x86/hyperv: Block root partition functionality in a Confidential VM
[ Upstream commit f8acb24aaf89fc46cd953229462ea8abe31b395f ] Hyper-V should never specify a VM that is a Confidential VM and also running in the root partition. Nonetheless, explicitly block such a combination to guard against a compromised Hyper-V maliciously trying to exploit root partition functionality in a Confidential VM to expose Confidential VM secrets. No known bug is being fixed, but the attack surface for Confidential VMs on Hyper-V is reduced. Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1678894453-95392-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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@ -291,12 +291,16 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
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* To mirror what Windows does we should extract CPU management
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* features and use the ReservedIdentityBit to detect if Linux is the
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* root partition. But that requires negotiating CPU management
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* interface (a process to be finalized).
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* interface (a process to be finalized). For now, use the privilege
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* flag as the indicator for running as root.
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*
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* For now, use the privilege flag as the indicator for running as
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* root.
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* Hyper-V should never specify running as root and as a Confidential
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* VM. But to protect against a compromised/malicious Hyper-V trying
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* to exploit root behavior to expose Confidential VM memory, ignore
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* the root partition setting if also a Confidential VM.
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*/
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if (cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES) & HV_CPU_MANAGEMENT) {
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if ((ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_CPU_MANAGEMENT) &&
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!(ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION)) {
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hv_root_partition = true;
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pr_info("Hyper-V: running as root partition\n");
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}
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