yet.
*/
#include <asm/processor.h>
extern void select_idle_routine(void);
static void __init check_bugs(void)
{
extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */
select_idle_routine();
current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
switch (current_cpu_data.family) {
case CPU_FAMILY_SH2:
*p++ = '2';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A:
*p++ = '2';
*p++ = 'a';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH3:
*p++ = '3';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4:
*p++ = '4';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A:
*p++ = '4';
*p++ = 'a';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP:
*p++ = '4';
*p++ = 'a';
*p++ = 'l';
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = 'd';
*p++ = 's';
*p++ = 'p';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN:
/*
* Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than
* default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine
* about unhandled enumerations.
*/
break;
}
printk("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(&current_cpu_data));
#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
/* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */
*p++ = 'e';
*p++ = 'b';
#endif
*p = '\0';
}
#endif /* __ASM_SH_BUGS_H */

2
arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h
View File

@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ extern unsigned int instruction_size(unsigned int insn);
#define instruction_size(insn) (2)
#endif
void select_idle_routine(void);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#include <asm/processor_32.h>

1
arch/sh/kernel/idle.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/bl_bit.h>

55
arch/sh/kernel/setup.c
View File

@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/mmzone.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/sparsemem.h>
#include <asm/platform_early.h>
@ -354,3 +355,57 @@ int test_mode_pin(int pin)
{
return sh_mv.mv_mode_pins() & pin;
}
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */
select_idle_routine();
current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
switch (current_cpu_data.family) {
case CPU_FAMILY_SH2:
*p++ = '2';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A:
*p++ = '2';
*p++ = 'a';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH3:
*p++ = '3';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4:
*p++ = '4';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A:
*p++ = '4';
*p++ = 'a';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP:
*p++ = '4';
*p++ = 'a';
*p++ = 'l';
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = 'd';
*p++ = 's';
*p++ = 'p';
break;
case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN:
/*
* Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than
* default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine
* about unhandled enumerations.
*/
break;
}
pr_info("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(&current_cpu_data));
#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
/* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */
*p++ = 'e';
*p++ = 'b';
#endif
*p = '\0';
}

1
arch/sparc/Kconfig
View File

@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config SPARC
config SPARC32
def_bool !64BIT
select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if !SMP
select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_CPU
select CLZ_TAB
select DMA_DIRECT_REMAP

18
arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* include/asm/bugs.h: Sparc probes for various bugs.
*
* Copyright (C) 1996, 2007 David S. Miller (davem@davemloft.net)
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC32
#include <asm/cpudata.h>
#endif
extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
static void __init check_bugs(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy;
#endif
}

7
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c
View File

@ -412,3 +412,10 @@ static int __init topology_init(void)
}
subsys_initcall(topology_init);
#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy;
}
#endif

1
arch/um/Kconfig
View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config UML
bool
default y
select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV

7
arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __UM_BUGS_H
#define __UM_BUGS_H
void check_bugs(void);
#endif

3
arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com)
*/
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
@ -426,7 +427,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
}
}
void __init check_bugs(void)
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
arch_check_bugs();
os_check_bugs();

27
arch/x86/Kconfig
View File

@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ config X86
select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if X86_64 && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE if !X86_PAE
@ -2512,6 +2513,13 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
performance.
config CPU_SRSO
bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
default y
help
Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
config SLS
bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
@ -2522,6 +2530,25 @@ config SLS
against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
larger.
config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
default n
help
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.
This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
break with this option set.
Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
If in doubt, say N.
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES

2
arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
extern void check_bugs(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
int ppro_with_ram_bug(void);
#else

7
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
View File

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
CPUID_7_EDX,
CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
};
#define X86_CAP_FMT_NUM "%d:%d"
@ -94,8 +95,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \
REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))
#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \
( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@ -118,8 +120,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \
DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))
#define cpu_has(c, bit) \
(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \

15
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
/*
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
#define NCAPINTS 21 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
* Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
@ -308,6 +308,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+20) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@ -423,6 +427,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (20*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
@ -464,5 +472,8 @@
#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
/* BUG word 2 */
#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

3
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
View File

@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK19 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
#define DISABLED_MASK20 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */

2
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
View File

@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ extern void fpu_reset_from_exception_fixup(void);
/* Boot, hotplug and resume */
extern void fpu__init_cpu(void);
extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void fpu__init_system(void);
extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void);
extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void);

9
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
View File

@ -17,6 +17,12 @@
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
#else
static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
extern u64 sme_me_mask;
@ -86,9 +92,6 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);
/*

12
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
View File

@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define PRED_CMD_SBPB BIT(7) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
#define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
@ -158,6 +159,15 @@
* Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
* Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL BIT(25) /*
* CPU is vulnerable to Gather
* Data Sampling (GDS) and
* has controls for mitigation.
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO BIT(26) /*
* CPU is not vulnerable to Gather
* Data Sampling (GDS).
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE BIT(21) /*
* IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR
@ -181,6 +191,8 @@
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) /* SRBDS support */
#define RTM_ALLOW BIT(1) /* TSX development mode */
#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */
#define GDS_MITG_DIS BIT(4) /* Disable GDS mitigation */
#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED BIT(5) /* GDS mitigation locked */
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175

18
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
View File

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
* eventually turn into it's own annotation.
*/
.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
#if (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
nop
#endif
@ -185,12 +185,18 @@
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
"call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
"call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
#endif
.endm
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
@ -206,6 +212,8 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
extern void entry_ibpb(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
@ -311,11 +319,11 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
: "memory");
}
extern u64 x86_pred_cmd;
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
}
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */

2
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
View File

@ -800,9 +800,11 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
#else
static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; }
static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void) { return 0; }
static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; }
#endif
#define for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base(function) \

3
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
View File

@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
#define REQUIRED_MASK20 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */

2
arch/x86/include/asm/sigframe.h
View File

@ -85,6 +85,4 @@ struct rt_sigframe_x32 {
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
void __init init_sigframe_size(void);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SIGFRAME_H */

19
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
View File

@ -1245,6 +1245,25 @@ u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_highest_perf);
bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
{
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
/* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
case 0x17:
return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
case 0x19:
/* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
default:
return false;
}
}
static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());

388
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
* - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
@ -27,8 +26,6 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@ -49,6 +46,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@ -58,6 +57,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
@ -124,21 +126,8 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
void __init check_bugs(void)
void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
/*
* identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
* core code know.
*/
cpu_smt_check_topology();
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
pr_info("CPU: ");
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
/*
* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
* have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
@ -175,39 +164,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
*
* - i386 is no longer supported.
* - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
* compiled for a i486.
*/
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
init_utsname()->machine[1] =
'0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
alternative_instructions();
fpu__init_check_bugs();
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
alternative_instructions();
/*
* Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
* There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
* MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
*
* Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
* very little benefit for that case.
*/
if (!direct_gbpages)
set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
#endif
gds_select_mitigation();
srso_select_mitigation();
}
/*
@ -693,6 +651,149 @@ static int __init l1d_flush_parse_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt
enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
#else
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
#endif
static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
[GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode",
[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
[GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
};
bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
{
return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
void update_gds_msr(void)
{
u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
u64 mcu_ctrl;
switch (gds_mitigation) {
case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS;
break;
case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED:
/*
* The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have
* the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all
* CPUs.
*/
case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
break;
case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
return;
};
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
/*
* Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to
* GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot
* processor was not.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after);
WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after);
}
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
{
u64 mcu_ctrl;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
goto out;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
/* No microcode */
if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
/*
* This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
* here rather than in update_gds_msr()
*/
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n");
} else {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
}
goto out;
}
/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n");
/*
* The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs
* _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked
* but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
* mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
* ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled.
*/
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
}
update_gds_msr();
out:
pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
}
static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
return 0;
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
return 0;
}
early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
@ -2207,6 +2308,165 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt
enum srso_mitigation {
SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
};
enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
SRSO_CMD_OFF,
SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
};
static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
};
static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF;
else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE;
else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
else
pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
return 0;
}
early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
#define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html for mitigation options."
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
bool has_microcode;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
goto pred_cmd;
/*
* The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
* for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
*/
has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
if (!has_microcode) {
pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
} else {
/*
* Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
* flags for guests.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
/*
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
*/
if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
(!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
}
if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
if (has_microcode) {
pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n");
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
goto pred_cmd;
}
}
switch (srso_cmd) {
case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
return;
case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
if (has_microcode) {
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
}
break;
case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
/*
* Enable the return thunk for generated code
* like ftrace, static_call, etc.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
else
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
goto pred_cmd;
}
break;
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
goto pred_cmd;
}
break;
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
goto pred_cmd;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode"));
pred_cmd:
if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
@ -2405,6 +2665,18 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
}
static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
(cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));
}
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@ -2454,6 +2726,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
return retbleed_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_GDS:
return gds_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_SRSO:
return srso_show_state(buf);
default:
break;
}
@ -2518,4 +2796,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO);
}
#endif

126
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
View File

@ -18,11 +18,15 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@ -58,7 +62,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
@ -1072,6 +1076,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021);
init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
init_speculation_control(c);
@ -1237,6 +1244,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define RETBLEED BIT(3)
/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
#define SMT_RSB BIT(4)
/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
#define SRSO BIT(5)
/* CPU is affected by GDS */
#define GDS BIT(6)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@ -1249,27 +1260,30 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
{}
};
@ -1390,6 +1404,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
/*
* Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
* an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
* disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
* which means that AVX will be disabled.
*/
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
}
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@ -1571,10 +1600,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
sld_setup(c);
fpu__init_system(c);
init_sigframe_size();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
@ -1957,6 +1982,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
update_srbds_msr();
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
update_gds_msr();
tsx_ap_init();
}
@ -2290,8 +2317,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
doublefault_init_cpu_tss();
fpu__init_cpu();
if (is_uv_system())
uv_cpu_init();
@ -2307,6 +2332,7 @@ void cpu_init_secondary(void)
*/
cpu_init_exception_handling();
cpu_init();
fpu__init_cpu();
}
#endif
@ -2369,3 +2395,69 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
/* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */
apic_smt_update();
}
void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
/*
* identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
* core code know.
*/
cpu_smt_check_topology();
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
pr_info("CPU: ");
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
cpu_select_mitigations();
arch_smt_update();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
/*
* Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer
* supported and fixup the utsname.
*/
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
init_utsname()->machine[1] =
'0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
}
/*
* Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear
* feature bits.
*/
fpu__init_system();
fpu__init_cpu();
alternative_instructions();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
/*
* Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
* There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
* MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
*
* Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
* very little benefit for that case.
*/
if (!direct_gbpages)
set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
} else {
fpu__init_check_bugs();
}
/*
* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
* must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
* hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
*/
mem_encrypt_init();
}

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
View File

@ -79,9 +79,11 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
void cpu_select_mitigations(void);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
extern void update_gds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);

8
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
View File

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void)
fpu__init_cpu_xstate();
}
static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
{
unsigned long cr0;
u16 fsw, fcw;
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f;
}
static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) &&
!test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) {
@ -211,10 +211,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_xstate_size_legacy(void)
* Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial
* FPU state that is later cloned into all processes:
*/
void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
void __init fpu__init_system(void)
{
fpstate_reset(&current->thread.fpu);
fpu__init_system_early_generic(c);
fpu__init_system_early_generic();
/*
* The FPU has to be operational for some of the

4
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
View File

@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
static unsigned long __ro_after_init max_frame_size;
static unsigned int __ro_after_init fpu_default_state_size;
void __init init_sigframe_size(void)
static int __init init_sigframe_size(void)
{
fpu_default_state_size = fpu__get_fpstate_size();
@ -736,7 +736,9 @@ void __init init_sigframe_size(void)
max_frame_size = round_up(max_frame_size, FRAME_ALIGNMENT);
pr_info("max sigframe size: %lu\n", max_frame_size);
return 0;
}
early_initcall(init_sigframe_size);
unsigned long get_sigframe_size(void)
{

32
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
View File

@ -133,7 +133,20 @@ SECTIONS
LOCK_TEXT
KPROBES_TEXT
ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
*(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain)
#endif
ENTRY_TEXT
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
/*
* See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s
* definition.
*/
. = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
*(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe)
#endif
ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
STATIC_CALL_TEXT
@ -141,13 +154,15 @@ SECTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
__indirect_thunk_start = .;
*(.text.__x86.*)
*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
*(.text.__x86.return_thunk)
__indirect_thunk_end = .;
#endif
} :text =0xcccc
/* End of text section, which should occupy whole number of pages */
_etext = .;
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
@ -492,6 +507,21 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
"fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned");
. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
/*
* GNU ld cannot do XOR so do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR
* of the two function addresses:
*/
. = ASSERT(((srso_untrain_ret_alias | srso_safe_ret_alias) -
(srso_untrain_ret_alias & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
"SRSO function pair won't alias");
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE

3
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
View File

@ -736,6 +736,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
F(PMM) | F(PMM_EN)
);
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
/*
* Hide RDTSCP and RDPID if either feature is reported as supported but
* probing MSR_TSC_AUX failed. This is purely a sanity check and

1
arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
[CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX},
[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 0, CPUID_EAX},
[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX},
};
/*

4
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
View File

@ -1485,7 +1485,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);

3
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
View File

@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
*/
UNTRAIN_RET
/* SRSO */
ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT
/*
* Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded

7
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
View File

@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void);
/*
* When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr.
* Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access.
@ -1613,7 +1615,7 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)
ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO)
static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
@ -1670,6 +1672,9 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
*/
}
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
return data;
}

83
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nops.h>
.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
@ -74,6 +75,46 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
/*
* srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at
* special addresses:
*
* - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned
* - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
* and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the
* srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared).
*
* This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch
* target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential
* poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted.
*
* As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
.section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain
SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
ASM_NOP2
lfence
jmp __x86_return_thunk
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
.section .text.__x86.rethunk_safe
#endif
/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */
SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
add $8, %_ASM_SP
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
#endif
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
.section .text.__x86.return_thunk
/*
@ -86,7 +127,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
* from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
*/
.align 64
.skip 63, 0xcc
.skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
/*
@ -118,10 +159,10 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
* evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
* which will be contained safely by the INT3.
*/
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ret
int3
SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
/*
* Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
@ -132,11 +173,45 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
* Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
* INT3 is for SLS protection.
*/
jmp __x86_return_thunk
jmp __ret
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
/*
* SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret()
* above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a
*
* movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax
*
* and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret()
* later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and
* thus a "safe" one to use.
*/
.align 64
.skip 64 - (srso_safe_ret - srso_untrain_ret), 0xcc
SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
.byte 0x48, 0xb8
SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
add $8, %_ASM_SP
ret
int3
int3
int3
lfence
call srso_safe_ret
int3
SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret)
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret)
SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk)
ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
"call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
int3
SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */

6
arch/x86/mm/init.c
View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <asm/pti.h>
#include <asm/text-patching.h>
#include <asm/memtype.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
/*
* We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c
@ -832,9 +833,12 @@ void __init poking_init(void)
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep;
poking_mm = copy_init_mm();
poking_mm = mm_alloc();
BUG_ON(!poking_mm);
/* Xen PV guests need the PGD to be pinned. */
paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(NULL, poking_mm);
/*
* Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page
* will be mapped at the same PMD. We need 2 pages, so find space for 3,

1
arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
View File

@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static void cpu_bringup(void)
cr4_init();
cpu_init();
fpu__init_cpu();
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
/* PVH runs in ring 0 and allows us to do native syscalls. Yay! */

18
arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
/*
* include/asm-xtensa/bugs.h
*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Xtensa processors don't have any bugs. :)
*
* This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
* Public License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of
* this archive for more details.
*/
#ifndef _XTENSA_BUGS_H
#define _XTENSA_BUGS_H
static void check_bugs(void) { }
#endif /* _XTENSA_BUGS_H */

16
drivers/base/cpu.c
View File

@ -577,6 +577,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@ -588,6 +600,8 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@ -601,6 +615,8 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr,
NULL
};

15
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
View File

@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first;
nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1;
nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1;
copy_count(skb) = 0;
XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->split_mask = 0;
@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
}
}
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots;
shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) {
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) {
index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++);
pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index];
xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp,
@ -476,12 +476,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
txp++;
}
if (frag_overflow) {
if (nr_slots > 0) {
shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb);
frags = shinfo->frags;
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow;
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots;
shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) {
index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++);
pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index];
@ -492,6 +492,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
}
skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb;
} else if (nskb) {
/* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed
* because enough slots were converted to copy ops above.
*/
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
(*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops;

11
include/asm-generic/bugs.h
View File

@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H
#define __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H
/*
* This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for
* architecture-dependent bugs.
*/
static inline void check_bugs(void) { }
#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H */

8
include/linux/cpu.h
View File

@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@ -187,6 +189,12 @@ void arch_cpu_idle_enter(void);
void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void);
void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void);
#else
static inline void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { }
#endif
int cpu_report_state(int cpu);
int cpu_check_up_prepare(int cpu);
void cpu_set_state_online(int cpu);

2
include/linux/sched/task.h
View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
void __noreturn do_task_dead(void);
void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr);
extern void mm_cache_init(void);
extern void proc_caches_init(void);
extern void fork_init(void);
@ -90,7 +91,6 @@ extern void exit_itimers(struct task_struct *);
extern pid_t kernel_clone(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs);
struct task_struct *create_io_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int node);
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);
struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void);
extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags);
extern pid_t user_mode_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags);
extern long kernel_wait4(pid_t, int __user *, int, struct rusage *);

21
init/main.c
View File

@ -96,7 +96,6 @@
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/rodata_test.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/kcsan.h>
#include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
@ -104,7 +103,6 @@
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@ -779,8 +777,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
}
#endif
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
@ -858,6 +854,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
/* Should be run after espfix64 is set up. */
pti_init();
kmsan_init_runtime();
mm_cache_init();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
@ -993,7 +990,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
sort_main_extable();
trap_init();
mm_init();
poking_init();
ftrace_init();
/* trace_printk can be enabled here */
@ -1082,14 +1079,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
*/
locking_selftest();
/*
* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed.
*/
mem_encrypt_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
@ -1106,6 +1095,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
late_time_init();
sched_clock_init();
calibrate_delay();
arch_cpu_finalize_init();
pid_idr_init();
anon_vma_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
@ -1132,9 +1124,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
taskstats_init_early();
delayacct_init();
poking_init();
check_bugs();
acpi_subsystem_init();
arch_post_acpi_subsys_init();
kcsan_init();

37
kernel/fork.c
View File

@ -2685,11 +2685,6 @@ struct task_struct * __init fork_idle(int cpu)
return task;
}
struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void)
{
return dup_mm(NULL, &init_mm);
}
/*
* This is like kernel_clone(), but shaved down and tailored to just
* creating io_uring workers. It returns a created task, or an error pointer.
@ -3110,10 +3105,27 @@ static void sighand_ctor(void *data)
init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh);
}
void __init proc_caches_init(void)
void __init mm_cache_init(void)
{
unsigned int mm_size;
/*
* The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is
* dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system
* can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids).
*/
mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size();
mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct",
mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
NULL);
}
void __init proc_caches_init(void)
{
sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache",
sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|
@ -3131,19 +3143,6 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
NULL);
/*
* The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is
* dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system
* can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids).
*/
mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size();
mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct",
mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
NULL);
vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK
vma_lock_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vma_lock, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);

2
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
* Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used

5
tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
View File

@ -796,5 +796,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym)
bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
{
return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk");
return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk") ||
!strcmp(sym->name, "srso_untrain_ret") ||
!strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret") ||
!strcmp(sym->name, "__ret");
}