security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations
[ Upstream commit 2d7f105edbb3b2be5ffa4d833abbf9b6965e9ce7 ] If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via `capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message. Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them. Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is actually privileged. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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@ -977,14 +977,19 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
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ret = -EACCES;
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down_write(&key->sem);
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
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{
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bool is_privileged_op = false;
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/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
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if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
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goto error_put;
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is_privileged_op = true;
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/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
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* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
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if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
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is_privileged_op = true;
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if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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goto error_put;
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}
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@ -1084,7 +1089,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
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down_write(&key->sem);
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/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
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if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
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if (uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid()) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
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key->perm = perm;
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ret = 0;
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}
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